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ABSTRACT 
Nazya Fiaz 
A CONSTRUCTIVIST ACCOUNT OF PAKISTAN’S POLITICAL PRACTICE IN 
THE AFTERMATH OF 9/11 
The normalisation of Pakistan’s participation in the ‘war on terror’ 
Keywords:  Pakistan  -  9/11 - war on terror - constructivism - critical realist depth 
ontology - political discourse - social structure - causal agency - state practice
This research is concerned with Pakistan’s participation in the US-led ‘war on terror’ 
in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. The study seeks to 
explain how Pakistan’s state practice in the aftermath of 9/11 was normalised and 
made possible. In explaining the state practice, the study draws on a constructivist 
conceptual framework; which is further enhanced by incorporating key theoretical 
insights from critical realism.  
In the first instance, the study proposes that Pakistan’s participation in the ‘war on 
terror’, seen as a set of actions and practices, was an outcome of a specific domestic 
political discourse. This discourse enabled and legitimised the state’s alliance with 
the US and its abandonment of the Taliban regime. Secondly, the study is concerned 
with explaining why the particular discourse emerged in the shape and form that it 
did. In this context, the argument is that a depth ‘critical realist’ ontological inquiry 
can reveal underlying and enduring global and domestic social structural contexts, 
and traces of agential influence as connected to the discourse.
Consequently, this study conceptualises Pakistan’s actions in the context of the ‘war 
on terror’ as emerging from a multi-causal complex in which discourse, structure and 
agency are complicit.      
The study represents a departure from realist readings that emphasise a mono-causal 
relationship between the US and Pakistan. Instead, this research uses a synthesis of 
critical realism and constructivism to add a fresh perspective in terms of how we may 
conceptualise Pakistan’s political practice in this instance.  
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 1
Introduction 
1.1 The Research Setting 
On September 11, 2001, the United States was subjected to a ferocious terrorist 
attack on Washington DC and New York. In the years since these attacks it has 
become clear that September 11, 2001 (hereafter 9/11) had far-reaching 
consequences for world politics. In the first instance it signalled a decisive upgrading 
in US concerns regarding its national security and global ideological dominance. 
Furthermore, what is remarkable about this event is the way in which the ensuing 
commencement of the US-led global ‘war on terror’ was backed by an international 
coalition focussed in its opposition to the alleged instigators of the attacks i.e. the al-
Qaeda network and their Taliban hosts (Ali 2008). Countries constituting the 
‘Muslim world’ also vociferously condemned the attacks on the US and backed the 
‘war on terror’ including Pakistan. However, in contrast to other countries in the 
international community or even the ‘Muslim world’ the US-led ‘war on terror’ 
posed an enormous predicament for Pakistan. Indeed ‘the war’ was something that 
was to effectively transpire in its own backyard, and not somewhere distant and far 
from sight. Although US action was to focus on Afghanistan it is important to 
understand that Pakistan being an immediate neighbour has had a long-standing and 
close relationship with its neighbour; this relationship often oscillating between 
solidarity and aversion. Furthermore, it soon became clear that the US sought the co-
operation of Pakistan in order to launch its military operation in Afghanistan, and 
consequently Pakistan became a key player in the international coalition against al-
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Qaeda and the Taliban. On its part, the practice of becoming a ‘key player’ in the 
US-led ‘war on terror’ entailed significant policy reversals and shifts in Pakistan’s 
political discourse. Although the terrorist attacks on the US were condemned in 
Pakistan; nevertheless jumping from this condemnation to the concrete practice of 
co-operating with the US military strikes and presence in the region was not as 
straightforward as some analysts imply (see for e.g. Hadar 2002, Jones and Shaikh 
2006, Schaffer 2008). However, before this argument is developed further it would 
be useful to proceed to a general review of how the wider literature approaches the 
subject-area of 9/11 and where this study is located within the field.
There is no doubt that since 9/11 had such far-reaching consequences for world 
politics this prompted a plethora of literature and interest in the subject-area. 
Specifically within the academic literature the diversity of topics focussing on 9/11 
range from evaluating the morality and legality of the ‘war on terror’, the alleged 
operation of American global imperialism, the continued threat of Islamic terrorism, 
an interest in qualitative studies of the Taliban, and how 9/11 reproduces the 
discursive and material power of the US. What is remarkable about the bulk of this 
literature however is that much of this is centred on the analysis of America and the 
operation of its global power. If Pakistan does feature in the analysis then its state 
behaviour is unquestionably conceptualised in the context of US power. In contrast, 
this study differs from the current literature in that although its interest is also 
broadly concerned with the events in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks; its principal 
unit of analysis however is Pakistan within this quagmire. This interest stems 
primarily from the fact that although Pakistan became a hub of activity right from the 
onset of the US-led ‘war on terror’; there is a marked lack of depth and variety in the 
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academic discussion relating to Pakistan’s participation in the US-led ‘war on terror’. 
This monotony will be discussed below, but for the moment, it is important to note 
that Pakistan became involved in a range of political practices and reversals of 
official policy in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks. These political actions 
involved such things as the reversal of support for the Taliban and Pakistan’s 
simultaneous co-operation with the US in its military strikes within Afghan territory. 
In becoming a front-line state in the ‘war on terror’ Pakistan’s state practice was 
geared towards fulfilling the necessary political action required of this subject-
position. It is important to understand that from the perspective of this study political 
action is embedded in and often preceded by an enabling and constraining discourse 
which regulates the action. Thus, this study is most interested in understanding how 
Pakistan’s becoming a front-line state in the ‘war on terror’ was justified and 
normalised in the domestic sphere. This study thus offers an alternative account of 
why and how Pakistan became a front-line state by investigating the underlying 
discourses and structural contexts which propelled and facilitated political action. 
The changes in official policy and practice on the part of Pakistan form the central 
problematic of this study, and I am interested in why and how Pakistan was able to 
initiate and follow through with a public rethink in terms of foreign alliances and 
state policy. In short the question I ask is: how does a state bring about political 
practices that require a significant degree of reversal in long-standing official policy? 
One of the most dominant trends within the current literature has been to adopt a 
broadly neo-realist-inspired framework of analysis in accounting for official state 
practice in relation to Pakistan. What I mean is that, the analysis is often implicitly 
based on the notion that the external environment or the ‘international system’ 
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impinges on patterns of Pakistan’s state behaviour implying a deterministic logic. 
Specifically, I refer here to those studies that posit an unproblematic mono-casual 
and deterministic relationship between the United States as a world hegemon and 
Pakistan’s political practice. In these accounts, Pakistan’s political practice in the 
9/11 period is unproblematically ‘produced’ directly by an external environment in 
which the US is powerful. Indeed the vast bulk of the literature on Pakistan’s policy 
in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks simply reduces the ensuing policy and 
practice to the effects of a US superpower. 
The central argument of this study is that such mono-causal or reductionist accounts 
bring a misleading parsimony to a complex social reality. Whilst the existence of the 
US as a superpower is not denied here, nor its power to ‘effect’, nevertheless I want 
to argue that there is greater complexity involved in terms of the production of 
Pakistan’s policy and practice in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This 
study is concerned with exploring how the concrete realisation of a particular set of 
political actions involving Pakistan’s alliance with the US, and a reversal of support 
for the Taliban was made possible. Rather than tackling this question from a purely 
structuralist position, this thesis addresses the question from a specific theoretical 
approach which postulates that the concrete realisation of any political reality or 
large-scale public consensus requires discursive legitimisation. This theoretical 
approach, or what is widely known as social constructionism1 considers discourse as 

1Withinthewidersocialscientificliterature,ageneraldistinctionismadebetweenconstructionism
andconstructivism.ForinstanceBurr(2003),Wetheralletal.(2001a,2001b),Willig(1999),Cromby
andNightingale(1999)postulatethattheessentialdifferencebetweenconstructionismand
constructivismistwofold:intheextenttowhichtheindividualagentisseenasincontrolofthe
constructionprocessi.e.thatthesourceoftheconstructionisthepersonandtheextenttowhich
ourconstructionsareproductsofsocialforces(structuralandinteractional).Thus,constructivist
writingswithinthewiderbodyofsocialscientificliteraturearemorelikelytoviewagencyasactively
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powerfully productive of all social reality; it draws analytical attention to the 
deconstruction of discourse in order to ascertain how it enables and constrains the 
emergence of concrete thought and practice. The basic premise of a social 
constructionist theory is the idea that language is political in that it is constitutive of 
social reality and the site for the production and reproduction of both individual and 
collective subjectivity and identity. Within this framework of understanding, national 
identity as a concept is constituted in the social realm through discursive practices. 
This view is similar to the anti-essentialist theorisations of Benedict Anderson (1983) 
for whom national identity or ‘nation-ness….are cultural artefacts of a particular 
kind’, Anderson contends that ultimately nations are, ‘imagined communities’
unconnected to actual primordial considerations. Further still, identity is connected to 
outcomes or social practices. Thus the proposition is that national identity understood 
as a discursive phenomenon is dynamic and productive of national policy and 

engagedinsocialconstructionscoupledwiththenotionthateachpersonperceivestheworld
differentlyandcreatestheirown‘meanings’fromtheeventsaroundthem(seeVonGlasersfeld1995
foraclassicconstructivistposition).Importantlysinceconstructionislocatedatthelevelofagency;
thereforeconstructivistslimittheiranalysistotheperson.Discursivepsychologyforinstancelimits
itsdiscourseanalysistotheimmediatecontextwithinwhichtheinteractiontakesplaceandfocuses
analyticalattentiononthewayinwhichparticipantsactivelychooseinterpretativerepertoiresto
buildmeaning(seePotter1996,PotterandWetherell1987).Incontrast,socialconstructionism(or
whatistermedasa‘macro’constructionistpositionbyBurr2003)focuseslessattentiononactive
agencyandaffordslittlepowertothatagencyinsteadlocatingtheconstructionormeaningmaking
processasanoutcomeofexternalsocialforces(bothlinguisticandstructural).Inthissense
Foucault’swritingsconcerningtheregulatorypowersofdiscursivestructuresandtheirimpactona
docileagencymaybeseeninthismould.
WithintheIRliteraturehowever,approachestakingthislatterpositionhavebeenvaryinglytermed
as‘poststructuralist’positions.Furthermore,ratherconfusinglytheterm‘constructivism’as
employedwithinthefieldofIRimpliessomethingaltogetherdifferentwhenjuxtaposedtoitsusein
thewidersocialsciences.ConstructivismasemployedwithinIRisdefinedasacriticalapproachthat
incorporatesanalyticalattentiononthedialectbetweenlanguage/discourse,agency,andstructure
intheproductionofworldpolitics(see:Onuf1989,Wendt1999,Adler1997,ReusSmit2009).
ConstructivistsinIRarekeentodistinguishthemselvesfromapproachesthatanalyticallyand
theoreticallyprioritisediscourseandlanguageintheproductionofsociallifewithoutasimultaneous
inclusionofagencyandstructureinanalysis.WriterswhoanalyticallyprioritisediscourseinIR
studies(suchasCampbell1992,Doty1993,1996,Ashley1989)areoftenlumpedtogetherand
describedas‘poststructuralists’withinthewiderIRliterature.PoststructuralistapproachesinIRare
thusdefinedasthosecriticalperspectivesthatdealwithinterpretationandrepresentationin
internationalpoliticsanddistinguishedfromconstructivists(Onuf1989,Wendt1992).
6



practice (see Hansen 2006).  The present study draws on such a social constructionist 
theory2 in conceptualising state practice in Pakistan in the aftermath of 9/11. 
Within the wider literature, many IR analysts have begun to take up a broad social 
constructionist theoretical framework to explain patterns of state behaviour. This 
broad critical theoretical framework has been used by some writers to analyse 
specific patterns of state practice, most notably those of the US (See Doty 1993, 
Campbell 1992, and Jackson 2005). In particular, Jackson (2005) has employed a 
broadly social constructionist approach to analysing the way in which specific 
discursive constructions within domestic political space in the US imposed 
‘meaning’ to the extent that US military action in the aftermath of 9/11 was 
normalised and legitimised. Jackson’s main contention is that large scale social 
consensus, such as going to war, requires much discursive work in order to enable 
the practice3. However, in terms of the available IR literature on Pakistan it is notable 
that analysts have not really taken up a such a critical linguistic or discursive

2Inlieuofthecommentsinfootnote1,itisthusnecessarytoclearlyclarifytheworkingdefinitionof
eachtermasemployedwithinthisstudy.Inthefirstinstance,thestudywillemploytheumbrella
term‘socialconstructionism’torefertothebroadercriticaltheorythatbringstoattentionthe
centralityofdiscourseandrepresentationtotheproductionofsociallifeingeneral.Secondly,
referencesto‘constructivism’referstothatbodyofworkinIRwhichalthoughsignificantlyinspired
bythebroadertheorydiscussedabove;neverthelessvaryinglycombinesafocusondiscoursewith
anappreciationoftheroleofagencyandstructureintheorizationsofthepoliticalworld.Lastly,
followingthedominanttrendwithinthecurrentIRliteraturetheterm‘poststructuralism’refersto
thosevariedapproaches(whichincludeperspectivessuchaspostcolonialism,feminism,
Foucauldiananalysisandthelike)whichnotablyexcludeasubstantialanalysisofagencyand
materialstructuresintheirtheorizations.Itmustbenotedthatthosetermed‘poststructuralists’may
notpositionthemselvesunderthislabel;neverthelessitisnotablethatmostIRstudiesdescribea
varietyofapproachesaspoststructuralistiftheirprimaryroleistodeconstructdiscourseinworld
politicswithoutafocusonmaterialandsocialstructureandtheroleofanactiveagency.
3ToafarlesserextentColletandNajem’s(2005)paperalsolooksathowaspecificdiscourse
articulatedbytheBushadministrationintheaftermathofthe9/11attackswasproductiveofthe
categoriesof‘them’and‘us’.
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analysis of Pakistan’s policy and practice either prior to, or indeed, following 9/114.
It is precisely this gap in the literature that this study will help to fill in seeking to 
contribute by bringing more depth, nuance and understanding; particularly in terms 
of how Pakistan’s political elite was able to construct a wide-scale consensus in 
relation to reversing support for the Taliban and a simultaneous co-operation with the 
US.
Before proceeding to discussing the hypothesis and the research questions guiding 
this study, it is important to qualify that the particular strand of social 
constructionism adhered to in this project is, best described as, ‘constructivism’. 
Although I flesh out this approach in more detail in chapter four, it is important to 
immediately note that, some perspectives5 drawing on a broader critical theory of 
discourse, and particularly those termed as poststructuralist perspectives6 in the wider 
IR literature imply a strong relativism i.e. that all social reality is seen as singularly 
connected to discourse. The extent of this relativism is such that it leads to a 
reductionist account of social reality much like the economic reductionism of classic 
Marxism. In this sense, both realism and poststructuralism within the field of 
international relations share a similarity in that, in different ways, they each posit the 
validity of singular variables as causally connected to an emergent political reality 
i.e. either the external environment or discourse as the single determining link 

4Seefootnote8.
5Socialconstructionistapproachesthatprioritisediscourseasthesinglemostimportantfactor
productiveofsociallifearealsoreferredtointhebroaderIRliteratureas‘poststructuralist’
perspectives(seeDunneetal.2007).Thisstudymakesadistinctionbetweenpoststructuralismand
theconstructivistapproachtakenbythisstudy.Refertofootnotes1and2.
6Refertofootnotes1and2.
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producing state practice7. Whilst this study does not seek to negate these approaches 
to explaining state behaviour, the issue here is the lack of analytical depth. In many 
ways, these frameworks of understanding are rigid and encourage theoretical closure 
since they fail to incorporate other variables that may also impact how a specific 
political reality is produced. For instance, poststructuralist approaches often fail to 
comprehensively appreciate wider social and material contexts as having a causal 
impact on social constructions. In a similar way, realist approaches tend to ignore the 
way in which discourse has an impact on behavioural outcomes. However, it is 
conceded that some level of theoretical closure is common to all theoretical 
approaches. Nevertheless, the argument here is that a constructivist paradigm 
drawing on critical realist insights produces a theoretical framework that is better 
placed in terms of explaining the production of a complex social reality such as 
Pakistan’s political space in the aftermath of 9/11; particularly since it is able to 
incorporate a multi-causal analysis. This framework moves away from the 
reductionism inherent in many poststructuralist approaches. The specifics of this 
theoretical approach will be thoroughly discussed in a later chapter.
1.2 Research Questions and Hypothesis 
Where this study differs from previous explanatory attempts is the specific way it 
engages with explaining why and how political practice in Pakistan emerged in the 
shape that it did. As noted, the investigation is broadly influenced by social 

7Asecondcommonfeatureofbothtrendsistheiradherencetoempiricalrealismi.e.onlythat
whichisobservableis‘real’andsignificant.Althoughstrictlyspeakingpoststructuralismmovesaway
fromempiricistunderstandingsofknowledge;neverthelessitscriticalapproachisoftenempirical
usingarchives,textualdata,contentanalysis,andthelikeasevidenceinunderstandingthe
relationshipbetweenlanguageandknowledge/power.Thetheoreticalapproachadoptedbythis
studydrawsinsightfromcriticalrealistthoughtforwhomempiricism,thoughimportant,is
neverthelessnotanoverridingcriterionfordetermininghowsocialrealityisproduced.
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constructionist theory which postulates the notion that language and more generally 
‘discourse’ creates the conditions for practice. Thus, the proposition is that Pakistan’s 
political practice in the post-9/11 period was produced by a specific political 
discourse that normalised particular practices. This in itself is a different way of 
exploring Pakistan’s foreign and domestic policy space8. It is necessary to therefore, 
clearly establish that in this respect this study conceives all social practice including 
Pakistan’s political practice as being enabled and constrained by circulating 
discourses. However, explaining political practice as an outcome of specific 
discourses provides a partial answer to the question of what produces political action. 
As suggested, stopping analysis at this point would draw reductionist conclusions. 
Instead whilst this study concedes that discourses are critically productive and 
constitute political practice thus warranting analytical attention; there is also an 
acknowledgement, that discourses are themselves embedded in specific antecedent 
social structures. This implies that we cannot conceptualise discourse as ‘free-
floating’ or emerging from a vacuum of nothingness, but instead their specific shape 
and form is deeply connected to their contexts of emergence. In furthering this 
enquiry into what drives, shapes and produces political practice this study is drawn to 
a critical realist theoretical approach; which is able to incorporate and allow for a 
multi-causal explanatory framework by drawing attention to the productive powers 
of deeply embedded social structures. The overall theoretical framework advanced 
here is one in which the constructivist paradigm is further enhanced by incorporating 
critical realist theoretical insights which will allow for a rigorous investigation into 

8Theonlyworktodatethatexamines‘discourses’asitsprincipalunitofanalysisisthatofHaider
Nizamani(2000).Nizamanioffersa limitedattemptata‘discourseanalysis’ofnuclearnarrativesin
Pakistaninordertoshowhowdominantdiscursivecategoriesandconcepts‘framed’understandings
andworldviewsinthroughwhichtheactivepursuitofnuclearweaponsbyPakistanwasnormalised
withinthepoliticaleliteandthepublicdomain.AsfarasIamaware,Nizamani’swork,though
limited,istheonlycontributiontodatethatoffersadeconstructionofstatediscourseinPakistan.
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the production of Pakistan’s political practice in the aftermath of 9/11. In short, this 
study is interested in how such a political reality was made possible. It would be 
useful here to refer to the underlying hypothesis guiding the project: 
Pakistan’s co-operation with the United States in the aftermath of 9/11 was co-
constituted by underlying social structures and political discourse in Pakistan. 
Let us first briefly examine what this hypothesis is NOT saying in order to bring into 
sharper focus what it IS saying. Firstly, the hypothesis does not indicate that 
Pakistan’s political practice was a direct result of US dictates, and secondly the 
hypothesis does not specify that a deconstruction of political discursive space holds 
the ‘key’ to explaining why specific political action was realised. Instead, the 
emphasis is on both ‘discourses’ and ‘structures’. Within the social sciences, the 
structure/agency (discourse) debate is extensive and contentious; it is not possible to 
rehearse this in the present introductory chapter; rather, the way that this study 
conceptualises the dialect between structure/agency (discourse) will be addressed 
more thoroughly in chapter four. However, in this respect it is important to establish 
that the hypothesis emerges from a specific theoretical orientation, as is evident in 
the twin focus the hypothesis proposes, and which will be subject to a full scrutiny.  
However, for the moment we should note that in the first instance there is emphasis 
on a close exploration of political discursive space. Discourse9 in this sense, is seen 

9Inthecontextofthisstudytheuseoftheterm‘discourse’isrestrictedtoprimarilylinguisticacts
andisclosertothewayinwhichthetermisusedwithinconstructivistapproachesinIR.This
restrictionisanalyticallyusefulinthatitallowsforaseparationtobemadebetween
language/discourseandconcretepractice.Inthiscontextdiscourseisconceptualizedassomething
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as ‘productive’ in an enabling and constraining fashion so that world-views10 put 
forward are seen as inextricably linked to action outcomes. The specific discursive 
space to be focussed on is, Pakistan’s political discourse in the aftermath of 9/11. 
This study conceptualises political practices such as a rebuffing of the Taliban, the 
Pakistan-US alliance and even the political engagement with India as an effect of 
discourse. In short, the thesis examines how the discourses’ ‘regime of truth’ 
normalises and legitimises these practices. Secondly, the hypothesis identifies further 
‘variables’ involved in the production of Pakistan’s political practice, namely the role 
of structure and agency. In important ways, this is the point at which the current 
study parts ways with a wholly poststructuralist analysis, and seeks to incorporate an 
appreciation of the extent of the role of extra-discursive11 social structures in the 
enactment of Pakistan’s political reality. The hypothesis signals an appreciation of 
wider social contexts thus drawing attention to the impingement of deeply embedded 
social structures on discursive space. Overall, the hypothesis postulates that 
discourse is productive of political action; however, simultaneously it is important to 
analyse the extent to which social contexts, such as the specific domestic power set-

whichcreatestheconditionsforpractice.Thisrestricteduseoftheterm‘discourse’maybe
comparedtoanddistinguishedfromthebroaderFoucauldianuseinwhichdiscourseisusedtorefer
tobothlinguisticactsandactualpractices.DespitethisdistinctionfromFoucault’suseoftheterm
‘discourse’,itisimportanttonotethatthestudydrawssignificantinspirationfromFoucault’swork
ontheregulatoryandproductivepowersofdiscoursesandtheneedtointerrogatediscourse.
10Theterm‘worldview’isdefinedhereasreferringtoadistinctwayofthinkingaboutand
understandingtheworldaroundus.Aworldviewisitselfbasedonspecificbeliefswhichaffectthe
wayinwhichaspectsofthesocialworldareperceivedandgivenmeaning.
11Inthecontextofthisstudytheterm‘extradiscursive’isusedtorefertomaterial,socialand
discursivestructuresthatpreexistanyoneperson’sentryintotheworld.Theterm‘extradiscursive’
isusedtoclarifythatalthoughsomestructuresmaytoalargeextentbediscursiveconstructsi.e.in
thattheyareconstructed,reproducedandmaintainedbydiscourse(suchasthestructuresof
capitalism,patriarchy,realism)nevertheless,oncesetup,theyimpingebyenablingandconstraining
furthersocialconstructions.Inessencetheyrepresentantecedentandpreexistingcontexts(evenif
theyrelyondiscoursefortheirexistence).Thisunderstandingdoesnotimplythatthe‘structure’in
questionisnondiscursiveornotdependentondiscourseratherinthecontextofthisstudy‘extra
discursive’structuresreferstothosestructures(discursiveandmaterial)thatpreexist,arerelatively
enduringandmaybeunobservable;neverthelessthestructureshave‘powereffects’intermsof
influenceonrelativediscursiveconstructions.Itisusefultoanalyticallyconceptualisethese
structuresas‘extradiscursive’inordertostudytheextentoftheirimpactandinfluenceon
contemporarysocialconstructions.
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up or a global hierarchy, impacts in terms of limiting the array of discursive choices 
that can be made. This position does not reject the power and significance of 
discourse but is indicative of an approach that recognises the idea that discourse is 
not free-flowing or unhindered. Rather, social contexts and structures are powerfully 
productive in terms of allowing and limiting the array of choices available.   
The research questions flowing from this hypothesis are listed below: 
 How does the official political language construct the Pakistani Self in the 
aftermath of 9/11? Is there an identifiable discourse?  
 What is the impact of discursive constructions in terms of the subject-position 
it offers to the Self? 
 What are the extra-discursive conditions that need to exist in order for this 
discourse to emerge in its present form?  
 How do underlying structural conditions affect the kind of political 
constructions that are able to emerge?  
 How do these constructions affect political space? 
This enquiry begins by placing at ‘centre stage’ Pakistan’s official practice in the 
aftermath of 9/11. The principal argument proceeds along the lines that the practice 
was not unproblematic but is linked to specific discursive formations and is 
simultaneously ‘effected’ by deep social structures. In a nutshell, the objective of this 
research is to identify ‘what’ produces the concrete political practice we witness. In 
this respect, the main academic contribution of this project relates to advancing the 
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literature on Pakistan’s official state practice; on a second note, in a more limited 
fashion, the thesis also seeks to contribute to the broader study of state practice in 
world politics. In particular, the study helps to fill an important gap in the current 
literature on Pakistan, which tends to be dominated implicitly and explicitly by a 
realist framework of analysis. The vast body of literature on Pakistan’s domestic and 
foreign policy, and practice takes unproblematically the idea that Pakistan (like all 
other states) is suspended in an external anarchical world environment in which a 
global power hierarchy determines patterns of behaviour. Whilst the purpose here is 
certainly not to propose the irrelevance of such realist theories and the studies they 
spawn; it is necessary to point out that the dominance of one theoretical approach has 
the effect that it brings into focus only some aspects of a specific socio-political 
reality. However, such limitation is not exclusive to realism indeed all theoretical 
approaches are ultimately limited in one way or the other owing to their specific 
ontological and epistemological positions. Nevertheless, the point here is that the 
frequent application of realism as the dominant framework of understanding in the 
Pakistani context has resulted in stifling variety and new avenues both in exploration 
and explanation. The purpose of this thesis is not to engage in proposing an 
alternative theoretical approach on par with realism, but to add to the existing 
literature, by adopting a theoretical framework that is able to bring into focus those 
aspects and facets of the enactment of Pakistan’s behaviour in the aftermath of 9/11 
that have, to-date, been overlooked by analysts.
Concisely then and in order to offer a plausible answer to the question, ‘how was 
Pakistan’s practice and political action made possible?’ the theoretical orientation 
advanced here explores discourse on the one hand. On the other hand, its critical 
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realist focus simultaneously incorporates an identification of depth ontological 
structures that are also implicated in the production of all political practice. The 
theoretical approach of this study to Pakistan’s state practice following 9/11 is a 
novel way of examining the subject-matter, and consequently will bring to the fore 
aspects and nuances involved in the unfolding of social practice. It is significant to 
establish at the outset that, this particular theoretical approach and its application in 
this study of Pakistan’s political practice is the over-riding and distinctive feature of 
this thesis. The underlying justification of the study is precisely this: that the 
particular theoretical application or the theoretical lens employed here in the study of 
Pakistan in the post 9/11 era has the ability to deepen our understanding of Pakistan’s 
behaviour in the time-period under scrutiny. This study engages with various causal 
connections such as discourse, agency, and unobservable social structures which are 
conceived here as ‘productive’ in relation to state practice. The underlying argument 
of this thesis is that discursive constructions emerging from specific social contexts 
and structures opened space within Pakistan’s domestic sphere to allow for the kind 
of political manoeuvre witnessed in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.  
1.2 Research Design 
It would be useful at this point to briefly discuss the overall research design adopted 
by this study, in order to thoroughly explore the hypothesis. In the first instance, it is 
notable that a significant part of this project involves the deconstruction of a 
particular discursive space. An important question in this regard relates to 
methodology since ‘discourse analysis’ is a rather messy, unbounded and limitless 
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affair. The discussion here will begin by concisely detailing how this project views 
its engagement with a discourse analysis inquiry. In a research project, such as this 
one, there is the question of whether ‘data’ should include only official texts or 
whether the net should be cast much wider to include media texts or opposition 
discourse? Moreover how many separate texts should one analyse? Indeed, the entire 
research process comprises of such choices and therefore it is important to think 
through the kind of research design that will best address the research inquiry. 
Although making choices between multiple options necessarily limits analysis 
nevertheless, it is a necessary component of focused research. 
In terms of exploring the realisation of Pakistan’s political practice and policy in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, I work with a selective discursive data-set 
which consists of unedited texts officially articulated by the government of 
Pakistan12. Since discursive material is limitless it is important to clearly set such 
benchmarks in terms of the specific discursive material one intends to explore, and 
why this space is given precedence over alternative discursive material. 
Consequently keeping in mind the hypothesis and research question this study will 
focus exclusively on official political discourse in Pakistan. The primary justification 
for the exclusive focus on official texts is premised on the realisation that political 
leaders in Pakistan have historically enjoyed significant social power in terms of the 
proliferation of representations in Pakistani society. On the whole, decision-making 

12Itisimportanttonotethatintheeightyearsfollowingthe9/11attacksPresidentPervaiz
MusharrafremainedtheheadofstateinPakistan.Musharrafwasalsooneofthemostvocal
supportersofthe‘waronterror’.ConsequentlyPakistan’spoliticaldiscourseintheaftermathof
9/11andintheensuingeightyearswasdominatedbyMusharrafandthereforeitisinevitablethat
thediscursivedatasetissomewhattilted(thoughnotexclusively)towardsananalysisof
Musharraf’sspeechesandstatements.However,itisessentialtoestablishthatthishasnotbeena
deliberatestrategybutmerelyreflectsthesourceofthediscursivearticulationinPakistanipoliticsin
theaftermathof9/11.
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power and the power to ‘frame’ issues in Pakistan has been concentrated in the hands 
of the ruling elite which has for many reasons been dominated by a political elite 
having military links; in Pakistan it is the military which holds real political power 
and the power to construct representations. Since political discourse, or elite 
discourse in Pakistan, is the key player in relation to the ‘construction of social 
reality’ exploring this discourse is necessary to this study. It is useful in this context 
to conceptualise the political elite in Pakistan as comprising an ‘epistemic 
community’13. It could be argued, that members of Pakistan’s ruling elite share a 
common style of thinking (an episteme) by virtue of their association with the 
military institution14. Of course, Pakistan’s military evolved into an epistemic 
community owing to peculiar and specific conditions most prominently the existence 
of a deep sense of insecurity that infested the Pakistani state after its birth in 1947. 
Historically then, political elites have been critical to defining and representing both 
the Self and the Other(s) in Pakistan and thus structuring political practice. However, 
Pakistan’s epistemic community is more than a depository of knowledge since it 
wields significant social power15. The consequence being that the military’s ‘regime 
of truth’ has historically dominated social space resulting in a Gramscian hegemony 
in which particular narratives, representations and world-views are privileged over 
alternative representations. Indeed political elites have historically enjoyed more or 
less complete monopolisation of communicative events and allowed little space for 

13PeterM.Haasin‘Introduction:EpistemicCommunitiesandInternationalCooperation’in
InternationalOrganisation(1992)46.1:136describesanepistemiccommunityasanetworkof
professionals/expertswhosememberssharesimilarbeliefsandhavefaithinthe‘verityand
applicabilityofparticularformsofknowledgeorspecifictruths–athoughcollective–asociological
groupwithacommonstyleofthinking’.
14Seediscussionin6.2andparticularlypp:28081.
15VanDijk’s(2001)CriticalDiscourseAnalysis’approachdefinessocialpowerasrestingonaccessto
wealth,privilegeorincomecoupledwithspecialaccesstovariousformsorcontextsofdiscourse.In
termsofaccesstowealthSiddiqua(2005)inarecentbook‘MilitaryInc.’documentsthemilitary’s
intimatelinkstoand,vestedinterestsinPakistan’seconomy.Accesstosuchwealthandincomeisan
importantsourceofsocialpower.
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the articulation of counter-discourses to be heard. Until relatively recently, Pakistan 
had only one state run television channel and limited access to the internet; arguably 
in such an environment where alternative discourses are silenced and marginalised it 
becomes comparatively easier for a powerful epistemic community to legitimise 
particular knowledge claims and representations. 16 However, this is not to suggest 
that oppositional and counter-discourses are non-existent, rather the decision to 
analyse official discourse was a conscious step signalling that although counter-
discourses existed during the time-frame under consideration; nevertheless the 
‘airtime’ they received was limited. Instead, a hegemonic official discourse was 
aggressively and pervasively articulated within Pakistan.  
Having identified the discursive space to be investigated, there are further questions 
related to style of engagement which can either be textual in its orientation or more 
Foucauldian inspired. Keeping in mind the research questions, it is necessary to 
qualify that this project is far less interested in a textual analysis or the nature and 
sequencing of activities in talk; instead the analysis is far more interested in modes of 
representation reflecting a Foucauldian approach to discourse analysis17. This 
approach focuses on situating language beyond immediate and local contexts by 
locating it in a broader field of text allowing for an appreciation of concepts such as 
ideology and power differences.  Moreover, a Foucauldian discourse analysis also 
draws attention to the notion of subject-positions offered by constructions; thus 
which world-views do particular constructions allow, promote and legitimise, and 

16ForanexcellenthistoricalstudyofPakistan’sschoolcurriculaandthekindofrepresentations
articulated,seeSaigol(2005).
17Textualanalysisismorecommoninthefieldofdiscursivepsychology.Howeveratextualmethod
hasalsobeenadoptedbyFairclough,N(2003)‘AnalysingDiscourse:textualanalysisforsocial
research’,Routledge,London.Faircloughanalysesthepoliticsof‘newLabour’inBritishpolitics.
18



subsequently which subject-positions are constrained and disallowed. These 
questions and explorations are essential in terms of subsequent analysis which seeks 
to account for Pakistan’s political practice.
Limiting analysis to official political discourse does not imply a reduction in the 
quantity of potential data material rather, official sources produce an abundance of 
discursive data. In order to address this issue, and to ensure that a systematic and 
valid method of engagement with discursive themes in the data is enabled, this study 
takes its lead from a grounded theory method. A grounded theory approach suggests 
that the researcher should cease to analyse only when new data consistently does not 
offer anything new in relation to what has already been identified. This seems a 
convincing and analytically rigorous approach to take and ensures the fulfilment of 
quality and validity requirements. Moreover, it is important clarify at the outset that 
despite taking a deconstructive approach to discourse it is not possible, given the 
confines of this limited study, to extensively quote and explicitly analyse all of the 
texts consulted throughout this study. The approach to discourse is broadly 
Foucauldian and therefore the study analyses a variety of texts from official sources 
to build a general picture of what is being represented and to confirm or discard 
emergent themes. The nature of discourse study is such that often a large number of 
texts are examined in order to understand the overall representations being 
articulated. However, in practicality the entirety of these texts cannot be included 
within the thesis. Therefore, although a wide range of texts have been consulted to 
ensure that relevant themes in the political discourse have been identified; it is 
important to note that it is not possible to relate here the entirety of the data. 
Furthermore, this study makes no claim to being able to collect all possible data 
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material; nevertheless, the material selected will cover enough to provide the 
dominant narratives and relevant examples for specific points made in the study. 
Having identified discursive constructions in Pakistan’s political discourse, this study 
does not offer a historical genealogy along the lines of Foucault in terms of exploring 
the discursive histories of the concepts identified in the data. Foucault (1961, 1977) 
for instance, conducted genealogies of the concept of madness and the prison system. 
Instead, the critical realist theoretical position of this research gives analytical 
primacy18 to an exploration of the ‘depth ontology’ underlying the identifiable 
discourse (Delanty 2005). This means that a considerable part of the study will 
employ a transcendental argumentation19 to conceptualise social structures and 
contexts, which although not immediately given in experience, may still be 
connected to the constitution of political reality and subsequent political practice in 
Pakistan20. From a critical realist point of view, the discourse is embedded within 
depth structures and mechanisms. This twofold exploration will provide for a more 
plausible explanatory account of Pakistan’s political practice after 2001. 
Consequently, the overall design of this research project is more geared towards 
provided a ‘snapshot’ of political reality in Pakistan as opposed to providing a 
historical-comparative account that traces qualitative changes over a longer period of 

18Itmustbenotedthatacriticalrealistpositiondoesnotexplicitlyrejecttheusefulnessof
Foucauldiangenealogiesratheritsanalyticalprimacylieselsewhere.
19Atranscendentalargumentationgoesbeyondtheempiricalobservablerealmandseekstoclarify
thebasicprerequisitesorconditionsforsocialaction.Theterm‘conditions’referstothose
circumstanceswithoutwhichtheactioncannotexistfurtherthismayinvolvetheorisationsof
unobservablestructuresandmechanisms.Atranscendentalphilosophyisstronglyopposedbythe
empiricismwhichmaintainsthenotionthatvalidknowledgeisonlythatwhichisimmediately
observedorexperienced.Bhaskar’scriticalrealismisextremelycriticalofthisempiricistargument
whichreduces‘knowledge’toonlythatwhichisdirectlygiveninobservation.Foraveryreadable
introductiontotranscendentalargumentationseeDanermarketal.(2002:9698)
20Theprecisecriticalrealistmethodologyemployedtoidentifyoften(unobservable)social
structureswillbedetailedinchapterfour.
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time. This study of ‘one moment’ has the advantage that it focuses the entire analysis 
on exploring this moment of intense political concern.  
1.4 Organisation of thesis 
This research project has been designed to fully explore the hypothesis and related 
research questions. The thesis is organised in the following way: following this 
introductory chapter, the study will proceed to a two-stage review of the relevant 
literature in order to provide background contextualisation in relation to the theory 
and the subject-area of this thesis. In the first instance, chapter two will examine the 
dominant theoretical frameworks employed within the field of international relations 
in order to place into sharper focus the specific approach of this study. Similarly 
chapter three will seek to provide a background contextualisation of the ‘problem-
field’ by considering the main historical contours of Pakistan’s political discourse 
coupled with a general analysis of the wider environment of Pakistan’s existence. In 
this context, the review seeks to also make a critical appraisal of the current literature 
as it relates to Pakistan in the post-9/11 era and simultaneously clarify the gaps in 
current knowledge.  Chapter four is very extensive and covers the theoretical and 
conceptual frameworks from which this study emerges and which provide the 
‘steering force’ in terms of guiding and informing the entire research process. In this 
respect the discussion will begin by examining the philosophical approach of social 
constructionism proceeding to a clarification of the ways in which the social 
constructionist theory stance taken by this thesis is qualified. The central argument 
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will focus on a number of key critical realist insights that conceptualise the stratified 
nature of reality and consequently can offer a more holistic social explanation.  
Chapter five consists of a discursive analysis of Pakistan’s official political 
discourse. The discursive chapter is concerned with a fine-tuned reading of textual 
data and an identification of themes that are repeatedly emphasised, and the 
discursive strategies employed to reinforce these themes. The purpose of this chapter 
is to investigate the specific constructions and representations constitutive of 
Pakistan’s political discourse in the aftermath of 9/11, and to discern how this space 
is linked to the normalisation and legitimisation of political practices during this 
time-period. The main argument of this chapter will focus on evidencing the 
connections between discourse and the possibilities of political practice. Having 
deconstructed Pakistan’s political discourse in relation to 9/11 chapter six, taking its 
inspiration from critical realism, will seek to analytically embed the discourse within 
a critical realist stratified ontology. The main objective of this chapter is to further 
enhance the explanatory power of the analysis by identifying those relevant domestic 
and international social structures and social contexts that allow for the emergence of 
the specific political discourse identified. This chapter is important since it indicates 
a distance from linguistic realism by proposing that extra-discursive factors are also 
implicated in social constructions.  
In chapter seven the discussion draws together the various arguments and threads to 
advance a clearly coherent position in accounting for Pakistan’s political practice 
following 9/11. In particular, the study will argue that a multi-causal framework of 
22



analysis as adopted by this research is better able to explain patterns of state 
behaviour. This concluding chapter will concisely reiterate the subject of each 
chapter culminating in a restatement of the main findings of the thesis and a number 
of recommendations for further research.  
1.5 Limitations of the thesis
It is important to stress that this study forms a small part of a much larger subject-
area. Although this research is located within a definite and wider subject-area i.e. 
the ‘war on terrorism’ it however deals with one isolated facet: the discursive 
normalisation of Pakistan’s political practice. This specificity has both strengths and 
limitations. In the first instance, given the confines of time and space, it is impossible 
to thoroughly investigate all aspects of such a wide-ranging subject-area. Given the 
various actors that are related to the ‘war on terror’ (the US, Pakistan, the Taliban, 
India and the rest of the coalition effort); the various dimensions that can be explored 
in the context of the relationship between the actors themselves and their relationship 
to the ‘war on terror’, it is difficult to see how a study like this could incorporate a 
consideration of all these actors. Secondly, the theoretical framework underlying the 
study, acting as a lens, draws attention to particular objects and subjects whilst 
constraining a consideration of other variables; this means that it limits our attention 
to a consideration of only those aspects it considers as significant. The theoretical 
framework that underscores this study highlights the relevance of discourse and 
social context to the construction of political realities thus overlooking other ways of 
perceiving the construction of political reality i.e. as resulting from the universality 
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of anarchic relations or Marxist relations of production, or the result of a deliberate 
extension of US imperial power and so on. Thus, it is important to note that the 
theory underlying this study limits our focus to specific variables and therefore 
constrains the exploration of alternative aspects. Moreover, even within the specific 
theoretical framework there have been further limitations. For instance, it has not 
been possible to discuss at length the discursive construction of US-Pakistan 
relations or engage in a genealogical account of the construction of the Pakistani 
Self, or examine the material and ideational role that India plays in the enactment of 
Pakistan’s political practice vis-à-vis the ‘war on terror’.
However, rather than viewing these limitations of time, space and theory as 
unhelpful it is useful to consider these limitations as enablers in the sense that they 
have enabled a clear delineation of a small and defined aspect of Pakistan and the 
‘war on terror’. These limitations enable an in-depth, intensive and sharply focused 
exploration allowing for a deeper and more sustained engagement with a particular 
facet of the wider subject-area.  Thus, this project can tell us something specific 
about the way in which Pakistan’s political discourse enabled and constrained 
political action in the aftermath of 9/11. Furthermore, this project has something 
useful to say in relation to how this discourse is itself rooted in local and global 
social contexts that impinge on the possibilities of discursive constructions. It offers 
a different way of looking at what ‘causes’ things to happen in the realm of world 
politics. This specificity of the project is its major strength in the sense that it 
engages intently with a specific aspect i.e. Pakistan’s political discourse in the 
context of the ‘war on terrorism’ and is able to demonstrate the links between this 
discourse and political practice.
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The findings of this study are specific to Pakistan and thus cannot be more widely 
generalised since this study is essentially an intensive study of a particular time-
period and a specific socio-political context. This intensity means that the project 
cannot claim to be extensive and it would be incorrect to claim that the findings of 
this project are widely applicable. Secondly the data-set itself is limited in the sense 
that it only analyses official political discourse articulated by official Pakistani 
sources. The reasons for considering this specific data-set have been outlined earlier. 
However this also means that other sources of political discourse within Pakistan 
such as media discourses and civil society discourses have not been considered. It is 
useful to add that, during the time-period under consideration media discourses and 
civil society discourses were largely curbed and censored. For instance, large-scale 
media liberalisation only occurred after 2002 whereas Pakistan has a relatively 
undeveloped civil society.
One of the major strengths of this thesis is that, in many ways, it is an attempt to 
bridge the gap between a purely structural explanation of a state’s pattern of 
behaviour and an alternative analysis that provides a purely discursive account of the 
same behaviour. In looking to both the extra-discursive and discursive theory and in 
evaluating which concepts within these paradigms can contribute to furthering the 
investigation the analysis of this study has resulted in a useful synthesis of both 
approaches. However finally, it is also important to concede that the research focus, 
conceptual framework, the analysis, and the interpretation of the findings throughout 
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the research project are biased in the sense that they relate to my own theoretical 
assumptions regarding the nature of political reality.
1.6 Exploring self-reflexivity 
The nature of social investigation is such that it is very difficult to assume that the 
researcher can be detached or separated from the research. Rather inadvertently the 
role and identity of the researcher extends from the choice of research area through 
to the analysis, interpretation and overall ‘knowledge’ claims. Since such 
involvement of the researcher is an inextricable component of the research process 
consequently it should not be construed negatively as bias but as a position to be 
acknowledged. This notion of adopting a policy of openness within the research 
process is commonly referred to as reflexivity. In the words of Cromby and 
Nightingale (1999:228), 
reflexivity requires an awareness of the researcher’s contribution to the 
construction of meanings throughout the research process, and an 
acknowledgment of the impossibility of remaining ‘outside of’ of one’s subject 
matter while conducting research…[Reflexivity then, urges us to] explore the 
ways in which a researcher’s involvement with a particular study influences, 
acts upon and informs such research.  
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In this light we may view reflexivity as an important component of transparent 
research. Furthermore Willig (2001) notes that we can distinguish two types of 
reflexivity: personal reflexivity and epistemological reflexivity; the latter referring to 
transparency relating to the conceptual paradigm employed in the research process. 
In terms of engaging with epistemological reflexivity it is notable that the research 
questions, hypothesis and findings are defined and limited by the underlying 
theoretical assumptions, design and method of analysis. However,  issues of personal
reflexivity which ‘involves reflecting upon the way in which our own values, 
experiences, interests, beliefs, political commitments, wider aims in life and social 
identities have shaped the research’ (Willig 2001:10) have not, as yet, been 
addressed. Since the acknowledgment of personal reflexivity as an important part of 
transparency it is essential to briefly attempt to understand and acknowledge the way 
in which the authors own presence and actions may be considered as influencing the 
research process. It is important to note at the outset that this is not an exhaustive 
reflexive account rather I address the main features of how I understand the research 
process to have been inadvertently impacted by my presence.  
In the first instance, I wish to acknowledge that my interest in the broader subject-
area is connected to my own British-Pakistani identity which has been strengthened 
by the frequent visits and interaction I have had with Pakistan throughout my life. 
This background shaped the decision to focus my research on Pakistan in the context 
of the US-led ‘war on terror’ and contributed to an awareness of perceived biases in 
many explanatory accounts within the current literature. Often I felt that many 
studies in prioritising the United States as their unit of analysis ignored or, at best, 
offered partial and parsimonious accounts of the role of Pakistan in the ‘war on 
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terror’. What I mean by this is that the literature predominately dealt with questions 
around ‘whether Pakistan was doing enough’ (for the US), assessing whether 
Pakistan is a friend or foe (of the US), how Pakistan’s internal governance, values 
and belief systems compare to their US counterparts and so on. While there is 
nothing inherently wrong with these analyses rather these are insightful 
contributions; the issue however is the dominance they enjoy within the broader 
subject-area. Indeed, there is a certain repetition in approach to the subject-area in 
that the starting point is, more often than not, the US. The decision to focus on 
Pakistan from a different theoretical perspective that emphasised qualitative richness 
and more depth engagement with the enactment of Pakistan’s political action is, to be 
seen as emerging from this personal background. 
Further, in terms of the analysis and interpretation it is important to note that this has 
certainly not entailed a deliberate decision in terms of applying bias or ‘taking sides’. 
Rather the overriding criterion has been to ground the analysis and interpretation 
within the data. For instance in the discursive analysis I examined the political 
discourse as a whole noting themes as they emerged in the data without engaging in 
‘picking and choosing’ which discursive themes I would highlight. In finality, I also 
wish to concede that on a personal level I find problematic notions of transcendent 
‘truth’ and ‘universality’; instead I view the contingent and political nature of most 
‘truth’ claims both at a personal subjective level and extending much wider to the 
international system. Although these ideas also underpin the particular theoretical 
approach of this study nevertheless, I wish to note that a general scepticism with 
‘truth’ is something that unconsciously underscores my interpretive stance. How this 
impacts the research process can be evaluated in the sense that I do not take a strong 
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position on evaluating the truth/falsity of US or Pakistani political representations, 
for instance in relation to the Taliban. ‘Truth’ is, first and foremost political and 
serves specific functions in enabling and constraining thought and action. It is this 
aspect of the subject-area that interests me most, how truth claims through 
representation and interpretation structure political actions, thus I am most concerned 
with productivity as opposed to evaluating the ‘truthfulness’ of the ‘truth claim’.    
1.7 Conclusion 
The main focus of this study remains on problematising Pakistan’s political practice 
related to the reversal of support for the Taliban, and its co-operation with the US in 
the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The study seeks a depth explanation rather than a 
simplistic reduction of Pakistan practice as an outcome of US dictates. A focus on 
why and how state practice is produced will provide useful insights into the 
complexity involved in constituting political action. In this respect, the study argues 
that Pakistan’s political practice after 9/11 emerged owing to the proliferation of 
specific discursive structures which normalised and legitimised reversals of official 
policy. However, in further theorising the production of practice through the medium 
of discourse, the study proceeds to note that discursive structures cannot plausibly be 
conceptualised as free-floating or emerging from a vacuum. Instead, in important 
ways, this study connects Pakistan’s political discourse to specific extra-discursive 
social contexts and social structures. The argument is that these structures impinge 
on the kind of discourse that is able to emerge in Pakistan’s political space. This 
study aims to provide a more holistic and plausible consideration of the production of 
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political practice by identifying a complex of causal determinants. Moreover, it is 
important to clearly articulate at the outset that this study does not engage with 
questions of morality or legality in relation to the ‘war on terror’ and the ensuing 
political actions and practices. The principal focus is not on deliberating whether the 
‘war on terror’ is good or bad; rather the principal objective of the deconstruction of 
discourse that takes place within this study is to uncover the discursive strategies 
employed to advance a specific representation. This disengagement with ascertaining 
‘truth’ reflects a Foucauldian scepticism concerning the existence of ‘a truth’ as 
opposed to its distortions. The remit of the study is to examine how and why political 
practice is produced in the way that it is, and as it is relevant to this case-study; the 
analysis will therefore be geared towards this end.
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Conceptual Trends in IR 
2.1 Introduction 
The world is a complex place and the use of theory is to make some sense of what is 
taking place. Theory is an important component of the substance and direction of 
research in world politics and is distinguished by the insistence that we have to focus 
on certain specific factors within this complex world. This means that different 
theories of world politics draw attention to and engage with different factors; the 
underlying justification being that a study of these particular factors can help us 
adequately describe, explain or predict the most important aspects of world politics 
such as wars and aggression. In effect, an IR theory can be described as a set of ideas 
about how the world of global politics works and what we need to study in order to 
understand that world. Within the field of international relations, there are broadly 
four major theoretical approaches in the study of global politics: realism, liberalism, 
Marxism and constructivism; with each of these insisting that its body of ideas is best 
suited to understanding and explaining how certain aspects of world politics 
operates21. The remit of this chapter is to concisely introduce and briefly review the 
ideas and concepts most important to these different schools of thought. The purpose 
being to broadly clarify the location of the theoretical approach taken by this research 
project vis-à-vis the most dominant theoretical trends within the field of International 
Relations (IR). This overview has relevance throughout this project particularly since 
the theoretical approach and conceptual apparatus employed by this study will 

21ThisisnotintendedtobeanexhaustivelistbutindicativeofthebroadtheoreticaltrendsinIR
thought.
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periodically be juxtaposed with the dominant theoretical trends I discuss here in 
order to demarcate commonality and difference of approach and concept. Therefore, 
a relevant contextualisation of the dominant theoretical trends within IR is important.             
2.2 Realism 
Realism is by far the most dominant theoretical framework employed with the field 
of IR and has a number of varying strands22. However, what is common to the 
various realisms is a specific structuralism that emphasises the causal impact of 
universal and static anarchic structures of the international system23. Whilst realism 
has a long history tracing back to Thucydides and Tsun Tzu; it is the theorist 
Kenneth Waltz (1959, 1979) who played a central role in modern realist theorisations 
of the state and international space. A number of key assumptions can be identified 
as underpinning the various realist approaches in IR. In the first instance, a realist 
theory assumes the anarchic nature of the world system with anarchy here being 
defined as the absence of an authoritative world government. Waltz argued that in 
the absence of a ‘central enforcer’ the world existed in a state of perpetual anarchy 
with this being the immediate context within which nation-states are located. As a 
result of these ‘pre-given’ and ‘natural’ conditions of existence the assumption is that 

22Owingtolimitedtimeandspacethestudywillnotprovideacomprehensiveoverviewoftheall
thevariantsofrealistthoughtinIR.Rathertheaimhereistoprovideashortoverviewofdominant
schoolsofthoughtinIR.Consequentlythestudywillonlyconsideraselectsampleofrealist
theorists.
23AninterestingaccountofstructuralconstraintsonUSsecuritypolicyisofferedbyBrooksand
Wohlforth(2008)who,afterconsideringthescopeandextentofglobalstructuralconstraintsonthe
US,proceedtoconcludethatthese‘constraints’areineffectiveinlieuoftheoverwhelmingmaterial
preponderanceoftheUS.SeealsoWalt,S.(2005)who,withinabroadlyrealistframework,argues
thatthecontinuationofUSmaterialandideologicalhegemonyinworldpoliticsneedsincreased
buffetingthroughtheexerciseof‘soft’powerinordertoinhibitglobalopposition.
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individual states are in constant competition with one another and therefore act 
rationally in their own self-interest in order to secure state survival. For instance, 
Mearsheimer (2001:2) notes that ‘even though the Soviet threat has disappeared, the 
United States still maintains about one hundred thousand troops in Europe and 
roughly the same number in Northeast Asia’. In this conception since anarchy is a 
‘natural’ and unavoidable feature of the international system, it feeds state insecurity 
making it difficult for states to trust one another (Keohane and Martin 1995)24.
Moreover, in order to ensure survival in an anarchic system realist theorists advocate 
that states are consistently engaged in amassing resources/power (economic, 
population, military power) and that relations between states are primarily 
determined by these relative levels of power (Gilpin 1989, Walt 2005). The practice 
of war is always on the horizon in the realist mindset; nevertheless, the assumption is 
that certain mechanisms, notably a balance-of-power, may help to limit inter-state 
conflict (Waltz 1979). One of the key differences between classical realism and the 
neo-realism of theorists such as Waltz is the extent to which they draw upon theories 
of human nature. Indeed, classical realism puts human nature (the urge to dominate) 
at the centre of its explanation i.e. that human’s are predisposed to conflict and that 
this is reflected in the anarchic system. On the other hand, neo-realists also referred 
to as structural realists tend to argue that the pressures of anarchy (the structure of the 
system) are what shape behavioural patterns of states.
We may thus conclude that in the realist conception states are homogenous entities 
having a similar purpose in that they are focussed on state survival in an anarchic 

24Theoristsfocusingontheideathatmistrustintheinternationalsystemisuniversaland
independentoftheaccumulationofpowerareoftenreferredtoas‘offensive’realistsinthe
literature.ForagoodoverviewofthissubjectseeKydd,AH.(2005).
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system. Inter-state belligerency is seen as a natural phenomenon that may be 
controlled to some extent by a balance-of-power. This conceptual framework means 
that realist-inspired studies are often positivist and focus analytical attention on how 
the international anarchic structure and levels of power between states determine 
patterns of state behaviour.
2.3 Liberalism 
Compared to the realist world-view of perpetual anarchy as the significant defining 
feature of world politics liberalism tends to be more optimistic, holding the notion 
that state preferences as opposed to state capabilities are the primary determinant of 
behaviour in world politics. Although liberals broadly accept the structural condition 
of anarchy; nevertheless, they contend that this does not mean that co-operation is 
impossible. Rather, since states are interdependent and engage in interaction in fields 
of culture and economic exchange liberalism contends that there exist a wide range 
of opportunities for inter-state co-operation and consequently peaceful relations 
between nation-states is not an unachievable goal as realism would imply (Milner 
and Moravcsik 2009). Contemporary liberals or neo-liberals are likely to focus on 
researching international organisations and the growing interdependence of states or 
the process’ of globalisation as a causal phenomena connected to increased inter-
state co-operation thus reducing conflict between them. Often the research agenda of 
neo-liberals is dominated by the debate about liberal states and in explaining why 
relations between states tend to be peaceful. More specifically, there is a focus on 
proposing liberal democracy as the ideal-type of governance geared to advancing co-
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operative intra and inter-state relations. Liberalism advances the notion that liberal 
democracies rarely make war against each other with this thesis widely referred to in 
the literature as the ‘democratic peace theory’ (see for e.g. Rummel. 199525, Ray. 
1998, Russett 1993). Critics however, contend that although liberal states have 
created a ‘separate peace’ amongst themselves nevertheless they are aggressive as 
any other state in their relationship to non-liberal and authoritarian governments 
(Doyle 1995). Other commentators, most notably Rosato (2003), suggest that 
(democratic) states interpret a rival states ‘regime type’ depending on their own 
security and economic concerns26.
At the same time, many are sceptical of the universalising mission of liberalism that 
involves the universalisation of principles of democracy, capitalism and secularism 
which tend to undermine the tradition and values of non-western cultures. Chan 
(2002) for instance although broadly an adherent of the expansion of democracy, 
questions the assumption of the universal application of liberal (western) institutional 
structures. In this context Chan (2002) notes that economic development in countries 
such as Japan and newly industrialising Asian countries has taken place despite the 
state and society being far less liberal.
Liberalism may be distinguished from realism in the sense that realist theory does not 
conceive a type of government (democratic) as explaining the apparent peace 
between democratic states. In contrast, realists posit structural reasons for the 

25Rummel’ssiteavailableat:www.hawaii.edu/powerkillsoffersextensiveliteratureonhisideasin
relationtothe‘democraticpeacetheory’.
26ForinstanceRosato(2003)inassessingthetheorythatdemocraciesrarelywagewarprovidesan
interestinglistof‘Americancoldwarinterventionsagainstdemocracies’inhisarticle.
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apparent ‘peace’ as opposed to the type of government in place; the realist emphasis 
is on the notion that, despite the co-operation, democratic states will still be working 
to defend against the ‘threat’ of other states.
2.4 Marxism 
On the other hand Marxism provides an alternative way of looking at world politics 
and has, like realism and liberalism, been a dominant theoretical inspiration for much 
of the analysis in international relations. Broadly speaking, Marxism as extrapolated 
into the field of IR considers economic forces as the most significant determining 
factor in terms of identity, interest and behaviour. In this context it is perhaps the 
Marxist inspired work of Immanuel Wallerstein (2004) and particularly his notion of 
the world-systems theory (WST) that has been most popular within the field of 
international relations. The world-systems theory seeks to uncover an underlying 
‘truth’ namely that events in the world (wars, treaties, international aid, foreign 
investment and all forms of interstate interaction) are ultimately embedded within the 
‘world-system’ which is organized according to the logic of global capitalism. 
Within this framework such things as states and ethnic groups are a product of the 
world-system and behaviour of entities is determined by their position within that 
system. In particular the scholarship in this tradition draws attention to ‘exploitation’ 
in terms of the reliance of Western capitalism on the ‘underdevelopment’ and 
‘peripheralization’ of the Third World. The argument from this approach is that the 
material exploitation defines the nature of global relations between states. 
Wallerstein’s work has been critiqued for its reductionist connotations in that its 
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principal proposition is the idea that economic relations are the defining meta-
narrative for understanding the world. In response to this Wallerstein’s later work 
(1991) also introduced the notion of ‘geo-culture’ which emphasizes the role of 
hegemonic ideologies in maintaining and reproducing a dominant world order in 
which capitalism is the defining force27.
A particularly useful off-shoot of such Marxist thinking within IR is the notion of 
cultural and ideological ‘hegemony’ as being productive of consensus in the 
international realm. The notion of hegemony has it origins in the historical 
materialism of Karl Marx who argued that the ruling-classes were intimately 
involved in the proliferation of a ‘false consciousness’ in order to represent the 
interests of the ruling-class as universal interests. Marx argued that this ‘false 
consciousness, played a pivotal role in eliciting consensual participation of the 
proletariat in capitalist modes of production. This concept was developed further by 
the Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci (1971) who introduced the notion of 
‘cultural hegemony’, which referred to the manufacturing of consent through non-
coercive means. More specifically, Gramsci defined ‘hegemony’ as that social 
process through which the leading group of a society transformed its own interests 
and values into ‘common sense’ for all members of the society. Extrapolating 
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony into IR, Robert Cox (1981) argued that global 
hegemony is a form of dominance which refers to consensual order as opposed to 
conventional IR theory which reduces hegemony to brute economic and military 
capabilities of states28. Hegemony is, thus understood to imply, a great capacity for 

27ThenotionofgeocultureisclearlyinspiredfromtheMarxistnotionof‘falseconsciousnesses’.
28ThisapproachcanbeseenasadevelopmentofMarxistthought.WriterssuchasCoxmoveaway
fromthenotionofanunchangingobjectiverealityorimmutablesociallaws.Moreover,themain
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eliciting influence or control over state behaviour without the employment of force. 
Indeed, it often refers to the way in which a ruling group is involved in the 
production of ways of thinking or world-views that exclude other ways of reasoning. 
In an important sense, hegemony can be distinguished from other concepts such as 
colonisation which signal direct, official and often forceful and violent control of 
foreign territories. Willing consensus is a key idea associated with notions of 
hegemony.  
The concept of ‘hegemony’ can be a useful tool in offering more nuanced accounts 
of the operation of power in international space particularly in relation to building 
consensus.  For instance, many writers have taken up the position that the 
contemporary world is dominated by a neo-liberal ideology principally spearheaded 
by the United States and which has specific conceptualisations of how space within 
an ideal society is organised and its governance. What is particularly useful is the 
way in which some writes have taken up this notion of a dominant cultural 
hegemony espoused by the US in order to understand how it interacts with local 
political elites giving way to consensus (see for e.g. Colas 2007: chapter 3). In 
examining the concrete operationalisation of a ‘hegemonic cultural ideology’ within 
IR, Falah and Flint (2004:1382) for instance have argued that this involves the 
defining and disseminating of a specific vision or model of society and civilisation – 
a vision which they bundle together under the term ‘prime modernity’. They explain 
this operationalisation, 

conceptofconcernistheenactmentofconsensualhegemonywiththeemancipatorygoaltoliberate
humanityfrom‘oppressive’structuresbyuncoveringtheirnonneutralityandpoliticizedrelation
withpower.Aconjunctionof‘socialforces’,ideasandstatescontributetounequalpowerrelations
intheworldeconomy.
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[prime modernity refers to] the products innovated by the hegemonic power are 
seen to represent the modern lifestyle – increasing their desirability. In 
addition, these products are consumed in a manner that defines what is seen as 
a modern lifestyle. Furthermore the products are produced in new and efficient 
ways that are seen as the most modern work-practices. The work practices and 
lifestyles of prime modernity combine to promote particular relations of 
production, gender and racial division of labour, and differential access to 
private and public goods as modern too. In combination, these aspects of 
modernity combine to form particular cultural landscapes that are not only the 
products of these processes but also advertise their supposed benefits. Finally 
what it means to be modern and its presumed benefits are broadcast for the 
world to see….disseminated through the mediums of television and cinema.   
The authors suggest that this modern lifestyle or the ‘prime modernity’ is 
championed as an ideal and which works to create a wholesale Gramscian consensus 
regarding the goals of the rest of the world. The goal thus is to consume and emulate 
the products and way of life of the hegemonic power.  In terms of promoting a neo-
liberal ideology, the key point to note here is that the emphasis is laid on consensus 
as opposed to brute force. Within the literature, it is acknowledged that the 
pervasiveness of this kind of cultural hegemony is much more sustainable for the 
hegemonic power as opposed to employing coercive political and military 
institutions to elicit consensus although these means to achieve compliance are not 
ruled out. In this construction, the US relies a great deal on the dissemination and 
promotion of a universal prime modernity as an ideal to be emulated by the rest of 
the world. As Falah and Flint (2004:1380) further note,
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the ideological basis of the hegemonic power’s rule lies in its ability to 
maintain cultural universality. In other words hegemonic cultural power rests 
upon the assumption that the prime modernity is desired by all, beneficial to all 
and attainable by all. Resistance to the prime modernity by any state is a chink 
in the armour of universality, inevitability and belief in the ability and desire of 
all to arrange their societies along the model of the hegemonic state.  
The US enjoys an unparalleled global cultural hegemony in that it is able to 
efficiently disseminate and promote its particular values of civilisation, morality, 
development, progress, modernity and governance. Moreover, some theorists have 
argued that these specific values are concerned with the organisation of domestic 
space within states in order to aid the smooth operation of capitalist structures of 
power, which ultimately benefit the US (Colas 2007). In the context of the ‘war on 
terrorism’ Falah and Flint (2004:1385) suggest that the US building upon the notion 
of itself as the definition of what is modern and universally desirable was similarly 
able to develop a notion of US moral concern at whose core was the benefit of all 
humankind rather than an expression of inter-state politics. This moral concern with 
terrorists and ‘rogue’ states was not solely a US enterprise; rather US values were 
equated and synonymous with global values benefiting all humanity. Thus by 
claiming to be speaking for ‘all’ the US was able to articulate the notion of a ‘just’ 
war. Within this literature if hegemony is understood as an ‘opinion moulding 
activity’ then the task of IR is to consider how a specific exploitative capitalist world 
order is buttressed by the proliferation of specific values, inter-subjective meanings, 
ideology, institutional and moral contexts.  
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2.5 Constructivism 
In more recent years, the ‘discursive turn’ in the wider social sciences brought forth 
approaches which found particularly problematic the notion that the social world was 
an unchanging and stable realm. Instead, these varied perspectives highlighted the 
relevance of ideational factors in the constitution of social reality and gave analytical 
priority to ideas, norms, rules and discourses that were seen to shape and construct 
the social world (see Onuf 1989, Hopf 1998, Wendt). In particular, Alexander 
Wendt’s (1992) article ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction 
of Power Politics’ laid the theoretical groundwork for the subsequent challenging of 
realist theorisations in the field of IR. Approaches inspired by this ‘discursive turn’ 
problematized dominant Waltzian conceptualisations of the state and the anarchic 
nature of the world system and instead emphasised the role of discourses and 
representation in the construction of social phenomena such as the ‘state’, ‘war’, ‘the 
international’.
These approaches posed a challenge to the dominance of realist theories of an 
unchanging and pre-given nature in relation to world politics.  In particular, it was 
argued that the ‘international’ cannot be conceived as a pre-given anarchic space in 
which states are suspended or that state behaviour can be explained solely with 
reference to reductionist theories of self-help. The argument by those inspired by the 
broader theory of social construction was that states are primarily discursive entities 
as opposed to ‘naturally’ occurring phenomena and their existence relied heavily on 
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the articulation of dichotomies between the Self and the outside Other (Hansen 
2006)29. In her seminal work on the notion of ‘intertextuality’, Julia Krestiva (1980) 
explored this very relationship between texts arguing that a text can never be 
completely divorced from a wider textual web to the extent that a specific text or 
discourse can only be ‘read’ against a background of other texts we have 
encountered. Krestiva thus postulated the intertextuality of all texts opposing the 
notion that any text can be conceptualized as a stand-alone entity; her focus on the 
generation of meaning can help us conceptualise more clearly how discourses are 
‘plugged’ into each other and helps us theorise their simultaneous effects on each 
other. As Ashley (1989:280-281) argues,
no subject, no object, no system, no structure of le texte general can be 
adequately comprehended as an already completed text that is fixed, finally 
bounded, and homogenous in its meaning. No aspect of history, no matter how 
unambiguous or self-evident it may seem, can be regarded as a central and 
orginary production, self-sufficient and complete in the meanings it contains 
and engenders. Comprehended in its historicity, each aspect of history must be 
comprehended as an intertext.
What this means is that, the constitution of the ‘state’, its definition and roles, the 
way it ‘should’ behave domestically and at the international level is not a pre-given 
set of rules but that we should understand the state as a product of discourse and that 

29Indeedthenotionthatthestateasanentityonlyknowswhoitisbydiscursivelymarkingoutand
distinguishingtheoutsideOther.Hansen(2006)suggeststheoutsideOtherdoesnotnecessarily
constituteanaggressivehostileOtherbutthat‘otherness’maybeconstructedthroughless
aggressivedistinctions.
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this specific discourse or text of who and what the state is, is itself an intertextual 
product bearing traces of other texts both contemporary and historical (Shapiro 
1989). It is in this fashion that ‘international social reality’ is conceived as emerging 
from discourses, which are ‘plugged’ into each other and, which work to define 
‘states’ as legally legitimate units, their roles in the global ‘system’ and the kind of 
relations and interactions that must exist between them (Kurki 2008).  
Approaches prioritising discourse in the study of the object of world politics have 
produced some interesting incursions in IR thought. Campbell (1992) in his book 
‘Writing Security’ situates US foreign policy as an identity constituting practice that 
plays a pivotal role in the reproduction of an American territorial, ideological Self. 
Similarly Doty (1996:92) in her study of US counterinsurgency policies in the 
Philippines during the 1950s notes the way in which the US was constructed as a 
‘speaking, writing, knowledgeable subject....an initiator of action, a formulator of 
policy, an assessor of situations and a definer of problems’. For Doty, the array of 
ideas, attributes and values cohered to build a world-view of oneself which ‘in turn 
constructed a cultural code within which foreign policy was discussed, organised and 
implemented (Doty 1996:92). Doty provides an excellent study of subject positioning 
and its political consequences30. Further, one of the key areas that has seen 

30ItisnotablethatalthoughthediscursiveconstructionoftheUSintermsof(re)producingrelations
ofglobalpowerhasreceivedmuchscholarlyattentionthereiscomparativelylittleliteraturewithin
theIRfieldexamininghow‘Others’cometoacceptorresistUSdiscursivepositioning.Muchofthe
discursivetheorizingwithinIRtendstofocusonhowvariousOthersareperceived,constructed,
representedbytheWest.Asimilarfocusisnotextendedtodiscursivestudiesofhowthosemaking
upthe‘West’areperceivedandrepresentedby‘Others’andthepoliticalconsequencesofthese
constructions.Postcolonialistliteratureincomparisonhasengagedfarmoreinthissenseinthat
investigationshavefocussedonindigenousdiscoursesandvoicesandtendedtonottoonlygive
primacytostudiesofthecolonizinghegemonicdiscourse.
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constructionist re-theorising has taken place in understanding the end of the Cold 
War (see Koslowski and Kratochwil 1995). 
The influence of the ‘discursive turn’ has been wide-ranging with theorists drawing 
on social constructionist theories to draw attention to the role of language and 
discourse in the production of the object of IR. Post-colonial writers for instance,
have been concerned with notions of ideological and cultural hegemony and have 
been critical of an IR field that is inattentive  to ‘the ways in which power is 
constituted and produced, or the role of history, ideology, and culture in shaping state 
power or practices in international relations’ (Chowdhry and Nair 2002:4). In 
particular, post-colonial writings examine how discursive representations of race and 
ethnicity subtly underwrite the exercise of global power. Similarly, in the collection 
of essays edited by Katzenstein (1996) the authors consider the role of national 
identity and ‘cultural elements’ as a determinant of national military and security 
policy.
However, it is important to mention here that within IR there are two dominant 
trends in the use of discursive theories. In the first instance, the IR literature terms 
those writers (such as Campbell 1992, Doty 1993) who tend to study discourse and 
representation without a significant analysis of material/social structures and the role 
of agency as, ‘poststructuralists’. Arguably these incursions in IR thought tend to be 
reductionist in their consideration of the relationship between discourse and political 
life. On a second note, theorists that incorporate agency and the role of social or/and 
material structure in their discursive analysis are more often termed constructivists.


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Poststructuralist approaches in IR have been criticized by constructivists in general 
and by those taking more of a material stance in terms of accounting for world 
politics. Arif Dirlik for instance, argues that postcolonial literature by taking 
Foucauldian and post-structuralist positions and being preoccupied with discursive 
regimes and representations, ignore the (real and causal) material inequalities 
between the First and Third worlds. Dirlik (1997 in Chowdhry and Nair 2002:22 ) 
writes, 
The denial to capitalism of “foundational status” is also revealing of 
culturalism in the postcolonial argument that has important ideological 
consequences. This involves the issue of Eurocentrism. Without capitalism as 
the foundation for European power and the motive force for its globalization, 
Eurocentrism would have been just another ethnocentrism (comparable to any 
other ethnocentrism from the Chinese and the Indian to the most trivial tribal 
solipsism). An exclusive focus on Eurocentrism as a cultural or ideological 
problem, which blurs the power relationships that dynamized it and endowed it 
with hegemonic persuasiveness, fails to explain why this particular 
ethnocentrism was able to define modern global history, and itself as the 
universal aspiration and end of that history, in contrast to the regionalism or 
localism of other enthnocentrisms. 
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It is apparent that Dirlik’s concern relates to the broader tension within IR theorizing 
concerning the validity of either a materialist explanation of world politics or the 
validity of a discursive explanation. Although Chowdhry and Nair (2002) have 
suggested adopting a stance that is sensitive to both modes of conceptualisation this 
is not backed up by the delineation of a concrete theoretical approach incorporating 
both variables i.e. representational themes and material conditions. While 
constructivist approaches in IR do pay analytical attention to the role of wider 
structures and agency in their discursive theorizations of world politics; nevertheless, 
it can be argued that the precise dialect and interplay between discourse, structure 
and agency is under-theorised by constructivists. It is here, in terms of providing a 
more robust conceptual and theoretical framework, that a critical realist ontological 
framework is useful. Indeed the position of this study is that critical realist theoretical 
insights into the relationship between discourse, structure and agency and in 
particular Bhaskar’s (1989) TMSA31 model offers a concrete and robust theoretical 
position from which constructivist studies can begin to consider both material and 
discursive structures underlying the construction of a postcolonial social reality. This 
would mean that the contemporary post-colonial world, in which the North 
articulates power (understood both in terms of material power and consensual 
hegemony) vis-à-vis the South, is conceptualized as emerging from a complex of 
material and ideational ontological structures underlying the world.

31Seesection4.17,foracomprehensivediscussionofhowBhaskar’sTMSAmodelisusefulinterms
ofconceptualizingtherelationshipofdiscourse,structureandagencyintheproductionofsociallife.
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2.6 Conclusion
The theoretical approaches distinguished above reflect the broad divisions between 
different explanatory frameworks dominating thinking in the field of international 
relations. The short overview in this chapter does not exhaust the range of conceptual 
frameworks being employed within the field of IR but is merely indicative of the 
main strands of thought. There are a number of other ‘critical’ approaches to IR 
which have not been explored here, including feminist and critical security studies, 
which in their own way draw attention to different nuances in their attempts to 
understand and explain world politics. Nevertheless despite its conciseness, the brief 
overview of this chapter has an important purpose in terms of the overall thesis in 
that it will help to clarify and clearly locate where the theoretical orientation and 
inspiration of this specific research project lies. In chapter four, the study will 
delineate the theoretical approach of this study and may be contrasted vis-à-vis the 
dominant conceptual trends outlined here. 
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Pakistan – A Historical Review 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to enable a critical appraisal of the existing literature 
on Pakistan in the context of the war on terror, and to analyse how this subject area 
has been broached by analysts. This chapter will seek to show how the wider 
literature on Pakistan in the years after the commencement of the US-led ‘war on 
terror’ is consistent in the sense that a ‘standard’ method of analysis is employed to 
‘view’ and analyse Pakistan’s relationship with the US-led ‘war on terror’. This 
realist lens provides a wealth of key information nevertheless the issue is not with the 
conceptual framework itself but with the frequency of the employment of this ‘lens’ 
to the extent that it becomes pervasive amongst analysts of the ‘war on terror’ and 
undermines the development of other approaches to the subject-area.
Arguably, there is a monopoly of studies inspired in a realist mould and a 
simultaneous dearth of analysts who employ a different way of looking at the same 
problem-field. In contrast to this existing body of work, it is important to note that, 
this study starts from an altogether different starting point in that its theoretical vision 
is focussed on the role and causal potentialities of discourse, and underlying social 
structures and mechanisms in effecting political action in Pakistan. Arguably then, 
whilst many of the existing studies on Pakistan and its relationship to the ‘war on 
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terror’ are interesting they often stem from a realist framework of understanding in 
which discourse as a causal factor is overlooked. This chapter has an important 
objective in that it will refer to these studies whilst simultaneously identifying gaps 
in this literature. Consequently, this process will enable a clarification in terms of 
how this study seeks to contribute in an original way. This means that an important 
and implicit component of this appraisal is to locate the distinctiveness of this study 
vis-à-vis already published work.
However, before engaging with the literature that is immediately relevant to the 
subject-matter of this study it is useful to begin by providing a general historical 
contextualisation of Pakistan. Although such a discussion involves a historical 
account that stretches back to Pakistan’s creation in 1947; nevertheless, this 
contextualisation is critically important in terms of providing a necessary background 
understanding of the subject-area. On the other hand, owing to confines of time and 
space the discussion here does not provide a definitive or comprehensive historical 
account but should be seen as a preliminary reading of the main contours of 
Pakistan’s history32. Further, it is also useful to note that since this study originates 
from an interest in the social construction of political reality; therefore the discussion 
will broadly pay attention to the kind of narratives and discourses underlying 
Pakistan’s historical political practice. As the chapter moves towards the time-period 
immediately prior to 2001 and in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks the discussion will 
simultaneously move from descriptive to more analytical through incorporating a 
critical review of the relevant literature. In particular, the discussion will clearly 

32FormorecomprehensiveintroductionstoPakistan’shistorysee:Raza2001,Shaikh2009,Wirsing
1994,Ziring1997.
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demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of the current literature, and in the final 
analysis will clarify how this project contributes to the subject-area in an original and 
insightful way.  
3.2 The creation of Pakistan: Territorial partition and internal division:  
During the latter years of colonial rule in India (1920-47), and especially when it 
became apparent that India was soon be granted independence from the British Raj; a 
civil movement spearheaded by the leader of the All India Muslim League,
Mohammed Ali Jinnah33 (hereafter Jinnah), began to demand the division of the 
union of India into two separate and sovereign territories. The basis of such a 
demand was the belief in the ‘two-nation theory’ the notion that undivided India was 
home to two different peoples: the Hindus and the Muslims. It was argued that each 
of these peoples constituted a nation and therefore the logic was that they each 
deserved a separate state to realize their differing national and cultural aspirations 
thus promoting the division of India into two (Hindu, Muslim) sovereign states. 
Moreover, implicit within this idea was the notion that, without a separate state, 
freedom from the colonists would simply result in a ‘changing of masters’ from 
British to Hindu for the Muslim minority. It was widely argued that Muslim culture 
and identity would be come under threat in such a scenario; since Muslims would 
feel threatened by an overwhelmingly Hindu majority that would overshadow and 
marginalise a distinct Muslim identity. Further, the preservation of Muslim culture 
could only be guaranteed within a Muslim state.  

33MohammedAliJinnahisalsoreferredtointheliteratureas‘QuaideAzam’orthe‘greatleader,
seeglossary.
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On the other hand, the secular All India Congress Party rejected outright the 
legitimacy of the ‘two-nation’ theory, as espoused by the Muslim League, instead 
insisting that Muslims and Hindus constituted one people having lived side by side 
for centuries prior to the arrival of the British and refused to accept the notion that 
the union of India required division. Arguably, Muslim separatism in undivided India 
did not have spontaneous origins rather Jaffrelot (2002) highlights the elitist origins 
of Muslim separatism in undivided India that later culminated in becoming a populist 
movement for the creation of Pakistan. Jaffrelot (2002) suggests that, nationalist 
Muslim sentiment in India had not occurred spontaneously amongst the masses, but 
was in fact a cultivated Indian aristocrat phenomena owing to the peculiar position 
the Muslim aristocrat found himself in during colonial India. The argument here is 
that during the British Raj the elite Muslims of the United Provinces (presently Uttar 
Pradesh) had, following the uprising in 1857, become the target of much British 
discrimination. Owing to this discrimination the Muslim elite became increasingly 
fearful of a radical shift in the advantageous status quo and began a slow but sure 
process of Muslim mobilisation in order to safeguard their class interests (see also 
Alavi 1983). For these reasons, Jaffrelot (2002) argues that Muslim nationalism 
cannot be conceived as grass-root phenomena but more of a cultivated sentiment. 
Such beginnings of Muslim separatism in the sub-continent are particularly 
important here since they can help in explaining why having achieved the territory of 
‘Pakistan’, the Muslim population comprising the new state were unable to attain 
national cohesiveness and whose reverberations are eminent to this day.   
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In a contradictory fashion, although the civil movement for the creation of Pakistan 
used identity markers, such as the Urdu language and Islam, to mobilise and 
consolidate the grouping; however, at the same time the movement did not primarily 
focus on creating a theological state. This orientation, which failed to explicitly 
emphasise an Islamic character to the Pakistan movement was the main bone of 
contention for religious parties and organizations who were subsequently bitterly 
opposed to the leadership of the All India Muslim League and eventually to the idea 
of Pakistan. The absence of religious parties from the Pakistan struggle seemed to 
confirm the notion that Pakistan was to become a modern nation-state and not a 
theocracy. Jinnah himself though having intermittently employed religious symbols 
during the campaign for Pakistan was reluctant to associate explicit religious 
ideology with Pakistan. In fact, the shortcomings of employing Muslim communalist 
rhetoric were exposed at Partition when (Hindu and Muslim) communities engaged 
in widespread and horrific bloodshed of each other (see for e.g. Khan 2007, Pandey 
2002, Talbot 2007).
However, Jinnah presented an ambiguous position over the role of Islam in the 
national narrative and soon after Partition he explicitly seemed to backtrack on 
associating Pakistan exclusively with an Islamic narrative. Shaikh (2009:82) notes 
that ‘having mobilised Islam’s vote-winning potential, [Jinnah] now sought to curb 
its destructive power by confining religion to the private sphere’. For instance, 
during his first presidential address to the new Constituent Assembly in August 1947 
clearly outlined his conception of a secular Pakistani identity:  
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I cannot emphasise it too much. We should begin to work in that spirit and in 
the course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority 
communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim community – because 
even as regards to Muslims you have Pathans, Punjabis, Sunnis, Shias and so 
on and among the Hindus you have Brahmans, Vashnanva, Khatris, also 
Bengalees, Madrasis, and so on – will vanish. Indeed if you ask me this has 
been the biggest hindrance in the way of India to attain the freedom and 
independence and but for this, we would have been free people long ago. No 
power can hold another nation, and specially a nation of 400 million souls in 
subjection.
You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your 
mosques or any other places of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may 
belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the 
business of the state. 
Now, I think that we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will 
find that in the course of time, Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims 
would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the 
personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the 
state (Jinnah, August 14th, 1947). 
53



It is clear that Jinnah had not intended for the new country to be a theocracy and 
indeed his numerous statements are testament to this persuasion34. Nevertheless, it 
was perhaps naïve to assume that having discursively emphasised to a group of 
people their similarities in terms of their Islamic faith and consequently the idea that 
they constituted and deserved a separate territory, to then argue that religion was not 
to be a significant part of state identity35. Ziring’s (1997:98) perspective on this is 
that Jinnah had devoted all his energies towards convincing the British Raj that a 
sovereign Muslim state within the subcontinent was desirable and entirely feasible. 
However, he further notes that, 
neither Jinnah nor any of his immediate circle was moved to lay out on paper 
the blueprint for the state they intended to create… [T]here is nothing in the 
archives to even hint that someone was responsible for defining the nature and 
structure of the state, its purposes and functions, its powers and limitations.  
There seems to have been little preparation in terms of thinking and working on the 
Pakistan idea apart from wrestling it from the clutches of the Congress and the 
British. Having accomplished the task of partition in August of 1947, the leaders of 

34AlthoughJinnahdidemploysomelevelofreligiousrhetoricduringthemovementforPakistan
neverthelesshemustbeseenashavingmoresecularleanings.Hisnumerousspeechesforinstance
indicatethisdispositionfore.g.see:GovernmentofPakistan:MinistryofInformationand
Broadcasting(1989).QuaideAzamMohammedAliJinnah,SpeechesandStatementsasGovernor
GeneralofPakistan194748.Furthermore,onapersonallevel,hehadbeeneducatedintheWest
andhiswifebelongedtotheParisireligiouscommunityofBombay.

35Shaikh(2009:4344)forinstance,hasarguedthatJinnahinusingthenotionofuniversalIslamto
defeattribal,racialandlinguisticaffiliationsJinnahpreemptedanyunderstandingofthePakistanas
asovereignpoliticalcommunity.
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the new state were wholly ‘unprepared for the ensuing responsibility that is, giving 
form and substance to what had been created’ (Ziring 1997:148).
The result of this gaping oversight was evident almost immediately when internal 
rebellions challenging the legitimacy and writ of the state began to emerge in various 
parts of the new country. On its western front for instance, the local leader of the 
North-Western Frontier Province (hereafter NWFP) Abdul Ghaffar Khan was unable 
to conceal his hostility to Pakistan and Mohammed Ali Jinnah and had refused to 
swear allegiance to Pakistan. Ziring (1997:85) notes that Ghaffar and his ‘Red Shirts’ 
organisation with a separate ‘Pakhtunistan’ in mind had laboured long before the 
formation of the Pakistan Movement to dislodge the British from the region…[A]nd 
just at the moment of realising their quest, their goal was snatched from their grasp 
by a relatively distinct Muslim League’. Moreover, in the same region Afghanistan 
openly refused to accept the dividing Durand line between it and Pakistan’s North-
Western Frontier Province terming the border ‘imaginary’. Additionally in the 
geographically distant eastern wing of Pakistan (presently Bangaldesh) a rebellion 
focussing on the imposition of Urdu as a national language demanded that the 
Bengali language be placed alongside Urdu as a national language (see Zaheer 1995). 
Jinnah however, was adamant that a common language was imperative to national 
unity36 – such an insistence however did not convince many of those in East Pakistan 
who viewed this as an imposition of Western Pakistan. In addition to unrest in the 
NWFP and Pakistan’s eastern wing the Muslim League leaders in Pakistan’s largest 
and relatively more prosperous province of Punjab also began showing strong 

36InMarch1948,JinnahtoldapublicmeetinginDhakathat,‘thestatelanguageofPakistanisgoing
tobeUrdu….anyonewhotriestomisleadyouisreallyanenemyofPakistan’(Dil2000:82).
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opposition to any central government which seemed to leave Punjab in a weak 
position in relation to East Pakistan. In particular, this opposition was focussed on 
the distribution of seats in the National Assembly, and since the majority of 
Pakistani’s lived in the eastern wing a purely representative National Assembly 
would mean that Bengal would enjoy more seats. The leaders in Punjab saw this as 
relegating the status of their province and opposed any such plans.
It is relevant here to note that a ‘nation’ as differentiated from a ‘state’ requires a 
strong sense of the Self as a separate entity (Anderson 1983). However, given that 
the peoples habituating the territory of Pakistan were ethnically, linguistically and 
often culturally dissimilar it is difficult to understand how Jinnah conceived that the 
peoples of Pakistan would unproblematically become integrated. The population 
consisted of a wide variety of ethnic and linguistic groups and sub-groups, which 
have very little in common besides being Muslim. Moreover, apart from the two 
official languages Urdu and English there were six or seven important regional 
languages, Punjabi, Balochi, Sindhi, Pashto, Sairaiki, Bengali and perhaps a dozen 
smaller local languages. Moreover, as Ziring (1997:201) notes,
[T]ribalism remained the defining feature of life in the Pathan and Baloch 
areas, and even the people of the settled regions were inclined to follow local 
personalities with habits and virtues much like their own’ even in Sindh and 
Punjab biradari…caste, zamindar and wadera dominated the lives of the 
population.
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Pakistan, at its inception was thus an amalgam of diverse and disparate peoples. 
Since many of the peoples comprising the new ‘nation’ had long traditions of local 
rule; relinquishing local power to a central authority soon became a bitter pill to 
swallow.
3.3 Constructing nationalism: Employing Islam 
Amidst the domestic chaos following the partition event, calls for an integrated 
Pakistani nation fell on deaf ears simply because there was very little that bound the 
population together. In the absence of a sense of nationalism, there was a dire need to 
integrate the diverse ethnic groups into a national community. Further, whilst this 
was a huge task in itself it was however, compounded by the untimely and early 
death of Jinnah whose towering personality held considerable sway over the 
populace. Pakistan’s lack of national identity was acute and Ziring (1997:184) notes 
those at the helm of national affairs quickly came to realise and were forced to 
acknowledge that,
[Jinnah’s] vision was too limited for the circumstances prevailing within the 
nation. In the end Pakistan’s sudden appearance as an independent state did not 
leave time to secure the meaning of nationhood among a far-flung, disparate, 
and largely uneducated population. The survival of the state rested on the belief 
that the central purpose of the nation was a common religious experience. 
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It is in this context that we need to view the ascendance of Islam as the primary 
identity of Pakistan, and which was clearly incorporated in the Objectives resolution 
of 194937 which provided the blueprint for the future Pakistani constitution (see 
Khan 2001). The overt references to the official purpose and aim of the state being to 
build a ‘truly Islamic society’ was met with indignation by minority communities, 
who argued that such association between Pakistan and Islam went against the grain 
of Jinnah’s assertions. The ensuing disagreements led to the resignation of Pakistan’s 
Hindu Labour Minister and a close associate of Jinnah, J. N. Mandal38. The 
incorporation of Islam in the Objectives Resolution was critical in that it paved the 
way for a later more vigorous association between religion and Pakistan. In the early 
years following partition , the political discourse in Pakistan began a focussed 
mission of emphasising the Islamic identity of the population and explicitly linking 
Islam with the purpose of the state.  
From the very beginning there is no doubt that the project of constructing a Pakistani 
national identity involved the representation of India and Pakistan as binary 
opposites of each other. The political narrative espoused Pakistan as the smaller, 
Islamic nation threatened by the much larger, expansionist Hindu India who, on 
being dismembered by the creation of Pakistan, was unable to reconcile itself to the 

37The‘AimsandObjectivesoftheConstitution’popularlyknownastheObjectivesResolutionlaid
thefoundationsforthefutureconstitutionofPakistanandwasimportantinthesensethatit
indicatedthebroadoutlineofthepoliticalphilosophyofthegovernmentofPakistan.Forthefull
textoftheResolutionsee:TheConstitutentAssemblyofPakistanDebates,V.Karachi:Government
ofPakistan,1964,p2.
38BeforehisresignationoverthecontentoftheObjectivesResolutionMandalmadeaneloquent
speechindefenseofhisviewswhichcanbeseenasrepresentativeoftheminoritiesinPakistan.See:
TheConstituentAssemblyofPakistanDebates,9thMarch1949.Vol.V1949,pp.27.
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division and hence sought to re-absorb Pakistan (Racine 2002)39. Nevertheless, it is 
important to note that the degree to which the Indian Other is ‘othered’ within 
Pakistan’s political discourse is comparatively less forceful than the intensity that 
was to follow in later years. Despite the bitterness of partition, Pakistan’s political 
discourse does not, from the outset, represent India as an overwhelmingly hostile 
entity. While there is a need to mark out and define Pakistan as different and separate 
from India; a reading of Pakistan’s political discourse clearly suggests that the 
political discourse, on the whole, does so without excessive pondering and 
preoccupation with India40 . Up and till the 1960s the political discourse does not 
suggest an aggressively negative portrayal of the Indian Other with Pakistani leaders 
more likely to focus on socio-economic development urging people to unite and 
work towards national development in addition to drawing on Islamic sentiments to 
build commonality41. Furthermore, although the two-nation theory clearly advocated 
a communal division between the Hindus and Muslims presuming that each 
community was a homogenous entity nevertheless, it did not explicitly promote 
aggressively negative constructions of the Hindu Other or place it in a lower 
hierarchical position as compared to the Muslim Self42. Arguably, the two-nation 
theory advocated distinct difference and not categories of the superior Self versus the 

39SeeforinstanceRacine,(2002)whoarguesthatPakistanhasbeenunabletoescapea
preoccupationwithIndiaandthushasfailedtoconstructanationalidentityindependentofthis
‘Indiasyndrome’.
40Seefore.g.AyubKhan,Mohammad,.President,SpeechesandStatements,Volume–V(July1962
1963)andVolume–VI(July1963June1964).Alsosee:JinnahGovernmentofPakistan:Ministryof
InformationandBroadcasting(1989).QuaideAzamMohammedAliJinnah,Speechesand
StatementsasGovernorGeneralofPakistan194748.
41IarguethatthenegativityoftherhetoricinvolvedinrepresentingtheIndianOtherasinferiorand
alieninPakistan’spoliticaldiscourseintensifiedduringandafterthe1960s.Forinstance,ifwe
comparerepresentationsofIndiainPakistan’spoliticaldiscoursefrom1947–upuntiltheearly
1960swiththepoliticaldiscoursefrom1964onwards,thereisamarkeddifferenceinthefrequency
andnegativeportrayalofHinduIndiainlatteryears.Theargumenthereisthatwhilstsuchatheme
hasbeenmoreorlessapermanentfeatureofPakistan’spoliticaldiscoursenevertheless,thereisa
markeddifferenceintermsofthefrequencywithwhichitisemployedafterthemid1960s.
42See:GovernmentofPakistan,1957.
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inferior Other. Indeed for Jinnah, Pakistan’s creation signalled the preservation of 
Muslim heritage and culture in South Asia and the only requirement of Pakistani 
citizens was that they should demonstrate ‘unflinching loyalty to the State’ (Jinnah, 
October 11th, 1947).
However, this is not to say that there is a wholesale indifference to presenting the 
outside Other as hostile; in fact, Pakistan’s political discourse had always, to varying 
extents, employed anti-India sentiments to bolster it’s self image. The proposition is 
however, that there is marked difference in the intensity in which the Other is 
‘othered’. Nevertheless, it became increasingly clear that an Islamic ideology on its 
own was proving to be unsuccessful in ensuring the construction of a ‘nation’. For 
instance, even ten years after partition internal rebellion both in the eastern and 
western wings of Pakistan had not subsided, but had become increasingly vociferous. 
In October 1958 for instance, The Khan of Kalat, Mir Mohammed Yar Khan 
removing the Pakistani flag from the Miri fort in Baluchistan, hoisted his own 
ancestral flag in its place effectively signalling a break with the central government 
by inferring independence of his realm. Although this rebellion was quashed by the 
Pakistan army and followed by a military coup it did demonstrate the precarious 
condition of Pakistani nationalism. The new state leader, General Ayub, decided that 
a Pakistani national identity would take time to evolve and that in the meantime 
Pakistan was not ready for parliamentary politics but required martial law to bring 
stability and national survival (Ayub Khan 1967). In addition to domestic rebellions 
in its western unit the situation in Pakistan’s eastern wing became even more 
precarious during the 1960s with widespread riots. It became clear that an Islamic 
ideology was on its own failing to bind the population into a common nation. Faced 
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with such circumstances and an the apparent failure of Islam in providing national 
cohesion political leaders now increasingly relied on more vociferous representations 
of the Other as a hostile, inferior, expansionist and monolithically Hindu oppressor. 
A reading of the political discourse suggests a reorientation of focus amongst 
Pakistani leaders, and the argument here is that such representations are certainly not 
a natural outcome of inter-state relations rather this kind of a representation had a 
political function in its attempt to unite a Pakistani nation against a oppressive Hindu 
Other. Moreover, a discourse focussing on threat and security also worked to 
legitimise and pave the way for a strengthening of the military institution.  
3.4 Constructing nationalism: The hostile (Indian) Other 
It would be incomplete to leave out an analysis of the role that the populist leader 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (hereafter Z.A. Bhutto) played in establishing particular 
discursive practices in Pakistan’s political discourse. Bhutto’s rise in politics 
signalled a shift in the political discourse of Pakistan. Bhutto’s voluminous speeches 
and statements43 are often intensely preoccupied with marking out and defining the 
Indian Other and indeed he initiates a far more intimate reliance of Pakistani 
nationalism on anti-India representations and particularly the perceived threat from 
India. This focus on Bhutto however does not suggest that he was the chief architect 
of the changing political discourse. Foucault for instance in his discussion of the 
origin of historical events and moments is extremely sceptical of such suggestions 
that historical events or ideas can have a singular point of origin. Instead, Foucault 

43See:BhuttoZ.A.,1964a,1964b,1969,1970.
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argued that the emergence of ideas or representations was a momentary effect of the 
play of dominations – that different ideas are always vying to become dominant and 
that if one idea becomes dominant it is neither right nor wrong but as a result of its 
momentary success in becoming dominant. For Foucault, 
the accidents, the minute deviations…the errors, the false appraisals, and the 
faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and 
have value for us;, it…discover[s] that truth or being do not lie at the root of 
what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents (Foucault, 
1977 in Smart 1985:56)44.
However, the ascendance of Bhutto to helm of national affairs signalled a break with 
past understandings and constructions of the Self and Other and it is really at this 
point we find Pakistan’s political discourse beginning to construct the Other as 
inferior and belligerent. Discursive practices thus in addition to vehemently drawing 
on a nationalist Islamic narrative also begin to draw on a representation of the Other 
as an intensely hostile, abnormal, aggressive, expansionist and a monolithically 
Hindu entity who is by default opposed to the smaller Islamic state of Pakistan . An 
analysis of the political discourse reveals a narrative that relies heavily on such 
binary constructions. The Other is devoid of heterogeneity and defined primarily on 
the basis of religious affiliation. General Ayub for instance argued that,

44Thougharguablythisfocuson‘accidents’issomethingacriticalrealistperspectivewouldreject
sincerealistontologysuggeststheexistenceofunderlyingmechanismsandstructureswhichmakeit
morelikelythatcertainrepresentationsemerge.
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the Indian attitude can be explained in pathological terms. The Indian 
leaders have a deep hatred for Muslims….[and] from the beginning India 
was determined to make things difficult for us (Ayub Khan, 1967  in 
Nizamani 2000:73)       
Much of the discursive practices reveal a strong tendency to equate an ‘Indian 
mentality’ with that of a ‘Hindu mentality’. Moreover, heterogeneity is denied 
because if there is a ‘deep hatred for Muslims’ then India must be homogenously 
Hindu. This idea of the Hindu despising all that is Islamic is a recurrent theme 
reproduced at different institutional sites and a narrative that has remained consistent 
throughout much of Pakistan’s history. This kind of political rhetoric that emerged in 
Pakistan can only be understood if one takes into account the prevailing context in 
which the discourse is embedded. Domestically Pakistan faced arduous conditions in 
terms of national integration. East Pakistan in particular was a sticking point and an 
issue which challenged the very foundations upon which Pakistan was created. Given 
the unrest in Bengal it had perhaps become clear that Islam on it own could not 
sufficiently bind the Pakistani people under the banner of nation and nationalism, and 
it is within this context that negative constructions of the Other begin to assert their 
power. The political discourse begins to focus on the outside Other as the cause of 
domestic problems and dissent in the Bengal is portrayed as of Indian making in 
order to weaken Islamic Pakistan. The subsequent truncation of Pakistan and the 
creation of Bangladesh was much more than a military success on the part of India, 
indeed the loss of East Pakistan was a significant psychological blow to Pakistan 
especially since it  gave strength to India’s vocal insistence that the ‘two-nation’ 
ideology had weak and false foundations. In Pakistan, the political discourse viewed 
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the loss not as an outcome of the shaky foundations of the two-nation theory but as a 
vengeful attack by India in its determination to demonstrate the invalidity of the 
theory and thus the existence of Pakistan. The separation of East Pakistan was 
represented as a deliberate and vengeful attack on Pakistan’s existence and a 
demonstration of the notion that India has not fully reconciled itself to the event of 
partition.
Although there is a wealth of historical data available that can explicitly demonstrate 
this point Z. A. Bhutto 1969 ‘The Myth of Independence’ provides an excellent 
synopsis of the kind of political representations cultivated by the discourse and gives 
a ‘feel’ for the kind of characterisations associated with the Other. An extract from 
this text is cited below.  
A life-long observation has convinced me that there is a streak of insanity in 
the Hindu’s and that nobody will arrive at correct appraisement of Hindu 
private and public behaviour on the supposition that they have a normal 
personality. This madness lurks within their ordinary workday self like a 
monomania, and the nature of the alienation can even be defined in the 
psychiatrist’s terms- it is partly dementia praecox, and partly paranoia. In all 
Hindu activities, especially in the public sphere, can be detected clear signs of 
either a feebleness of mental faculties or a pervasion of them.... (Bhutto
1969:126-128).
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.... through the period of Muslim domination, the Hindu exhibited an intense 
pride of race and culture, which developed into violent xenophobia. All the fear 
and hatred associated with the Malech – the unclean and uncivilised foreigner – 
were invoked in the struggle against the Muslim alien. Even when the Muslims 
sought compromise....they could not be accepted as equals because the faith of 
Islam was a challenge to the fundamental concept of the Hindu dogma....fed on 
centuries of hatred, their sense of injury received at Muslim hands reinforced 
by religious dogma, all Hindu movements have conceived the assimilation of 
the Muslim minority as part of their political agenda; differing only as to their 
method....Gandhi’s methods were more subtle. He frequently spoke of Muslims 
as blood-brothers and held out innumerable assurance that their rights would be 
safeguarded; but whenever called upon to define their rights and share of 
political power in an independent India, he invariably evaded a clear answer 
(Bhutto 1969:126-128).
The Hindu is endlessly demonised and vilified as being ‘evil’ in much of the official 
discourse and the extract above demonstrates the kind of characterisations cultivated. 
Firstly, the Hindu ‘Other’ is regularly assigned to the category ‘madness’ or 
‘psychologically ill’; this is a powerful way of dismissing and belittling the Other’s 
political world-view and statements as a product of a diseased mind. Indeed here 
there is reference to the way in which such a characterisation holds the authority of 
‘truth’ since this conclusion has been arrived at following a ‘life-long observation’. 
This is a repetitive theme which provides the basis from which the category ‘Other’ 
is further developed. Another significant and pervasive construction of the Hindu 
‘Other’ is that the prime motivation is an intense hatred of Islam and therefore this 
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‘Other’ cannot be put in the category of rationally calculating political actor. This 
depiction of motivation serves two purposes in that one the one hand it de-legitimises 
the ‘Others’ actions since they are not about ideology or foreign policy but about 
irrational hatred and on the other hand this characterisation highlights the difference 
between ‘them’ and ‘us’ i.e. ‘us’ being the diametric opposite of ‘irrational’. So that 
even when we propose rational actions such as compromise ‘...[the Muslims] could
not be accepted as equals because the faith of Islam was a challenge to the 
fundamental concept of the Hindu dogma’45. The Hindu religion itself is 
characterised as the foundation which promotes irrationality and madness leading to 
intense hatred and the wider implication here is that as long as they attach themselves 
to their religion Hindu’s will by default display such tendencies, note ‘all Hindu 
movements have conceived the assimilation of the Muslim minority’.  
Such dichotomising and binary discursive categorisations are a pervasive historical 
feature with characterisations seeking to essentialise, dehumanise and demonise the 
Hindu Other thus institutionalising an environment in which intense dehumanisation 
of the Other is normalised. There is no doubt that such narratives serve precise 
political functions in that they moralise the opposition to the Other by transforming it 
as a conflict between good and evil, After all, as Der Derian (2002) cited by Jackson 
(2005:60) notes, ‘[P]eople go to war because of how they see, perceive, picture, 
imagine, and speak of others; that is, how they construct the difference of others as 
well as the sameness of themselves through representation’. Secondly, the 

45ThenarrativeofthesuperiorityofIslamoverHinduismwasbolsteredbyapervasivenarrative
whichfirmlyprojectsontothecollectivememorythepropositionthatMuslimruleinsubcontinent
asrepresentedbytheMughalempire(15501857)astheregionsgreatestperiodofruleand
prosperity.
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construction is clearly part of a representational project in which not only are 
boundaries drawn between ‘them’ and ‘us’ but qualities of each are also affirmed. 
Differences are discursively interpreted as radical constructions of otherness; 
however, it is also important to note that such national narratives focusing on 
difference and the articulation of a security discourse have been critical in terms of 
constructing the Pakistani nation, conceived here as are all other nations, imagined
communities.
3.5 Political turbulence: Oscillating between military rule and democracy 
General Zia-Ul-Haq came to power through the overthrowing of Z. A. Bhutto who, 
although a popular prime minister, had been accused of rigging the 1977 elections. 
Opposition parties, including the religious right, came out on to streets in protest 
against Bhutto calling for the army to step in. Z. A. Bhutto was subsequently hanged 
by General Zia coupled with a number of other punitive measures such as the 
quashing of all political opposition, a crackdown on public protest and draconian 
media censorship. What is significant about Zia’s tenure is that the extent to which 
an Islamic ideology was employed to enable and legitimise the state apparatus. 
Siddiqua (2007:84) notes that the, 
alliance with the religious parties and propagation of Islamic culture were 
meant to establish the military hegemony over the civil society. The creation of 
the office of ‘nazim-e-salaat’ (controller of prayers), and the introduction of 
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Sharia law and Islamic banking in the mid 1980s, were some of the tools used 
to fight the secular image of Bhutto’s party. These measures gave the military 
dictatorship a symbolic legitimacy. 
Whilst the twin themes of an Indian other and an Islamic identity are constant within 
the discourse and occur simultaneously it is possible to argue that there is a 
qualitative difference between the discursive economies of Bhutto and Zia. Whilst 
Bhutto focussed on a more pronounced emphasis of a hostile Indian Other in order to 
consolidate the national self; the political discourse following the 1977 coup 
although continuing to focus on the Indian Other also began a renewed and 
aggressive use of Islamic discourse46.
In the backdrop of the Iranian Islamic revolution and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan General Zia set out on an explicit programme to systematically 
Islamisize Pakistani social structures and institutions. Pakistan was introduced to a 
zealous Islamisation involving, amongst other measures, the establishment of the 
clergy as an arm of the state and the establishment of hundred’s of madrassas 
financed mainly by the conservative Saudi government to educate the poor. In this 
context it is now widely established that these madrassas were also, at the time, a 

46WhileitisclearthatZiaUlHaqwasinvolvedinbringingamorepronouncedIslamiccharacterto
Pakistan’spoliticaldiscourseandindeedthewiderliteraturedocumentshowZiaUlHaqemployed
Islamicjustificationforhispolicychoices.IndeedanextendeddiscursiveanalysisoftheZiaUlHaq
yearswouldcertainlyrevealthediscursivestrategiesusedtoenableandconstrainworldviews
however,whatislessstudiediswhythishappened,whydidZiaUlHaqemployIslamicterminology?
Iaminclinedtoarguethatwhilethereisaclearpoliticalfunctionofthelanguage,GeneralZiawas
alsoreligiouslyinclinedman,andasStephenCohen(1984)hasargued,soismuchofthearmy.Most
ofitsrecruitstendtobedrawnfromthelowerandmiddleclasseswhoCohenarguesaremorelikely
tobereligiouslyinclinedthanPakistan’selites.Acriticalrealistperspectiveonstudyingthediscursive
realmismoregearedtoexploringsuchquestionsaroundwhythisdiscourseasopposedtoother
alternatives.
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source of ‘legitimate’ Islamic mujahideen who were in the game of assisting US 
strategic interests in ousting the Soviets from Afghanistan. It would be correct to say 
that large sums of money originating from the CIA and Saudi Arabia were involved 
in promoting a particular kind of combative Islam. For Nizamani (2000:100), the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 enabled an increased potency to Pakistan’s 
security narrative through the invoking of ‘images of a Pakistan sandwiched between 
hegemonic Hindu India and expansionist communist Russia’ and specifically through 
this narrative General Zia was able to take political actions such as the delaying of 
elections. The argument was that national security had precedence over the electoral 
process and General Zia ultimately declared in September 1979 that, ‘the security 
and solidarity of the country and the protection of Islamic ideology in any case was 
much more important than plunging the national into the electoral exercise’47. In 
essence then, the representation of Pakistan as sandwiched between two threats 
enabled the political discourse to articulate the electoral process as an opposite of 
Pakistan’s security (Nizamani 2000). Moreover, this notion of danger also 
legitimised defence expenditure indeed General Zia told the Pakistani population to, 
‘not grudge defence allocations…as no price is too big for national independence’48.
For Nizamani (2000) the pursuit of nuclear technology was buttressed by this 
security discourse within the within the wider political culture. Islamic imagery was 
frequently deployed to justify state action and policy ranging from authoritarian 
regimes, allocation of funds for the military and acquisition of nuclear technology. 
Indeed any major policy change or pursuit often intimately fused the policy with 
Islamic discourse to justify it. The nuclear narrative for instance employed Islam in 
the sense that it justified and legitimised Pakistan’s nuclear acquisition and capability 

47Dawn,September27,1979.
48Dawn,August11th,1988.
69



by representing it as an Islamic shield against those opposed to Islam. Similarly, 
Pakistan’s decision to co-operate with the US in Afghanistan during the 1980s drew 
on notions of an ‘Islamic jihad’ to legitimise the alliance. However, as the analysis 
demonstrated the secession of the Eastern half of Pakistan in 1971 dealt a serious 
blow to the role of Islam as a unifying factor for the country and following this the 
political elite in Pakistan began to articulate a more nuanced emphasis on the role 
and purpose of India vis-à-vis Pakistan. Indeed the widespread political articulation 
of the negative and inferior representation of the Indian Other began to emerge more 
aggressively following the break-up of Pakistan in 1971. 
3.6 Pakistan’s military elite 
The kind of narratives and recurrent themes in Pakistan’s political discourse 
converging around a ‘security’ theme49 had a particular effect on the organisation of 
political space in that they enabled the entrenchment of the military institution in 
Pakistan’s political process (Askari-Rizvi 2000, Cheema 2002, Cohen 1984, Nawaz 
2008). Consequently, successive military regimes were legitimately able to 
undermine the growth of civilian political institutions by putting the military 
institution in a favourable position with regard to policy formulation (Waseem 2002). 

49DavidCampbell(1992)hasarguedthatsecuritydiscoursesactuallyconstitutethestate,whathe
meansbythisis:thatthestateasadistinguishableentityonlyknowwhoandwhatitisthrough
articulatingexternalthreatsandradicalOther/swhichistremendouslyimportantformaintaining
theinternal/external,foreign/domestic,Self/Otherboundariesthatdefinethelimitsofthenational
group.Suchapropositiondoesnotdenytheimportanceofsecurityratheritdrawsanalytical
attentiontothenotionthatinorderforsomethingorsomeonetobecomeaquestionofsecurityit
needstobefirstconstructedassuchinthepoliticaldiscourseorinOleWaever’sterminologyit
needstobesecuritized.Fromasocialconstructionistperspectiveitisimportanttoembedthe
conceptofsecuritywithinitshistoricalanddiscursivespecificity.
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There was a deep sense of insecurity that infested the Pakistani state after its birth in 
1947 and the armed forces as the guardian of the state compensated for this 
insecurity. From a discourse analysis perspective any kind of hegemony requires 
discursive articulation or a ‘regime of truth’ which justifies and legitimises social 
dominance. In this respect, Pakistan’s security discourse whilst focussed on 
articulating ‘threat’ ensured the social dominance of the military establishment and 
their ascendance into an epistemic community described by Haas (1992) as a 
network of elites that play a central role in defining state identity, purpose and 
policy. Moreover, this special status afforded to the military establishment by the 
pervasive security discourse had the effect that the military was able to enjoy 
enormous social power in terms of defining and ‘framing’ national issues. 
However, more than being promoted to being a depository of knowledge Siddiqua 
(2007:248) in her analysis of Pakistan’s military economy has argued that the 
military institution, over time, graduated from drawing limited resources from an 
annual defence allocation into a ‘burgeoning economic enterprise’. Siddiqua 
documents the entrenchment of the armed forces in Pakistan’s economy to the extent 
that the country’s main assets and companies were subsequently concentrated in the 
hands of a small minority of senior army officials. This economic power established 
the military as a substantially autonomous institution which was deeply interested in 
Pakistan’s political process since it has a huge stake in maintaining the advantageous 
status quo. In exploring the dominance of an epistemic community Haas (1992:27) 
further observes that the power of an epistemic community can be compounded by 
its ‘political infiltration….into governing institutions which [then] lays the 
groundwork for a broader acceptance of the community’s beliefs and ideas about the 
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proper construction of social reality’. Arguably then the military’s interference in 
Pakistan’s political process and the its hindrance to the development of civil and 
political institutions makes sense if the aim is to ensure the military’s social and 
economic power in Pakistan, and therefore it follows that a discourse focussing on 
security and threat is best suited to maintaining and justifying such dominance.  The 
suggestion here is that, as Pakistan’s military became more and more involved in 
building an economic empire it also began to rely much more on articulating binary 
categorisations in order for institutional survival. Access to modes of communication 
is thus an extremely important power resource since it allowed the military to 
articulate a discourse that elevated the institution to a position whereby any critique 
of it was represented as synonymous with treachery. Indeed this representation of the 
role of the military in Pakistan is so strong and ingrained that even today critique is 
often guarded. 
3.7 The absence of an Islamic revolution in Pakistan
However, what is peculiar in this context is that despite Pakistan’s intimate and 
perhaps necessary reliance on an Islamic inspiration; arguably, Pakistan as a nation-
state has historically never resorted to religious revolution along the lines of Iran nor 
has any fanatically religious political world-view ever gained substantial ground 
politically. The Pakistani social fabric is largely moderate in religious terms. 
LaFrance (2002), accounts for this by drawing on a historical analysis noting that 
Islam was propagated in the sub-continent through Sufis whose teachings focussed 
on tolerance and co-existence. The Sufist mode of disseminating Islam heavily 
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involved music and was certainly not combative. Sufis are highly revered in Pakistan 
and during the annual ‘urs’ or death anniversary of any Sufi, people in large numbers 
throng to sufi shrines throughout the country50. Secondly, LaFrance argues that by 
and large the ruling elite of Pakistan including the founder of Pakistan Mohammed 
Ali Jinnah have belonged to the Aligarh51 school of thought characterised by their 
openness to modern scientific and technological developments. Indeed even the 
Jamaat-i-Islami, the largest religious political party in Pakistan ascribe to the Aligarh 
school of thought. Thirdly, Jaffrelot (2002) suggests that Muslim nationalism ,as a 
historical phenomena, in the Sub-continent cannot be traced to any primordial 
essence; instead elite Muslims of united India fearing shifts in the status quo which 
seemed to disadvantage them began a process of deliberate Muslim mobilisation 
using identity markers such as Islam and the Urdu language. For Jaffrelot, Muslim 
nationalism in the sub-continent never had deep roots and was territorially confined 
to Northern India. This observation is particularly relevant since it seems to explain, 
albeit in part, the reason why an Islamic identity was not a natural or deeply 
embedded identity marker for Pakistan’s population. The secession of Pakistan’s 

50ThoseadheringtoWahhibism,anultraconservativeandorthodoxSunnisectpredominately
associatedwithMuslimsinSaudiArabiarejectandevendeclareas‘nonMuslims’thosewhorevere
saintsandSufi’sastraditionallydoneinPakistan.ItisrelevantthatPersianGulfoilwealthhasbeen
involvedinpropagatingthespreadofWahhibistidea’sintheMuslimworldandparticularlyin
Pakistan.
51AligarhMuslimUniversitywassetbySirSyedAhmedKhanfollowingtheIndianwarof
independencein1857.ThepurposeofthisinstitutionwastodisseminatetheEnglishlanguageand
‘westernsciences’tothecommunity.Theestablishmentoftheuniversityissignificantsinceatthe
timetherewasintenseoppositiontotheBritishRajinIndiaandtheirreplacementofthePersian
languagewithEnglishastheofficiallanguageofthecourtsoflaw.SirSyedAhmedKhanhowever,
wasoftheviewthatproficiencyintheEnglishlanguageandamoderneducationwerecriticalifthe
MuslimcommunitywastoimprovetheirstandingincolonialIndia.OvertheyearstheAligarh
MuslimUniversitygaverisetoaneweducatedclassofMuslimwhowerenotonlyactiveinthe
politicalsystemoftheBritishRajbutalsoservedasacatalystforchangeinthesubcontinent
culminatingintheindependenceofIndiafromtheBritish.TheAligarhschoolofthoughtwasknown
foritsopennesstomodernscientificandtechnologicaleducationandwesternthoughtingeneral.
SomeofitsnotablealumniincludeMohammedAliJinnah(founderofPakistan),SheikhAbdullah
(PrimeministerandchiefministerofIndianKashmir),KhawajaNazimuddin(formerprimeminsterof
Pakistan).
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eastern wing clearly demonstrated the limits of an Islamic ideology as the sole binder 
of the ‘nation’.
3.8 A decade of isolation from the international community 
Although the death of General Zia-Ul-Haq in an airplane crash brought an abrupt end 
to direct military rule in Pakistan and ushered in the election of 1988 nevertheless it 
would be incorrect to suggest that this signalled the end of military interference; 
rather, the method of political infiltration became indirect but no less pervasive 
(Cohen 2005). From 1988 to 1999 Pakistan was, on the surface, ruled by 
democratically elected governments although the political situation remained 
intensely unstable owing to fact that during these ten years alone Pakistanis 
witnessed eight different prime ministers. Arguably the main reason for such a high 
turnover can be laid at the door of the military who as Siddiqua (2007:91) notes was 
the,  ‘the ultimate arbiter’ and ‘tweaked the political system every two years, 
especially when it saw the civilian regime challenging the defence establishment’s 
authority, or it perceived a sustentative threat to the polity’. However, significant to 
our analysis here, is that there is a consistency in terms of the themes dominating the 
political discursive space. In the run up to the 1988 elections for instance, Nawaz 
Sharif leader of the newly formed political party IJI52 vociferously and explicitly 
accused the leadership of the opposing political party the Pakistan Peoples Party 
(PPP) of colluding with Jewish and Hindu lobbies with the object of being to install a 

52IslamiJahooriIttehadtranslatesas:IslamicDemocraticAlliance.
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government in Islamabad that suited their ‘designs’53. Historically Pakistan’s 
political discourse despite witnessing a tirade of different statesmen and women had 
remained consistent in one sense in that India and Islam have remained dominant 
themes throughout varying only in terms of emphasis at different historical 
conjectures.
However, on the international front during the 1990s, Pakistan became increasingly 
isolated and towards the end of the decade Pakistan was being termed a pariah state. 
The reason for this isolation was twofold, in the first instance, this related to 
Pakistan’s particular relationship with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan; Pakistan, 
in addition to Saudi Arabia had been one of the only states in the world to recognise 
the Taliban. The reasons for this support were less concerned with a recognition of 
the ‘legitimacy’ of the Taliban and had more to do with Pakistan’s interest in having 
a pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan. It is important to contextualise such a 
strategy, in the fact that Pakistan is located in a ‘dangerous neighbourhood’ 
bordering India on the east, China on the North and Afghanistan and Iran on the 
west. As result of the perception of potential threats on all sides, Pakistan has always 
been interested in having a friendly government in Kabul and has repeatedly gotten 
involved in Afghanistan to ensure such a scenario. However, the chaos that engulfed 
Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal and subsequent US rebuffing led to 
Pakistan’s decision to take the militant Islamic student movement, the Taliban under 
its wing (see for e.g. Roy 2002, Mir 2009)). Pakistan’s inter-services Intelligence 
Agency (ISI) guided, armed and helped recruit new members and provided them 
with training and battle plans that they used to take over most of Afghanistan in the 

53Dawn,November2nd1988.
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1990s. Furthermore, it is also pertinent to note that following the end of the Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan the US effectively ditched Pakistan since it was no longer 
of any strategic use to the US. Only a year after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the 
US imposed various US economic and military sanctions on Pakistan the first of 
which was the Pressler Amendment of 1990 relating to non-proliferation54.
Moreover, India’s growing economic might and leverage prompted the US to begin 
repairing some of the damage done to US-India relations during the cold-war 
standoff. In such a scenario, Pakistan was adamant in ensuring that a pro-Pakistan 
government was in place in Kabul. 
Secondly, Pakistan’s nuclear tests in the spring of 1998, which had followed those of 
India’s in the same month, prompted international condemnation and further US 
sanctions. During the following summer, Osama Bin Laden was implicated in the 
terrorist attacks on US embassies in Dar-e-Salaam and Nairobi such events further 
tarnished the image of Pakistan since the Taliban confessed to being the protectors of 
the Saudi millionaire and since Pakistan recognised the Taliban regime then this 
implicitly implied that they also supported the attacks (see Shaikh 2009:198). The 
Taliban, by this stage, had become notorious on the world stage and in addition to the 
accusation of harbouring Islamic militant groups their discriminatory policies 
targeting women became the subject of much international condemnation55. Finally, 
Musharraf’s coup of October 1999 contributed to international isolation and 
prompted the expulsion from the Commonwealth and yet again more sanctions. The 
extent to which Pakistan had become a ‘pariah’ can be gauged from the fact that in 

54SeeKux(2001)foracomprehensiveaccountoftheUSPakistanrelationshipbetween19472000.
55SeeChapter8:‘AVanishedGender:Women,ChildrenandTalibanCulture’inRashid,A.(2009)
whichprovidesaparticularlyusefulaccountoftheTaliban’sdiscriminationofwomen.
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2000 Bill Clinton on his visit to India, which was significant in the sense that it was 
the first in twenty-two years, spent five days in India and then immediately flying to 
Pakistan spent a total of 5 hours in the country. Thus Pakistan during the 1990s and 
into the new millennium underwent a kind of international scrutiny and 
condemnation not experienced before, and which was primarily driven by its 
association with the Taliban regime coupled with its murky role in nuclear 
acquisition and proliferation.
3.9 The Taliban connection 
It is important to immediately clarify that Pakistan’s policy of support for the 
fanatical regime had less to do with the Taliban’s alleged ‘Islamic’ credentials and 
had more to do with a long-standing Pakistani policy to provide ‘strategic depth’ on 
its western border. If we recall, Pakistan is flanked by a hostile neighbour on its 
eastern front in the form of India. Pakistan’s insecurity dilemma vis-à-vis India has 
played a central role throughout its existence to the extent that  Pakistani leaders 
have always been interested in securing support from the state on its western side i.e. 
Afghanistan. Of course, if Pakistan is continually engaged in belligerency with India 
the last thing it needs is conflict with Afghanistan on its western borders. As a result, 
Afghanistan has been continually courted by Pakistan albeit rather unsuccessfully. 
This is because from the very beginning of Pakistan’s inception Afghan leaders had 
refused to accept the legality of the Durand line or the demarcation of Pakistan’s 
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borders with Afghanistan and which was sponsored by the British Raj in 194756.
Such was the intensity of feeling that Afghanistan was the only state in the world to 
oppose Pakistan’s admission into the United Nations in 1947 on the basis that it 
refused to recognise the territorial agreements reached with the British.  
Pakistan and Afghanistan are inextricably linked, and share an immense border of 
2430 km with the Afghan provinces of Badakhshan, Nurestan, Kona, Nangarhar, 
Patika, Zabul, Khandhar, Helamand and Nimruz adjacent to the Pakistani border; 
which cuts through sandy deserts in the south to rugged and difficult mountain 
terrain in the North. Both sides of this border is populated by ethnic Pakhtun’s57 who 
having tribal and family connections have historically moved back and forth without 
much regard for state boundaries. Following Pakistan’s creation, Kabul began a 
sustained effort to extend support to Pakhtun and Baloch nationalists inside of 
Pakistan and supported calls for the creation of a new state called ‘Pakhunistan’. For 
Pakistani leaders, Kabul’s covert and overt foreign policy objective was abhorrent 
considering its own efforts at integrating Pakistan’s population into one unit. 
Arguably, this remained a consistent Afghan policy and in his speech at the UN in 
1972 Afghanistan’s foreign minister reiterated this when he argued that the 
‘inclusion of NWFP and Balochistan in Pakistan in 1947 constituted a violation of 
Pakhtuns’ right of self-determination, and areas which were never part of undivided 
India were included in the new state’(Jillani 2001:378-9). Flanked by a much 
stronger and hostile India on its eastern border, Pakistan consequently became 
increasingly interested in the installation of a ‘friendly’ government in Kabul in order 

56TheborderbetweentheAfghanistanandBritishIndiawasagreedtoin1893.Thisagreementtook
placebetweentheEmirofAfghanistanAbdulRehmanKhanandtheBritishGovernmentofIndia.
57Alsoreferredtoas‘Pashtun’s’intheliterature.
78



to defuse potential threat from Afghanistan; which led directly to attempts to 
influence Afghan internal affairs.  This is really the gist of Pakistan’s involvement 
and interest in Afghanistan.
Despite Pakistan’s attempts at courting Afghanistan, the Afghan government instead 
sought to develop friendly and cordial relations with India, and consequently these 
developments caused much alarm for Pakistan. During the Cold War, India had 
unofficially aligned itself with the Soviet bloc whilst Pakistan on its part was the 
bulwark of the US in the region; however, what became even more alarming was the 
communist character emerging in Afghan politics. Since the communists were pro-
India, such a turn of events in Afghanistan was unsavoury for the leaders of Pakistan. 
Indeed, in April of 1978 the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) 
successfully staged a Communist coup overthrowing president Daud’s government 
who was by no means pro-Pakistan but had begun to make friendly gestures. It has 
been estimated that at least 350 Soviet ‘advisors’ were present in Afghanistan at the 
time to ensure a swift and unproblematic Communist ‘revolution’ (Jillani 2001).  
This state of Afghan affairs was problematic for Pakistan because of India’s 
alignment with the Communist bloc and the Soviet pro-Indian policy in general. 
Consequently, Pakistan’s policy of influence resorted to supporting dissident Islamic 
elements within Afghanistan who opposed the ruling communist government.  
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The Soviet invasion58 of Afghanistan in 1979 proved critical in the bolstering of 
support for Islamic dissidents when the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
calculated that it had an ally in the form of the Muslim dissidents who could be used 
by the US to avert Soviet expansion in the region. Consequently, the CIA began to 
pour huge funds into the recruitment, training and arming of these Islamic 
mujahideen (soldiers). These funds were covertly channelled through Pakistan, and 
its Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) decided which group of mujahideen were 
to receive the bulk of US funds59. This strategy was acceptable to Pakistan since it 
afforded the Pakistani state significant influence in Afghanistan. Thus, over the 
period of 10 years, Pakistan’s ISI worked in close collaboration with the Afghan 
mujahideen to avert Soviet expansion, and this ultimately led to the cultivation of 
close links between the ISI and the Mujahideen. In 1989, following the Soviet 
withdrawal the US having served its interests in the region also made a quick retreat 
leaving behind Afghanistan, which was by now, a wretchedly poor and unstable 
country ‘armed to the teeth with the most sophisticated weapons and torn apart by 
warlords’ (Musharraf 2006). With reference to the role of the ‘allies’, which included 
Pakistan, the United States and Saudi Arabia Musharraf (2006:208) notes that, 
we helped create the mujahideen, fired them with religious zeal in seminaries, 
armed them, paid them, fed them, and sent then to a jihad against the Soviet 
Union in Afghanistan. We did not stop to think how we would divert them to 
productive life after the jihad was won. 

58TheSovietinvasionwasdesignedtosupporttheCommunistgovernmentinAfghanistanwhohad
soughthelpfromtheSovietsagainsttheIslamicMujahideenresistance.
59Coll,S(2004)inhisbook‘GhostWars:TheSecretHistoryoftheCIA,AfghanistanandBinLaden,
fromtheSovietInvasiontoSeptember10,2001’providesarevealingaccountoftheCIA’scovert
involvementintheevolutionanddevelopmentofthealQaedanetwork.
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Consequently, and very soon after the end of the Cold War, Afghanistan spiralled 
into a brutal civil conflict between competing warlords. Pakistan had its own 
problems, not least the influx of 4.5 million Afghan refugees that had poured into the 
country during the Soviet invasion, but also the huge influx of arms and illegal drugs 
into the country. Moreover, its continued belligerent engagement with India meant 
that a pro-Pakistan Afghan leadership remained a vital source of strategic depth in 
the eyes of the Pakistani establishment, well into the 1990s. During this time, for 
Pakistan, the Taliban (literally translated as ‘the students’) posed to be the best pro-
Pakistan group who would not stoke Pakhtun and Baloch ethno-nationalist sentiment 
in Pakistan and secondly would not dispute the Durand line. Thus in the aftermath of 
the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan the official policy of Pakistan had been to 
support the ascendance of the Taliban in Afghanistan as opposed to the Tajik 
dominated and Indian-backed Northern Alliance. The Taliban regime propagating its 
own bizarre interpretation of Islam was subjected to extreme criticism from the 
international community prompting its non-recognition in the international arena. 
However, it is important to note that Pakistan’s Afghan policy largely emerged in the 
context of its insecurity dilemma vis-à-vis India. As such, its support for the Islamic 
mujahideen and subsequently the Taliban must be seen as a strategic interest rather 
than an ideological commitment. 
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3.10 Pakistan’s response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 
In September of 2001, and in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the 
United States, Pakistan decided to allow the US the use of airbases in Jacobabad in 
Sindh province and Shamsi in Balochistan to be used by American forces as recovery 
facilities during military strikes. By early October news reports noted that ‘a small 
contingent of US forces has already arrived at these facilities and arrangements were 
underway to make them operational’60. Officially, these airbases were to only 
provide ‘logistical support’ rather than be employed as bases from which to launch 
military strikes inside Afghanistan. Instead, American and British warships lying off 
of Pakistan’s coast were used to launch aircraft and missiles over Pakistani airspace 
and into Afghanistan (Synnott 2009). Pakistan’s military and other agencies also 
played an important role in providing intelligence and support to US forces inside 
Afghanistan and along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in terms of military 
targeting. Over the preceding years, while the West had disengaged with Afghanistan 
following the expulsion of the Soviets in 1989 Pakistan’s ISI, on the other hand, had 
continually been involved in the region. Consequently, the ISI had considerable 
expertise extending not only to names of militants and their organisations but also a 
deep understanding of the political power play among groups and their various 
factions (ibid). This information and insight was vital to the US operation in the 
region. Pakistan further co-operated with the US in terms of capturing hundreds of 
al-Qaeda members, associates and facilitators and handing them over to the US.

60BBCNews:Article:‘UScanusePakistanairbases’publishedon10thOctober,2001at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1590807.stm.
82



This joint military co-operation with the US was a direct result of Pakistan’s decision 
to join the international coalition against al-Qaeda and their Afghan-based Taliban 
hosts, but more significantly it signalled a decisive and abrupt shift in Pakistan’s 
domestic and foreign policy discourses. This is because in the period prior to the 
terrorist attacks on American soil, the Pakistani government had remained one of the 
strongest allies of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and had helped the group 
consolidate power from the mid-1990s onwards. Although this foreign policy invited 
much criticism from the international community; nevertheless, Pakistan could not 
be convinced to abandon support. Of course, supporting the Taliban was justified 
domestically along the lines of an argument that posited that although the Taliban 
were perhaps fanatical and over zealous; nevertheless they remained ‘Muslim’. What 
is interesting however, in this context is the abruptness with which official policy 
discourse was altered in the aftermath of September 2001, and the subsequent 
opening up of Pakistan airspace and airbases to US military operations. This point 
will be taken up further in the thesis; the argument will suggest that much discursive 
work was required in order to legitimise and justify such an abrupt policy reversal.
3.11 Pakistan: A critical appraisal of the literature 
As the introduction to this research project indicated there has, following the 
commencement of the US-led ‘war on terror’, been an explosion of literature 
examining an array of issues ranging from varying notions of an extension of US 
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imperialism61, to concerns regarding the possibilities of an Islamist takeover of 
Pakistan’s nuclear technology62. Much has been written about various facets 
concerning Pakistan and its relationship to the ‘war on terror’. It is possible to 
arbitrarily divide this literature broadly into three groups each of which, in important 
ways, highlights different nuances of the ‘problem-field’ depending on the specific 
approach taken to the subject-area. In the first instance, and by far the most abundant 
is the broadly realist-inspired literature which implicitly and exclusively 
comprehends Pakistan’s relationship to the war on terror wholly within a uni-polar 
word environment. Many writers in this mould explain Pakistan’s willingness to join 
the international coalition against Al-Qaeda and their Taliban hosts as a direct 
outcome of a ‘carrots and stick’ scenario in which the US holds the stick. Hilary 
Synnott (2009:63) for instance writes that, ‘Musharraf, who having “war-gamed” the 
possibility of having the US as an adversary, immediately came up with the only 
possible response: to join the coalition in the so-called ‘global war on terror’. 
Similarly, Jones and Shaikh (2006:2) write that, ‘Musharraf made a snap decision: 
Washington would get what it wanted’. Ali (2008:146) goes even further writing 
that, 

61Seeforinstance,Chomsky(2007:87),SotirisandSpyros(2008),Rockmore(2004),Stokes(2005).
SeealsoIgantieff,M.ProfessorofHumanRightsPolicyattheKennedySchoolofGovernmentwho,
writingin2002,intheNewYorkTimesandreferringtoUSoperationsinAfghanistanwritesthat:‘Yet
theSpecialForcesaren’tsocialworkers.Theyareanimperialdetachment,advancingAmerican
powerandinterestsinCentralAsia.Callitpeacekeepingornationbuilding,callitwhatyoulike
imperialpolicingiswhatisgoingoninMazar.Infact,America’sentirewaronterrorisanexercisein
imperialism.ButwhatelsecanyoucallAmerica’slegionsofsoldiers,spooksandSpecialForces
straddlingtheglobe?’AlternativelyotherwritersconceptualiseAmericaasa‘reluctant’powerand
welcomeUS‘benign’imperialism–seeforinstanceMallaby(2002).
62SeeforinstanceBBCReport:‘ArePakistan’sNuclearWeaponsSafe?’bySyedShoaibHasan,
publishedon23rdJanuary2008,availableat:www.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7190033.stm.Also
relevanthereisKifr2007.
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Armitage handed the ISI boss a seven-point list of U.S. requirements from 
Pakistan for waging the coming war in Afghanistan. Without even looking 
closely at the printed sheet, Mahmud Ahmad put it in his pocket and said he 
accepted everything. 
Here, the analysis hinges on a simple observation concerning the primacy of the US 
in the international system and resultant behaviour of states as being in line with the 
realist conception of ‘state survival’63. Whilst many writers tend to exclude a broader 
acknowledgement of the global coalition that sprung into existence following 9/11; 
some analysts add more ‘context’ to this oversimplification. For instance, Rizvi 
(2004) notes that many western states, in addition to China as well as Russia, were in 
favour of US measures to counteract terrorism; moreover, the UN General Assembly 
itself condemning the terrorist attack on US soil called upon members to join the 
global effort. It is within this context that Rizvi (2004:24) explains Pakistan’s 
decision arguing that, ‘[Pakistan] sensing the mood of the international community’ 
as well as the UN General Assembly resolutions decided that inclusion in a coalition 
partnership would help protect Pakistan’s major strategic interests.  
Although Hillary Synnott’s analysis is geared towards providing a prescriptive 
model, or an action plan to those in the West whose interests are tied up with 
Pakistan; nevertheless, he provides a particularly comprehensive overview of the 
volatile situation in Pakistan and particularly the dilemmas it faces. This is a 

63Ali(2008:195)writesaninterestingaccountofPakistan’sdependenceonAmerica.Hearguesthat
theUSuseditspositionasa‘paymaster’toensurepolicyinPakistanisalwaysorientatedtowardsUS
interestsandnotesthatearlyon‘thenewrulesofPakistandevelopedanearlycommunalawareness
thattosurvivetheyhadtorenttheircountry…therewasonlyonepossiblebuyer’[theUS].
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refreshing and holistic analysis describing the historical and political background to 
the current turmoil, and challenges faced by Pakistan. Synott’s contribution can be 
contrasted to other writers who seem increasingly concerned with elucidating 
Pakistan’s ‘genuineness’ in terms of commitment to the coalition effort. Hadar 
(2002:1) for instance is principally concerned with ‘truth’ evaluations leading to the
conclusion that: Pakistan is an insincere US ally in the sense that it is ‘not doing 
enough’. Hadar, in focussing on monetary funds provided by the US to fight its war 
in the region argues that,
Americans should not be required to “reward” Pakistan for taking steps that are 
in its own interest, such as reforming its political and economic system, ending 
anti-American and anti-Semitic propaganda, arresting terrorists or reducing 
tensions with India….By permitting Islamabad to “wag” Washington and 
squeeze rewards from it, Washington has helped to prop up one of the world’s 
most anti-American states.  
This line of reasoning is US-centric, and unlike Synnott fails to take into account the 
nuances of the historic relationship between the US, Pakistan and Afghanistan64.
However, such academic incursions into evaluating ‘truth’ and ‘genuineness’ reflects 
a general pattern in the post-9/11 US-Pakistan relationship where, for instance, the 
head of US spying operations John Negroponte65 claimed that (despite provision of 
US funds) al-Qaeda were strengthening their foothold in Pakistan. On the Pakistani 

64Seealso,‘Pakistan:Friendorfoe?’inLosAngelesTimesSeptember5th2006availableat
http://www.ciponline.org/asia/articles/090506harrison.htm.
65SeeBBCreportFriday12thJanuary2007,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/6254375.stm.
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side, rejecting these comments, Pakistan’s foreign office spokeswomen insisted that 
‘Pakistan does not provide a secure hideout to al-Qaeda or any terrorist group…in 
fact the only country that has been instrumental in breaking the back of al-Qaeda is 
Pakistan’(ibid). Although Hadar’s analysis represents a particularly blunt and crude 
way of approaching Pakistan’s relationship with the US and its ‘war on terror’ it is 
notable that many more ‘polite’ analyses tend to also focus their energies on 
precisely this issue which involves quantitatively investigating ‘outputs’ in relation 
to ‘funds given’. 
Further still, other writers and academics are concerned with positing analyses that 
relay immense threat of either an Islamist takeover of Pakistan or an immanent threat 
of ‘state failure’. Kfir (2007) for instance argues that, ‘Pakistan is a weak state, 
bordering on failure…the longer Pakistan remains in this vulnerable position, the 
more powerful the Islamists will become’. In this context, often there is the 
suggestion that given this threat of ‘failure’ the notion of nuclear acquision by 
terrorist groups is realisable. Consequently, many analysts engage with exploring the 
reliability of the protections and other safety measures Pakistan has in place in order 
to ensure that its nuclear technology is not transferred either through collaboration or 
through a (possible) takeover by terrorist groups. Still, others have disregarded such 
concerns (Khan 2009:13) and the idea of an Islamist take-over (Synott 2009b). 
Writing in 2006, and before Musharraf’s ousting from power, Grare (2006:1) argued 
that the risk of a Islamist takeover in Pakistan was a myth to ensure institutional 
supremacy of the army; he writes that, ‘what the West perceives as a threat to the 
regime in Pakistan are manifestations of the Pakistani Army’s tactics to maintain 
political control’.
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Often this idea of an ‘Islamist takeover’ within the literature is often premised on the 
somewhat implicit notion that Pakistani’s are inherently anti-American and are open 
to an Islamist government. Arguably, such a notion blurs important context in the 
sense that it fails to recognise or emphasise that Pakistani’s on the whole are not 
ideologically anti-American but rather the anti-American sentiment has a solid 
foundation in Pakistan.
As Ali (2008: preface, x) has noted, one of the reason for the deep hostility to the US 
in Pakistan ‘has little to do with religion, but is based on the knowledge that 
Washington has backed every military dictator that has squatted on top of the 
country’.  It is important therefore, to qualify Pakistan’s broader anti-Americanism 
and separate it from the kind of anti-Americanism of Jihadi militant organisations. 
Arguably, while Pakistan’ s anti-Americanism can be seen to be a consequence of 
the often exploitative relationship between the US and Pakistan. Jihadi militant’s on 
the other hand posit anti-Americanism on the basis of how the US deals with the 
wider global Muslim ummah. So while Pakistan’s popular anti-Americanism tends to 
have national boundaries; Jihadi organisations often justify anti-Americanism on the 
basis of US (non)intervention in areas such as Kashmir, Palestine, Chechnya, 
Afghanistan and the like. This position however is very rarely alluded to in the 
literature, and most analysts conform to one of the core narratives of the wider 
discourse on ‘Islamic terrorism’, in that it is, ‘motivated largely by religious or 
‘sacred’ causes rather than political or ideological concerns’ Jackson (2007:405).
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 In this context it is also important to note that, for the militant jihadi mindset 
ordinary Muslims within Pakistan by ‘co-operating’ with the Pakistani authorities in 
allowing US presence in the region are also lumped together with the American 
‘Other’ and are therefore legitimate targets for violence. For instance, Rashid 
(2009:93 italics added) notes that the ‘Taliban and their supporters present the 
Muslim world and the West with a new style of Islamic extremism, which rejects all 
accommodation with Muslim moderation and the West’. This ideological mindset of 
the militant jihadi is thus opposed to the West in general and must be separated from 
the Pakistan’s popular anti-Americanism which is fuelled by its historical experience 
in dealing with the US. In this context, Ali (2008: preface, xi) writes that, given the 
hopelessness and inescapable bondage that afflicts Pakistan ‘the surprise is that more 
of them don’t turn to extremist religious groups, but they have generally remained 
stubbornly aloof from all that, which is highlighted in every election’. In light of the 
way that the US has historically conducted itself in the region in terms of its exit 
after the fall of the Soviets, and its involvement in procuring regime changes in 
Pakistan; there is a deep-seated distrust in Pakistan which cannot disappear overnight 
simply because the US and Pakistan are now collaborating in the ‘war on terror’. For 
instance, retired Lieutenant-general Talat Masood writes that, 
Anti-Americanism continues unabated…it is not confined to fringe elements 
alone but is spreading in the mainstream. A few recently retired military 
officers and politicians have gone as far as accusing the US for abetting and 
supporting acts of terror that have engulfed the country. This is despite the fact 
that President Obama and the administration hade made serious efforts clearing 
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up misunderstandings and reducing the inherent tensions not only with 
Pakistan but with the Muslim world in general66.
Masood further notes that the ‘legacy of betrayal is so strong and deep-rooted that 
the US will have to work very hard to overcome the prevailing suspicions’ (ibid). 
Often, western literature refuses an appreciation of such historical contexts and any 
manner of pundits and writers generalise Pakistani’s as ‘anti-American’. Whilst there 
is much focus on Pakistan’s behaviour and commitment in the post 9/11 
environment; it is useful to note the comments of Ahmed Rashid who questions the 
‘commitment’ of the US arguing that, ‘the US will abandon the region anyway after 
2011 and will prioritise its domestic issues’67. Indeed, this US strategy has already 
been alluded to by the Obama administration.         
In addition to these realist-inspired analyses, there is a second body of work that is 
very useful in the context of providing much needed detail in terms of rendering a 
chronological history of the events and interactions leading up to the terrorist attacks 
of 9/11. One of the distinct features of this body of literature is that it tends not to be 
wholly geared towards an analysis of how and where Pakistan features in relation to 
western and principally US interests in ‘winning’ the ‘war on terror’. Employing a 
linear methodology, these studies discuss issues around Pakistan’s relationship with 
the US prior to 9/11, its estrangement from the international community, Pakistan’s 
involvement with al-Qaeda and other Taliban-linked jihadi groups. In terms of the 

66TalatMasood,‘AntiAmericanism’inTheNewsDecember14th2009.
67AhmadRashidin,‘USpressureiscertainlythere,butsoaresweetenerssuchas…’inTheNewson
SundayDecember13th2009.
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period after 9/11, currently one of the most extensive works has been authored by 
Ahmed Rashid who in his 2008 book: ‘Descent into Chaos: the world’s most 
unstable region and the threat to global security’ aptly chronicles the events and 
interactions between Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States in the aftermath of 
9/11. Rashid focuses on uncovering and detailing such things as interactions between 
the CIA and the ISI, and why the coalition forces have failed in breaking a resurgent 
Taliban. Within this body of work, the literature engages in a more qualitative way 
with in-depth explorations of the Taliban and Islamic militancy in the context of 
South Asia. In particular, Amir Mir’s book: ‘Talibanization of Pakistan from 9/11 to 
26/11’ and Ahmed Rashid’s title: ‘Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism 
in Central Asia’ provide a comprehensive illumination of not only the rise of militant 
groups in the region, but also a detailed account of the inner workings and dynamics 
of the Taliban and related militant groups. In contrast to the kind of studies alluded to 
in the section above which focus on state-level interactions, Mir and Rashid’s 
expositions provide much needed qualitative accounts. These studies are particularly 
useful in that they engender a deeper engagement connecting with discussions 
around why the Taliban were able to gain a foothold in Afghanistan and 
neighbouring border areas in Pakistan, and why and how the Pakistani state became 
involved with these militant groups68. Furthermore, there are insights into such things 

68Inadditiontothesechronologicalaccountsanotherinterestingliteraturefocusesonthelackofa
robustnationalidentitythatclearlydefinestheroleandpurposeofIslaminPakistan.The
assumptionofthisliteratureisthatthisabsenceallowedforuncensoredspreadofmilitantformsof
IslaminPakistan. Shaikh(2009)forinstancehascontendedthatPakistan’sambivalenceand
uncertaintyconcerningtheroleofIslaminitsnationalidentitypreemptedawidescalenational
consensusofwhatitmeansto‘bePakistani’.Shaikh’scontentionisthatthisencouragedthe
unhinderedspreadofpoliticalIslamandimplicitlythestate’sassociationwiththeTaliban.Other
writerssuchasNasr(2005)andRacine(2002)havealsobeenconcernedwithexploringthenotionof
nationalidentityinPakistanandhavedrawnattentiontothenotionthatPakistan’sidentitystandsin
anegativerelationshiptoIndiatotheextentthatitisconstitutedbythe‘Indiasyndrome’.Forthese
writersPakistan’snationalpolicyratherthanbeingaconsequenceofnationalinterests,hasinstead
beendictatedbythisambivalentandfragileidentity.InthiscontextTalbot(2005)suggeststhatthe
developmentofanationalidentityinthePakistanicontexthasbeengreatlyhinderedbythe
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as the organisation of the Taliban, internal dynamics, ethnic moorings, ideology and 
methods of indoctrination. Studies like these have brought to the fore issues such as 
the failure of the state to regulate madrassas in Pakistan coupled with an inadequate 
public schooling system. Hussain (2007), for instance, has argued that the dramatic 
expansion in the number of madrassas over the past 30 years has provided a fertile 
recruiting ground for militant Islamic groups to the extent that there are now an 
estimated 13,000 madrassas in Pakistan with approximately 1.7 million enrolled in 
them.  
Finally, there is a third kind of literature relating to the ‘war on terror’ which tends to 
take as its principal subject-matter the United States and engages with the subject in 
one of two ways. Either there is a focus on explaining events, military and political 
practices in the aftermath of 9/11 in the context of a US ‘grand strategy’ to ensure 
global primacy. These discussions often posit Pakistan as a passive recipient of 
American empire and the thrust of the exploration remains on an implicit recognition 
and approval of the notion that the US-led war on terror’ is an extension of US 
imperialism in the world. For instance, Boyle (2008:192) in concentrating on 
measuring the efficiency of US interventions in the global war on terror advises that 
if the US-led war on terror is to continue then, ‘American policymakers need to think 
critically about its purpose and how it should be located within American grand 
strategy’. In contrast, another kind of approach that focuses on the ‘war on terror’ 
emphasises its relationship to securing US economic primacy in the world (for e.g. 

authoritarianlegacyofcolonialrulewhichheargues,gavewaytosuccessivedictatorialrulers.For
TalbotparticipatorypoliticscouldhavestrengthenedthedevelopmentofanindependentPakistani
identity.Thisliteratureisinterestinginthesensethatitprovidesamorehistoricallynuanced
accountofwhypoliticalIslamwasabletoflourishinPakistan.
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Colas 2007). Some of this literature, which tends to have Marxist undercurrents in 
terms of its focus on economics and capitalist relations of power, is reviewed in 
chapter six. In relation to literature that takes it subject matter the United States in the 
context of the ‘war on terror’ some writers, most notably Richard Jackson (2005), 
arguably take a social constructivist approach to their analysis. The concern here 
again is less with Pakistan and more in terms of how the US-led discourse on the 
‘war on terror’ normalised and legitimised political and military action and inaction 
on the part of the US in the post 9/11 time-frame. Employing a discourse analysis, 
Jackson contends that the emergence and proliferation of a specific ‘regime of truth’ 
emanating from the Bush administration ensured that certain a certain foreign policy 
and associated actions such as military deployment in Afghanistan were construed as 
inevitable. Importantly, Jackson focuses on the productive power of discourse in 
terms of enabling and constraining political action. 
Inevitably, since the subject-area of Pakistan and its relationship with the US-led 
‘war on terror’ is so wide-ranging and abundant the review of the literature can but 
be limited in a modest project such as this one. For instance, there is a wide range of 
literature available concerning Pakistan’s nuclear status, and though briefly 
considering this issue I have however, deliberately not sought to develop this theme 
in order to keep the literature review focussed and relevant to the research subject69.
Nevertheless, I have addressed the main contours of the debate as they relate to the 
specific subject-matter of this thesis. The objective of the discussion has been to 

69ThereisanextensiveliteratureonnuclearrelatedissuesconcerningPakistan.Seeforinstance:
Ahmed,S.(2000).SecurityDilemmasofNuclearArmedPakistan.ThirdWorldQuarterly.Vol.21,no,
5pp.781793.Shaikh,F.(2002)Pakistan’sNuclearBomb:Beyondthenonproliferationregime.
InternationalAffairs.Vol.78,no.1.pp.29–48.
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make immediately discernable the originality of this research project in relation to 
the previously published work in that something of this nature and focus has not been 
previously undertaken. This study will take a broadly constructivist perspective on 
the ‘war on terror’ and in this sense it follows in the footsteps of Jackson (2005) who 
makes a similar enquiry into the construction of the ‘war on terror’ in the US. This 
theoretical approach to the case-study offers a fresh perspective in that the thesis will 
not deliberate on accounting for such things as ‘truths’ as do other studies; rather, its 
focus is altogether different and concerns the productivity of a specific discourse in 
terms of generating practice. In taking such a theoretical approach, the study pays 
attention and operationalises analytical categories ignored by other studies; 
consequently bringing to the fore a different way of looking at the problem-field. For 
instance, the literature is often geared towards providing a quantitative analysis 
analysing the cost-benefit scenario of such things as the amount of funds given by 
the US to Pakistan and the concrete practice of Pakistan in relation to pursuing al-
Qaeda and the Taliban. Within this context, much of the deliberations focus on 
attempting to ascertain whether Pakistan is a ‘genuine’ partner70 in terms of curbing 
terrorist activity within its territory. Other accounts offer a historical guide and focus 
on delineating how the Taliban and al-Qaeda are a product of the political and 
military manoeuvrings of the US and Pakistan albeit different authors ascribe more 
or less responsibility  on either the US or Pakistan depending on ‘which side of the 
fence the analyst is on’. However, as the review of the literature has revealed there is 
a dearth of studies in this area that operationalise ‘discourse’ as a way of 
understanding the progression of the ‘war on terror’. It is here that this study hopes to 
contribute in a meaningful way by highlighting how discourse and representation 

70Ofcourseverylittleofthecurrentliteratureanalysesorquestionsthe‘genuineness’oftheUnited
Statesinrelationtothe‘waronterror’.ThisdebateisoftenlimitedwithinPakistan’spublic
discourse.
94



played a critical role in the enactment of the political practice in Pakistan. Since the 
particular method of engagement with the subject-area has not been taken up 
previously in relation to Pakistan and the ‘war on terror’; the next chapter will 
deliberate on a comprehensive delineation of the theoretical and methodological 
underpinnings and implications for this study. Having discussed the theory and 
method of engagement with the thesis topic the following chapters will then proceed 
to an application in terms of rendering a concrete analysis.  
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4
Locating the theoretical intervention  
4.1 Introduction
Discourse is always already situated in a material world…This means that we 
simply cannot construct the world any old way we chose, and if we persistently 
attempt to do so we are ultimately more likely to come to the attention of 
psychiatric services.71
This project takes as its subject matter state policy and practice, and more 
specifically the political practice of Pakistan in the aftermath of the September 11th,
2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. Whilst the dominant conceptual 
framework within which this event has been framed tends to be realist-inspired this 
study however seeks to re-theorise Pakistan’s co-operation with the US in the ‘war 
on terror’ by drawing on an alternative body of thought. Consequently, the purpose 
of this chapter is to clearly articulate the theoretical approach and the associated 
methodology taken by this project to investigate why and how Pakistan was able to 
co-operate with the US-led ‘war on terror’. Such a clarification is necessary in order 
to ascertain why this study prioritises texts or more generally discourse as the 
primary unit of analysis within this project. This chapter plays an important role in 
providing a theoretical contextualisation of the whole research project since the 

71CrombyandNightingale(1999:9).
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theory underlying the project plays a critical role right from the formulation of the 
research questions through to the interpretations and conclusions drawn.
As chapter two explained, the dominant realist mode of thinking in IR conceives 
world politics as embedded in an essentialist and static anarchic environment. In this 
conception, socio-political reality is pre-given and independent of agential influence. 
This implies that inter and intra-state interaction for instance is already conditioned 
by the ‘truth’ or inevitability of anarchic relations. It is from this realist perspective 
that much of the analysis of Pakistan’s participation in the US-led ‘war on terror’ is 
interpreted by current analyses. Conversely, this study takes a different perspective 
on the production of political reality by highlighting the constructed nature of reality 
as opposed to it being something that already exists ‘out there’. This means that 
belligerent inter-state relations for instance, are not conceptualised as inevitable or 
‘natural’ as realists would imply, rather belligerency must be understood as a 
discursively constructed political practice. From this perspective, Pakistan’s political 
action in terms of participation in the ‘war on terror’ must also be seen as an action 
embedded and produced by specific discursive constructions.
In the first instance then, a broad social constructionist theory takes as its starting 
point the acceptance that social reality is constructed through a system of similar 
(though not necessarily identical) statements which conform to the same basic world-
view or representation of the object i.e. a discourse. This means that a discourse 
beyond its analysing, describing and classifying qualities produces the world by 
privileging particular narratives relating to an object over and above alternative 
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narratives or representations related to the same object. A discourse as a narrative or 
representation then has the power to present as entirely legitimate and logical the 
incurring of limitations on certain ways of thinking or ‘being’ in the world 
(knowledge-power nexus). Moreover a theoretical commitment towards examining 
productivity leads onto an analysis of how structuring of meaning is connected to 
practice.     
It is essential to clarify that this project makes a basic commitment to a social 
constructionist theoretical framework concerning the construction of political reality 
as it relates to the specific area of concern i.e. Pakistan’s co-operation in the ‘war on 
terror’. What this means is that this study views Pakistan’s co-operation as something 
that was enabled and normalised by a productive discourse. However, on the other 
hand it is important to also clarify that that this project adopts a qualified social 
constructionist approach which is much closer to constructivist approaches in IR and 
distinguished from poststructuralist and other similar critical perspectives in IR 
which reduce world politics to the operation of discourse72. Although the specificity 
of the qualified stance taken by this study will be discussed in more detail as the 
chapter progresses; however, it is important, at this point, to briefly discern the 
salient contours of social constructionism as a body of thought73. The main 
proposition of social constructionism is the idea that social reality is neither static nor 
universal but contingent and intimately connected to prevailing discourses or 
‘knowledges’. Apart from this basic commonality, there is a multiplicity of strands 

72Refertofootnotes1and2.
73Socialconstructionismisthebroadercriticaltheorythatinformsbothpoststructuralistand
constructivistthoughtinIR.Itisthereforeusefultofirstconsiderthebroaderphilosophical
underpinningsofthisperspectivebeforedistinguishingthedifferencesbetweenpoststructuralism
andconstructivism.
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within social constructionist thought differing on such things as epistemology and 
methodology. In terms of ontological moorings, some strands of social 
constructionism (discursive psychology, discourse analysis, Foucauldian analysis, 
content analysis and poststructuralism in general) adhere to an understanding of 
ontology that dictates the centrality of discourse/text to an ensuing social reality. 
Arguably, this is a reductionist account in that social reality is reduced to the 
operation of texts alone. Some theorists have been vehemently opposed to 
conceptualising and considering an extra-discursive realm (for instance Edwards et 
al. 1995). It is, at this juncture that this study differs in its conception of the way in 
which political reality is socially constructed. Whilst an extended discussion cannot 
be engaged in these introductory paragraphs it is necessary to clearly clarify that 
although this study considers discourse as powerfully productive nevertheless there 
is ‘theoretical space’ within the specific perspective underlying this study which 
allows and encourages a conceptualisation of the influences of wider extra-
discursive74 features of the world on our social constructions75. Importantly, this 
position is taken without signalling the deprecation of linguistic spaces. Within the 
field of international relations, such an approach to social construction which 
appreciates, acknowledges and analytically incorporates the extra-discursive realm 
may be described as constructivism76 reflecting its distance to the linguistic 
reductionism postulated by poststructuralist approaches.  Furthermore, in seeking to 
enhance constructivism this study draws much inspiration from the work of Roy 
Bhaskar (1978, 1979, 1989), whose ideas on ‘critical realism’ have been pivotal in 

74Refertofootnote11.
75Amoreradicalvariantofsocialconstructionism(termedasapoststructuralistapproachinIR
literature)isrepresentedbyEdwards,D.,Ashmore,M.andPotter,J.,(1995).Thesewriterswhilst
entertainingtheontologyoftheextradiscursiverefusetoacceptthatthisontologycanbetheorized
aboutsincelanguage,textordiscourseistheonlywayknowledgeisconstructed.Wecannothave
directaccessto‘ontology’sinceallknowledgeofitisrepresentation.
76Refertofootnote1.
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bringing back the notion of ‘cause’ in the social sciences and are useful in terms of 
combining a discursive study with an analysis of structural constraints. Bhaskar’s 
work encourages analysis to uncover the underlying social mechanisms, processes 
and structures that afford, shape and give rise to our experiences, social events and 
social reality in general. Although Bhaskar is not directly concerned with discourse 
and its links to the construction of political reality nevertheless his work is 
particularly useful in embedding discourse in its historical, social, political and 
economic contexts and discerning the links between these structures and the 
possibilities of discourse.
The primary remit of this chapter is to clarify the theory underlying this study. 
Theory is significant since it has influenced and inspired the entire research process 
from the formulation of the hypothesis to the data collection and analysis. This 
chapter will discuss how political reality is conceived here as co-constituted by the 
discursive and extra-discursive coupled with a consideration of the theories relied 
upon in order to advance such an argument. The discussion is organised in a way that 
emphasises the relevance and significance of a theory that advances the centrality of 
discourse and representation to social life. On the other hand, this chapter will also 
seek to critique the reductionism of poststructuralist/social constructionist 
approaches. The main concern of this chapter is to advance a theoretical position that 
incorporates an analysis of the discursive and the extra-discursive in accounting for 
the emergence of social reality. In short then, the chapter seeks to advance a 
theoretical framework that incorporates IR constructivism with critical realism 
arguing that this resulting paradigm is better positioned to explain the emergence of 
Pakistan’s political reality in the post 9/11 time period.   
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This chapter begins with an extensive discussion of how early linguistic theorists 
such as Saussure and Austin radically problematised the notion that language was a 
neutral medium of expression. The discussion will focus on addressing the way in 
which these early theorists conceptualised the emergence of social reality by 
intimately implicating language and more broadly discourse in the emergence of 
social reality. This discussion will then flow into an examination of the work of  
Michel Foucault whose studies of concepts such as ‘madness’ and ‘sexuality’ have 
been instrumental in demonstrating how  ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’ are contemporary 
and contingent as opposed to being universal phenomenon. In particular, Foucault 
was concerned with discerning the myriad ways in which a particular discourse 
becomes productive through the operation of regulatory power (see for instance 
Foucault 1977). Foucault’s work has much to offer in helping us theorize how a 
discourse regulates through enabling and constraining individual and collective 
thought and action. This exploration will then link in to a more complex debate 
around the social construction of the Self (both individual and collective) in order to 
demonstrate the ways in which, and the extent to which, discourses construct 
subjectivity from individual personhood to group identity. Within this discussion 
there is implicitly a rejection of essentialist and realist readings around how 
humans/groups/nations ‘naturally’ behave or the idea that certain behaviours are 
intrinsic, innate or ‘natural’ to either the person or the nation-state. In examining the 
discursive emergence of the ‘Self’ the chapter will also begin to address how the 
‘Other’ is simultaneously constructed through specific discursive strategies deployed 
to differentiate and ‘mark out’ the ‘other’. In particular the discussion focuses on 
how the ‘Self’ relies on the representation of an outside Other. In proceeding towards 
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a critical analysis of social constructionism ,the chapter will draw attention to one of 
the central tensions concerning the theorizations of the power of discourse. The 
discussion will note that although Foucault’s work has undoubtedly been ground-
breaking nevertheless it affords little, if any, conception of human agency as a 
deliberate agent. Rather, the extent of discourse is that it is conceived as all-
embracing and all-powerful in terms of constructing subjectivity and all aspects of 
social reality. For writers such as Hall (2001), Foucault’s work though important is 
problematic in its inherent tendency to move away from the rational, reasoning 
individual of modernity and a move towards a picture of human agency as existing as 
a mere mouthpiece of discourses. 
Taking a critical stance towards poststructuralist approaches, the chapter will seek to 
qualify the discursive stance of this study by relating some of the key critical realist 
critiques of the strong relativism and reductionism of poststructuralist analyses. In 
order to explain the critical realist critique of relativism77 the discussion will begin by 
reviewing the critical realist ontology which will help to clarify how and where 
Bhaskar locates discourse in his ontological framework. The chapter will focus on 
the notion of ‘cause’ within this ontology and draw on the work of Milja Kurki 
(2006, 2007, 2008) who takes Bhaskar’s work forward by clarifying how social 
science can draw on a non-Humean causal framework. The purpose of this review is 
to discern how we may conceptualise links or ‘cause’ between the extra-discursive 

77Thiscritiqueofrelativismisnotadenialthat‘knowledge’isrelativeandcontingenttothetime,
spaceandculturewithinwhichtheknowledgeemerges.Rathercriticalrealismcritiquesthe
reluctanceofsomepoststructuralistaccountstoincorporateanalysisoftheeffectsofexisting
structures(discursiveandmaterial)onourrelativesocialconstructions.Theargumentthusisthat
knowledgeisrelativebutsomethingscanbepreexisting.Inthisaccountthenreducingthe
productionofsociallifewhollytocirculatingdiscourseswithoutalsoconsideringtheenduringsocial
structureswhichmaketheparticular‘knowledge’possibleisaflawedapproach.Referalsoto
footnote11.
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and the discursive. The ontological realism put forward by critical realism is at the 
heart of this approach and the chapter will seek to elaborate how social reality is 
conceptualised as stratified within this approach. Thus, while discourse and language 
are seen here as vitally important to the construction of social reality; however, a 
critical realist stratified ontology also conceptualizes the existence of observable and 
unobservable ‘depth ontological structures’ which are generative and causally 
connected to the kind of social constructions that emerge.   
Finally, in order to provide for a transparent research endeavour the chapter engages 
in clarifying the methodological framework that will be employed in conducting the 
data analysis in this thesis. In the first instance the discussion notes that 
methodologically the discourse analysis draws on the guidelines and procedures 
suggested by Ian Parker (1992) and Carla Willig (1999, 2001). Although Parker and 
Willig offer a useful ‘blueprint’ to conducting a broadly Foucauldian discourse 
analysis in the context of a critical realist ontology nevertheless it is noteworthy that 
they fail to offer similar procedural suggestions in analysing the extra-discursive 
contexts implied in a realist ontological framework. Therefore, in terms of the 
method employed in a critical realist examination of the extra-discursive I draw on a 
variety of writers of which the most important are: Danermark et al. (2002) and 
Sayer (1992), who offer concrete suggestions and method in terms of conceptualising 
and analysing critical realist social structures and mechanisms.  The purpose of the 
concluding sections of this chapter is to present a clear methodological framework 
which will be employed by the project in conducting its data analysis.  
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4.2 Social constructionism78 – key assumptions 
Whilst there are differences in the various approaches to social construction i.e. 
poststructuralism, constructivism; there is nevertheless, a commonality within these 
approaches in that they all represent a body of thought that has radically challenged 
the traditional foundations upon which scientific knowledge is built. Before 
proceeding to the main discussion of this chapter it would be useful to list, at the 
outset, some of the basic assumptions common to all strands of social 
constructionism. Burr (2003)79 suggests four key assumptions:  
A Critical stance towards taken for granted knowledge 
Social constructionism asks us to stand back and critically question our knowledge of 
the world. It rejects a positivist, empiricist orientation, or the idea that our 
observations unproblematically reveal the world to us. Social constructionism is 
deconstructionist in that it seeks to uncover and explain the way knowledge and truth 
are produced through social processes. This means that the categories and concepts 
we use to divide up our world and experiences become problematic and the focus of 
study. Social constructionism encourages us to challenge and seek out the way in 
which these categories emerge. 

78Note,thatsocialconstructionismreferstothebroadercriticaltheorythatbringstotheforethe
importanceoflanguageandrepresentationinsociallife.Inthissensebothpoststructuralismand
constructivismdrawonthisbroadercriticaltheory.Refertofootnote1and2formoreclarification.
79VivenneBurr’s(2003)book‘SocialConstructionism’isakeytextintermsofitsexpositionofthe
criticalapproachthatthebroadersocialtheoryofsocialconstructionismengenders.Inparticularitis
alsousefulintermsofdelineatingthesubtledifferencesbetweenthevariousapproachestosocial
construction.
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Historical and cultural specificity  
Social constructionism also postulates that the way in which we understand the 
world, the concepts and categories we use to divide up our experience of the world 
are culturally and historically specific. Such a proposition immediately throws into 
question the idea that there are universal truth claims and knowledge. Foucault’s 
work for instance demonstrated how the category ‘madness’ emerged in the 19th
century. Foucault demonstrated the historical variability of truth-claims related to 
mental illnesses arguing that the meaning of ‘madness’ was specific to the time and 
place in which the category emerged, and that  prevailing economic and social 
arrangements played a critical role in constituting knowledge. Such notions of truth 
and knowledge as being relative suggests that the way in which we divide up, 
conceive and categorise our world is not necessarily better or any nearer the ‘truth’, 
but that such conceptions are relative to our historical location and culture and that 
alternative ways of dividing up the world are possible.
The idea of ‘illness’ for example is not a fixed and universal entity but variable 
across time and space and highly dependent on the norms and values of a particular 
social group. The meaning of the concept ‘illness’ thus fluctuates and Burr (2003) 
cites a study in which working class women described themselves as healthy if they 
were able to go about their daily activities and viewed ‘women’s problems’ as other 
common ailments as part of their daily life. These women only referred to serious 
conditions as illness. In contemporary western society, premenstrual syndrome 
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(PMT) for instance is a recent addition to medical conditions. PMT has existed since 
women have been around but it is only now that we categorise and group together 
certain symptoms as PMT. Thus, what counts as illness in one society was seen as 
merely ‘women’s problems’ in an earlier historical period. As Burr (2003:40) notes,
defining illness and disease is not simply a matter of identifying the presence 
of pathology. It is a deeply social matter involving the interpretation of our 
experiences within our particular cultural context of assumptions, norms and 
values as well as the economic structure of our society. 
 Knowledge is sustained by social processes 
For social constructionism, our knowledge of the world is constructed through 
human interaction and does not occur as result of objective observation of the world. 
Language is performative, and linguistic studies show how people construct versions 
of objects and subjects in their talk. The primary role of language is seen as active 
and constructive as opposed to the traditional view that assume its neutrality and 
passivity.
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 Knowledge and social action go together 
For social constructionism, different constructions of truth and knowledge invite a 
different kind of action from human beings. Prevailing knowledge has implications 
for what we can and cannot do. Foucault in particular looked at the ways in which 
dominant knowledge and truth claims operated within society to regulate, control and 
punish.  Discourse allows certain ways of thinking, talking and constructing 
knowledge about a subject whilst simultaneously ruling out, limiting and restricting 
alternative ways of relating to a subject (Hall 2001). Burr (2003) gives the example 
of alcoholism, and suggests that in the past, alcoholics were seen as drunkards 
responsible for their condition and were often segregated and kept in workhouses; 
whereas now alcoholism is seen as a disease and addiction and the response has 
changed to therapy and empathy. Constructions of the world therefore sustain some 
patterns of social action and exclude others 
The social constructionist idea is that knowledge and truth are not entities already 
‘out there’ having an existence outside of and, prior to human existence. Instead, 
truth and knowledge is constituted amongst people through interaction is indeed a 
radical challenge to traditional ontological and epistemological claims. Such a stance 
immediately brings with it a focus on human interaction and more specifically 
language since it is at the heart of the human interaction process.  
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4.3 Early challenges to notions of language neutrality 
It would be useful to look at the way in which early linguistics began to question the 
neutrality of language simply and ‘naturally’ reflecting pre-given categories and 
‘meanings’. Instead, early linguistic theorists began to argue that language was very 
much alive and performative, and powerfully constructive of social reality, having 
real consequences in the world. Prominent linguists such as Saussure, Austin and 
Wittgenstein (Kress 2001, Potter 2001) were intimately involved in this early re-
theorising of language away from ideas around its supposed neutrality. Interestingly 
Marx, although not directly concerned with the power of language, also postulated 
the notion of a ‘false consciousness’ amongst the working class – a consciousness 
deliberately created and maintained by the capitalist bourgeois to maintain their class 
interests. There is arguably, in Marx’s theory, an implied notion of language as 
powerful in terms of structuring consciousness. However, it was the French linguist 
Ferdinand De Saussure who began to explore more systematically the characteristics 
of language and to some extent what speakers do in terms of performativity in 
language (Kress 2001). The notion that language is powerful is a radical argument to 
make and it is important here to clarify this position by way of demonstration.  
It is useful to draw on the work of Saussure who played an instrumental role in 
demonstrating how language was pivotal in structuring meaning. Saussure suggested 
that a language is made up of signs such as: cat, dog, friendship, marriage and so on. 
These signs, for Saussure, have two parts to them, the ‘signified’ or the item of 
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thought or mental image and the ‘signifier’ the sound used to refer to the mental 
image. Together, these two parts combine to produce a sign, which Saussure argued 
was an arbitrary combination. Drawing on Saussure then, it is possible to argue that a 
‘cat’ or a ‘spoon’ have a concrete existence in relation to other signs such as 
‘friendship’ however they are also signs in that they are concepts. When we use the 
words ‘cat’ or ‘spoon’ for instance, we are referring to the concept, the meaning that 
these terms hold for us. Without meaning, a ‘spoon’ is just a piece of steel and a ‘cat’ 
an animal. In English speaking cultures the signifier C-A-T produces the mental 
image of a domesticated, furry four-legged animal and it is as a result of convention 
that speakers of the same language have agreed to (and learned)  that this word 
evokes a certain image. Saussure suggested that we divide and categorize our 
experiences of the world into cats, dogs, marriage, and that these categorizations are 
not intrinsic but arbitrary. For instance, if we think of a map of London with a grid 
on it we can discern that London is the signified (the concept – London); 
furthermore, the grid on the map divides and categorizes London into areas. The area 
postcodes such as ‘EC1’ are thus signifiers; they are words that refer to the mental 
image of the division. The division of the map is arbitrary and there could have been 
other possible ways to divide it up (or not).
Saussure also postulated that the signs, or the names that we give to 
object/experiences do not in themselves have any intrinsic meaning, but that the 
concept or sign such as ‘dog’ ‘only has meaning by reference to its difference from 
other concepts such as ‘cat’ or ‘table’. Indeed, all languages seem to have an 
underlying architectural feature in that almost every adjective, noun and verb has a 
binary opposite for instance, good/evil, native/foreigner, west/east, strong/weak, 
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believer/atheist and so on. There is, as Jackson (2005:21) notes, a ‘natural inequality 
between terms, where one is lacking something the opposite embodies’. In order to 
comprehend the term ‘good’ we need to also have an understanding of the features 
and characteristics associated with its opposite term ‘evil’ or ‘bad’. More 
importantly, Saussure challenged the notion that language and meaning of things was 
something that emerged transparently reflecting ‘truths’. Rather, the contention was 
that a language made up of signs already exists and pre-dates any one person’s entry 
into the world. The implication of this pre-existence is that in the process of learning 
to talk we have no choice but to understand ourselves and our world in terms of the 
concepts and categories that already exist. In Burr’s words (2003:53), 
This is what Saussure’s structuralism is saying, then: language does not reflect 
a pre-existing social reality, but constitutes and brings a framework to that 
reality for us. It is the structure of language, the system of signifiers and 
signifieds and their meanings as constituted in the differences between them, 
which carves up our conceptual space for us.
Saussure was instrumental in showing how language determined the lines along 
which we divided up our experiences and our world. However, Saussure also 
maintained that once a signifier became connected to a signified, the meaning of the 
sign became enduring. This proposition, regarding the stability of meaning however 
has been challenged by later writers, who are often referred to as post-structuralists.  
110



4.4 Language as a performative practice
The previous section explains how Saussurean linguistics were a key influence in 
problematizing the idea of language as faithfully transparent in conveying reality. 
Although Saussure did not examine fully the performative aspects of language these 
ideas were later explored by Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Austin (Potter 2001) 
who, in the tradition of Saussure, also began to question popular notions around 
language as unquestioningly reflecting reality and language as an abstract referential 
system. Wittgenstein vehemently criticized the idea that meaning originated and 
resided in a private psychological space called ‘the mind’, and instead emphasized 
the public nature of meaning making in language (ibid). Similarly, Austin was 
fundamentally concerned with the flaws in philosophical conceptions of language as 
an abstract system and suggested that an utterance could be both descriptive and 
performative. Speech act theory, developed by Austin, sought to draw focus away 
from the idea that language was merely descriptive. Austin postulated that utterances 
were significant because of their performativity. When we say that language is social 
action or that it is performative what we mean is that it does things; it constructs and 
has consequences.
Discursive psychologists and ethnomethodology as developed by Harold Garfinkel 
are also less concerned with how language structures human experience and more 
focused on investigating situated language in use. Both these approaches and other 
perspectives that draw upon them, such as conversation analysis, explore the 
performative and action orientation of language and the way that ‘accounts are built 
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in interactions to suit particular purposes – fashioning identities, justifying our 
actions, blaming others and so on’ (Burr 2003:62). To give a simple example, if we 
are to believe that language is an unambiguous pathway connected to beliefs and 
actual events then we would presume that people’s account of the same event would, 
for instance, be consistent. However, any examination of language shows that a 
person’s account varies depending on its function. Potter and Wetherell (2001:199) 
give an example that, 
if we take two descriptions of a particular individual, we will expect them to 
vary in accordance with the feelings of the person doing the describing. If you 
like the person you may….describe particularly likeable characteristics out of 
the many available. Someone who dislikes that person may emphasize very 
different characteristics.
We find that people use language to construct a version of social reality and ‘reality’ 
as described or constructed at that moment comes into existence. The debate over 
truth and falsity of accounts is suspended and the focus instead is on the construction 
process itself.  
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4.5 Macro social constructionism80
For the moment we have been looking at approaches which drawing on the 
alternative framework proposed by a broad social constructionist theory focus their 
theoretical attention on situated language in use in human interaction, and the 
relationship between function and construction. Within this ‘micro’ social 
constructionist approach (Burr 2003), the individual articulating the text is seen as 
actively choosing linguistic resources upon which to draw, in constructing social 
reality. This approach is often referred to as a textually linguistic approach, and 
concentrates on interaction within a local context. However, a textual focus 
represents one way of engaging with discursive analysis; whereas another approach 
referred to as ‘macro’ social constructionism (Burr 2003) or a Foucauldian approach 
takes an altogether different view of the production of texts. Although both 
perspectives often use ‘discourse analysis’ to refer to their empirical study of 
utterance and spoken text there is a significant difference in their focus and thus 
‘discourse analysis’ takes on a different meaning in each case. The main difference 
between the macro approach and what Burr (2003) calls micro social constructionism 
is that while both approaches support the idea that language constructs rather than 
represents, the micro approach tends to emphasize the freedom of individuals in 
constructing accounts. A macro social constructionist approach however suggests 
that the construction process is intimately related to institutional practices and social 
structures, and that this connection is so strong that it is incorrect to isolate talk from 
these broader contextual influences. The operation of power is at the heart of this 

80Macroapproachesinsocialconstructiontendtoemphasisethepowerfulregulatoryeffectsof
discourseassingularlyproductiveofsociallife(Burr2003).WithinIRtheseapproachesarereferred
toundertherubric‘poststructuralism’.
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approach and often the freedom of individuals is marginalised in comparison to the 
power of institutional discourses. Importantly though, as Burr (2003) suggests, micro 
and macro strands of social constructionism should not be seen as mutually exclusive 
and there is no reason why they should not be used together. In this sense the sort of 
‘critical discourse analysis’ (CDA) approach suggested by Fairclough (2001, 2003) 
seems to represent a synergy of both approaches. However, for the purposes of 
clarity it is useful to differentiate the features of the two perspectives (micro and 
macro) in this chapter. In particular, macro social constructionism is referred to in the 
literature under a number of rubrics: deconstructionism, poststructuralism and 
‘Foucauldian’ on account of the instrumental influence of the work of Michel 
Foucault. The present study is also broadly located within the ‘macro’ spectrum.  It is 
useful therefore to examine the way in which Foucault discussed and defined 
discourses since the vast majority of approaches from poststructuralism to 
constructivism draw on Foucault’s ideas around the powers of discourse. 
4.6 Conceptualising discourses as knowledge  
Foucault’s concept of discourse is broad and incorporates linguistic acts as well as 
social practices i.e. discourse is practice. For Foucault, discourses refer to the way in 
which a topic or issue is ‘spoken of’ through mediums such as texts, speech, writing, 
practice and, which come together to build a picture or representation of the topic. 
For this approach, discourse is understood to not consist of merely one statement, 
one text, one action or one source. Rather, Foucault argues that the same discourse 
will appear across a range of texts and as forms of conduct at a number of different 
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institutional sites within society (Foucault 1973), and in this sense it is a way of 
thinking or the state of knowledge at any given time. There are, at any given 
instance, multiple discourses around any one subject each striving to legitimize its 
representation as the ‘truth’. A dominant discourse can permeate society to such an 
extent that what the discourse stipulates is often referred to as ‘common sense’. 
Furthermore, a discourse can manifest itself in ‘texts – in speech, say a conversation 
or interview, in written material such as novels, newspaper articles or letters, in 
visual images like magazine advertisements or films, or even in the meanings 
encoded in the clothes someone wears or the way they do their hair’ (Burr 2003:66). 
However, in terms of the working definition of ‘discourse’ as it is conceived in this 
study it is important to clarify the distinction between Foucault’s use of the term and 
the more restricted use employed here. Whilst a Foucauldian concept of discourse is 
broad and includes language and social practices, conversely this study uses 
discourse in a more restricted way in that it limits its use of the term ‘discourse’ to 
refer to linguistic acts only. This working definition of ‘discourse’ is useful from the 
perspective of this study since it allows discourse to be conceptualised as a condition 
that enables actions and practice81.   Nevertheless, it is important to stress that the 
restricted use of the term ‘discourse’ within this study has been prompted primarily 
to aid the ease of analysis of discourse and social structures. This restricted use of 
‘discourse’ does not imply that discourse and practice are two different things rather, 
as the discussion below will show, I concur with Foucault that discourse is 
inextricably bound up with social practice.

81Refertofootnote9.
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4.7 Discursive formations
One of the central themes in Foucault’s work is the idea that discourses regulate 
knowledge to the extent that ‘what we call knowledge then simply refers to the 
particular construction or version of a phenomenon that has received the stamp of 
truth in our society’ (Burr 2003:68). This means that ‘knowledge’ is not permanent 
or universal but that what counts as knowledge or common sense differs from one 
period to another. Burr (ibid) for instance suggests that, 
contemporary western societies it is commonplace for the version of natural 
events provided by science and medicine to be given greater credence than 
those offered by religion, magic or superstition and to be given the stamp of 
truth.
This is a different ‘knowledge’ to what has gone before. In the past, the version of 
truth provided by religion or superstition held sway and dictated and regulated what 
could and could not be done, just as scientific and medicinal discourse does in 
contemporary society. Discourse is therefore a powerful force in determining our 
realities or ‘truths’ and an analysis focussing on the deconstructing a discourse is a 
powerful and political act.
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Foucault often referred to the state of knowledge at any given time as the prevailing 
‘regime of truth’ or the ‘episteme’ of a specific historical period. Within this 
episteme, whenever and wherever texts, practices, images or indeed any other form 
of conduct occurring at different institutional sites within a society seem to bear 
resemblance to each other, when there seems a cohesion between them, when they 
refer to the same object, share the same style and support the same underlying 
message; when there is a commonality in the representation then the different 
manifestations are said to belong to the same discursive formation.  Texts are seen as 
specific products of a particular discursive formation. Foucault for instance, argued 
that the object ‘madness’ appears within a definite discursive formation, and that it 
was ‘constituted by all that was said, in all the statements that named it, divided it up, 
described it, explained it, traced its development, indicated its various correlations, 
judged it, and possibly gave it speech by articulating, in its name, discourses that 
were to be taken as its own’82 (Foucault 1972:32). 
4.8 The regulatory power of discourse 
For Foucault, knowledge is intimately bound up with power. Knowledge has real 
effects in the world because it brings with it the power to regulate, control and 
punish. Different knowledge constructions invite different responses. Burr (2003:68) 
gives an example that ‘behaviour which a few hundred years ago would have been 
taken as evidence of possession by evil spirits is today though of as a mental illness’; 

82ForcriticalrealistsandconstructivistsalikethisoverwhelmingFoucauldianfocusondiscursive
structuresaloneisproblematicparticularlywhenintermsofthetheoreticalclosureitimpliesin
conceptualizing‘other’structuressuchasmaterial,naturalandenduringsocialstructures.
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the result in this alternative knowledge construction is that it invites a different 
response and based on current ‘knowledge’ it therefore becomes legitimate to ‘treat’ 
the mental illness and illegitimate to ‘exorcise evil spirits’. The point here is that the 
power to act in certain ways, to make claims on anything depends on the prevailing 
‘knowledge’ in society. What can or cannot be depicted and talked about and who 
can and cannot say certain things will give us a clue as to whose and which 
discourses are dominant at a particular historical point in time and in a particular 
location, and whose discourses are subordinated or marginalised. Discourses 
determine what counts as knowledge and truth and what does not, whose voices and 
world-views are privileged, and whose are disregarded and silenced. 
There is however, an altogether different conception of power within the 
Foucauldian paradigm. In contrast to traditional models of power, Foucault does not 
view power as being located in a single source, but as a diffuse product located in all 
the practices that adhere and abide by the constraining and enabling aspects of a 
particular discursive regime. Interestingly, Foucault proposed that the exercise of 
force does not indicate power; instead what it means is that the discourse is failing in 
terms of postulating its truth validity therefore resulting in resistance requiring force. 
Resorting to force is rather to be taken as an indication of the lack of power (Burr 
2003:69).
Power as a diffuse product means that it permeates and operates at all levels of social 
existence. Marxist feminist writers, though not necessarily taking a Foucauldian 
inspiration, have demonstrated the extent to which the discourse of patriarchy 
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pervades both private and public spheres of existence. In terms of inducing cultural 
order, Marxist feminists argue that the powerful discourses of marriage and the 
family are critical in terms of creating, maintaining and legitimizing a certain way of 
living one’s life; so that when women prepare food, do the laundry and so on, as 
unpaid workers they contribute to the maintenance of the capitalist system. In this 
sense, their actions uphold a regime of truth and, power is exercised through the 
discourse which persuades women to willingly provide services. Foucault calls this 
the ‘micro-physics of power’, or the idea that power is rooted in forms of local 
behaviour (Hall 2001). The suggestion here is that whenever a worker ‘clocks in’ for 
work or a child sits in a classroom the discourse is at work in the social practice. 
Discourses are thus intimately tied to social practices.  
However, Foucault also suggested that often discourse exercised regulatory power in 
an almost invisible way in that those being regulated were often unaware of this. In 
fact Foucault suggests that the more invisible the operation of power the more likely 
it is to be successful. Although Marxist ideas around the power of ideology in 
inducing a ‘false consciousness’ seem somewhat similar to some of Foucault’s 
conceptions of power, and its operation; Foucault was specific in rejecting the class 
reductionism in classical Marxist theories. Marxism tends to ‘contrast the 
‘distortions’ of bourgeois knowledge, against its own claims to ‘truth’ (Hall 
2001:76), Foucault of course, rejects the notion of any form of thought as an absolute 
truth.
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4.9 Constructing the individual and collective Self 
A theory that postulates the centrality of wider discourses to social life rejects 
notions of the individual as having prior internal structures and characteristics, 
commonly referred to as ‘human nature’, which manifest themselves in the person’s 
personality and attitudes guiding and influencing thought and practice. In rejecting 
such essentialist views postulating personhood as something that is biologically 
determined, the broader theory of social constructionism instead locates the creation 
of the ‘self’ firmly in the social realm. For this reason, terms such as ‘attitude’ and 
‘personality’ connoting biological determinism are avoided in social constructionist 
literature and instead the term ‘identity’ is often employed which tends to signify a 
more social basis to the construction of the Self.
Language arbitrarily categorises, divides up things and concepts so that when we 
identify a ‘weed’ or a ‘flower’ we are not detecting an essential feature but are doing 
so because differentiating in this way has meaning for us. We are then giving the 
‘flower’ or ‘weed’ an identity, the point is that ‘it is you that is doing the identifying, 
and the identity you confer has more to do with your purposes than the nature of the 
thing itself’ (Burr 2003:106). In a similar way, social constructionism suggests that 
all identities (both individual and collective) are fashioned out of culturally available 
discourses and that there is no innate, identity or nature within us. Certainly, 
Foucault’s radical historicization of the ‘subject’ also viewed the ‘self’ and ‘other’ as 
having no existence or continuity in terms of an identity instead positioning the 
subject as a produce of discourse (Foucault 1961, 1977). In terms of individual 
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identity, the conception here is that there exist in the world discourses of age, gender, 
sexuality, ethnicity, class, occupation and so on which precede the individual’s 
entrance into the world, and that rather than innate psychic structures it is these 
discourses that shape our understandings of what it means to be black, or a child, or 
an atheist, or a criminal. Each discourse is seen to weave together to produce the 
‘self’ with discourses having implications for each other.
Our understanding of who we are as individuals is then determined to large extent by 
the prevailing discourses which paint a picture of what it means to occupy a certain 
position. For instance, prevailing western discourses around ‘old age’ tend to 
postulate reduced physical and mental capacities and a loss of power and status with 
increasing age. These understandings or ‘knowledge’ of old age has implications for 
other discourses such as those of occupation and sexuality. However, an alternative 
picture of increasing age, which is not so popular, could be one that emphasises old 
age as a time of wisdom, tranquillity and respect. In both versions, the ‘meaning’ of 
‘old age’ is different thus inviting different expectations, status and interaction. 
Similarly, the version of youth one can live out depends upon the content of the 
youth discourse available to the individual. The discourse of youth as a time of non-
conformity and identity crisis available to some individuals is perhaps not so relevant 
or available to young people in parts of the world experiencing poverty; young 
people here may draw on an alternative discourse of youth which emphases financial 
and familial responsibility. Feminists also demonstrate the myriad ways in which the 
discourse of patriarchy stipulates to women and the rest of society the caring and 
maternal characteristics it sees as natural to women. The point is that one’s 
personhood, ones understanding of whom one is, always stands in relation to 
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available texts or narratives; identity is socially bestowed and an amalgam of current 
‘truths’ about what it means to occupy a certain position.
The construction of the individual or the collective ‘Self’ necessarily involves a 
process of drawing boundaries of what is ‘in’ and what is ‘out’, what is allowed and 
appropriate and what is disallowed and inappropriate. Thus, what is seen as 
disallowed, inappropriate and so on constitutes the ‘external other’. The constitution 
of this ‘other’ is essential to the constitution and reinforcement of the identity of the 
self. Discourses of ‘mothering’ for instance define the kind of behaviour associated 
with a mother such as ‘nurturing’, ‘emotional’, or ‘self-sacrificing’; arguably, the 
discourse regulates the behaviour of a the mother defining how she ‘should’ feel and 
how she ‘should’ behave. Simultaneously, the discourse in drawing such boundaries 
and defining acceptable and appropriate behaviour necessarily entails a 
differentiation from inappropriate feelings and behaviour for a mother. In short then, 
the process of consolidating the ‘Self’, whether that constitutes a mother or a doctor 
or a nation-state, always involves a simultaneous process of defining the ‘outside 
other’ indeed that which the ‘Self’ is not. 
This idea of ‘what is in and what is out’ transported to the macro-level of group 
identity works in much the same way (Campbell 1992, Hansen 2006). Group identity 
is often thought of as ‘recognition of some common origin, or shared characteristics 
with another group or person, or with an ideal, and with the natural closure of 
solidarity and allegiance established on this foundation’ (Hall 1996:2). Arguably, this 
‘foundation’ however is itself constructed to mitigate differences. Though group 
122



identity often seeks to invoke a common historical past, group identities are actually 
about,
using the resources of history, language and culture in the process of becoming 
rather than being: not ‘who we are’ or ‘where we came from’, so much as what 
we might become, how we have been represented and how that bears on how 
we might represent ourselves (Hall 1996:4). 
 National narratives, stories, and myths conceived here as discourses are the basic 
substance through which conceptions of national identity and purpose are fashioned; 
however, these meanings are never fixed or absolute owing to the inherently unstable 
nature of language and discourse. Although a particular discourse or way of 
representing can become hegemonic nevertheless discourse are unstable grids 
requiring discursive work to articulate and rearticulate their version of ‘knowledge’ 
or ‘regime of truth’. As Doty (1996:6) explains, 
[a discourse’s] exterior limits are constituted by other discourses that are 
themselves open, inherently unstable, and always in the process of being 
articulated. This understanding of discourse implies an overlapping quality to 
different discourses. Any fixing of a discourse and the identities that are 
constructed by it can only be of a partial nature. It is the overflowing and 
incomplete nature of discourse that opens up spaces for change, discontinuity 
and variation.
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National narratives therefore cannot be conceptualised in terms of their absoluteness 
but need to be thought of as continually unfolding processes that structure meanings 
to the effect that these ultimately structure political practices. Particular discourses 
and the way in which they represent can enable, encourage and legitimise a particular 
set of political practices and this is where the real power of discourse lies. This 
means that ‘nations’ do not represent ‘natural’ boundaries but are arbitrary divisions 
which involve a frequent articulation of the discourse of difference. Discourses of 
sameness and difference are particularly evident during times of war when binary 
categories such as good/evil, innocent/guilty come into forceful play in order to 
constitute who constitutes the ‘group’ and who is constructed as existing outside of 
it. Moreover, we may also look to Edward Said’s (1978) varied works on 
‘Orientalism’ which drew on the ideas of Foucault to emphasise the relationship 
between power and knowledge in the construction of the Orient. The main argument 
here is that the Orient (the East) was constructed as an oppositional and negative 
term to Occident (the ‘West’). Said’s literary review of European writings sought to 
lay bare the relations of power between the coloniser and colonised, which emerged 
implicitly in texts proposing to depict a true representation of the Orient. Said 
suggested that colonialism was justified through the perpetuation of images 
representing the Orient as a mirror image of the West as inferior and alien 
concluding that this establishment of difference and exclusion is often the result of 
the operation of power rather than the consequence of some real differences. What is 
left ‘out’ or the constitutive outside is central to the process of consolidating what is 
inside. As Hall (1996:4-5 italics in original) further notes ‘it is only through the 
relation to the Other, the relation to what it is not, to precisely what it lacks, to what 
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has been called the constitutive outside that the ‘positive’ meaning of any term can 
be constructed’. This means that in a Foucauldian perspective, just as individual 
subjectivity emerges from prevailing discourses in a similar way group identity is 
also a product of a specific historical period and discursive formation negating the 
view that it is a natural distinction. 
Although this issue of discursive categorisations of ‘them’ and ‘us’ as it relates to 
this particular study will taken up later in the study it is useful however to note that 
many recent studies have focused on the language of the US led ‘war on terror’ 
(Jackson 2005, Collet and Najem 2005). These more recent works provide a stark 
example of the way in which discursive strategies are used to conceptualise and 
construct polarisation between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Collet and Najem (2005) for 
instance, show how polarisation is constructed through the use of pairs of antonyms 
i.e. words opposite in meanings to construct the ‘us’-group the American people as ‘a 
great people’, ‘a great nation’, the ‘brightest beacon’, ‘strong, powerful and daring’. 
Collet and Najem (2005) demonstrate that these positive signs are juxtaposed to the 
negative construction of the ‘terrorist other’ which function to depersonalise and 
dehumanise. In the contemporary communication age, such representations are able 
to quickly amass public legitimacy by acting on collective consciousness of 
recipients.  
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4.10 Exploring subject – positions 
The construction of a subject by a specific discourse is referred to, in the literature, as 
a ‘subject-position’. Again, if we begin with the example of subject-positioning on 
an individual personal level the idea of subject-positions is that the discourse 
addresses the individual as a particular person, as a woman, a child, a criminal, a 
patient etc. When we accept the way we are being addressed, or the category we are 
being assigned we then become the person that the discourse refers to. Taking up a 
subject-position has far-reaching implications for individual subjectivity and 
experience in that they make available certain ways-of-seeing and certain ways-of-
being in the world. In an influential paper Louis Althusser (1971), talked about the 
way that ideology creates or constructs ‘subjects’ by drawing people into particular 
positions or identities through ascribing characteristics, skills and attributes 
necessary for their social placement. Althusser called this process of being hailed or 
called up by a discourse as interpellation, arguing that we are positioned by 
discourse as particular kinds of individuals; our subjective experience is dependent 
on the positions we occupy. Taking up a position such as, ‘female’, or ‘father’ or 
‘patriot’ means that we then come to experience life from these perspectives. Our 
subjectivity is affected to such an extent that ‘once we take up a subject position in 
discourse, we have available to us a particular, limited set of concepts, images, 
metaphors, ways of speaking, self-narratives and so on that we take on as our own’ 
(Burr 2003:119). Similarly, Hall (1996:6) views ‘identity’ as a (sometimes 
temporary) attachment to a subject position, a ‘chaining of the subject into the flow 
of the discourse’. The concept of subject-positions or positioning allows us to ask 
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questions about the relationship between discourse and subjectivity and how that 
relationship impacts individual and collective social practice. 
We may extrapolate the concept of subject-positions more widely in order to argue 
that larger collectives such as nations and states may also be interpellated or ‘hailed’ 
into certain ways-of-seeing to the extent that ‘national experience’ emerges from the 
subject-position. As noted above, Said’s work is concerned with precisely this i.e. 
how a dominant discourse is able to position the western Self and impact subsequent 
interaction with the Other. Similarly, the work of Jackson (2005) and Doty (1993, 
1996), although not explicitly referring to the concept of subject-positioning also 
seem to underscore how internalising a subject position which constructs the US as 
good, truthful and so on is effectual in terms of national experiences and subsequent 
action.
4.11 The emergence of knowledge: Foucault’s genealogy 
Since discourses in Foucault’s view are pivotal in the construction of social reality, 
he offered a method of historical analysis that seeks to uncover, identify and trace 
discourses and their productivity. Foucault’s ‘genealogical’ approach to historical 
analysis, though not strictly a method, is particularly useful in terms of providing an 
overall framework; an approach or a lens through which the analyst can approach 
history and trace the development and effects of discourse. Foucault’s main concern 
was the operation of power in society, and the pivotal role of discourses in the 
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production of knowledge and power. The intricately intermeshed triad of 
discourse/power/knowledge remains the central theme throughout his works. 
Moreover, Foucault parted ways with the methodology of traditional historical 
analysis and instead looked to a ‘genealogical’ analysis to trace the development of 
knowledge’s and their power effects. In examining historical events, a genealogy 
differs from traditional historical analysis in two important ways in that its focus is 
the analysis of historical ‘descent’ and ‘emergence’. Foucault’s genealogy drawing 
on the work of Nietzsche challenged traditional ideas around the beginnings or 
origins of historical events. The genealogical focus of ‘descent’ disperses unity to 
reveal the multiplicity of events which lie behind historical beginnings. Foucault had 
major reservations around traditional notions of historical beginnings, or the idea that 
historical events, ideas, movements had a singular point of origin or a unity in their 
emergence. Foucault reveals the dispersion and disparity behind so-called ‘origins’ 
of events, 
the accidents, the minute deviations…the errors, the false appraisals, and the 
faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and 
have value for us;, it…discover[s] that truth or being do not lie at the root of 
what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents (Foucault 
1977, in Smart 1985:56). 
A genealogy disturbs the continuity marking a traditional historical analysis in order 
to uncover the instability, complexity and contingency around historical events. 
Secondly, in its focus on ‘emergence’ of an episteme or a world-view a genealogy 
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conceptualises such emergence not as a culmination of events but as a ‘particular 
momentary manifestation of the hazardous play of dominations’ (Smart 1985:57). 
Foucault conceived history as a constant struggle of dominations, a struggle between 
forces with ‘emergence’ as being merely transitory and fleeting. This schema has no 
place for the constituting individual since there is no one responsible for the 
emergence; it is, as Smart further notes, ‘an effect of the play of dominations’. A 
genealogical lens thus reveals no inevitability at work in history; indeed, Foucault 
argued that ‘no necessity determined that mad people would be regarded as mentally 
ill, that criminals should be imprisoned, or that the causes of illness were to be 
sought through the individual examination of bodies’ (Foucault, 1977 in Smart 
1985:58). Foucault’s genealogy then focuses on this ‘play of dominations’, it seeks 
to reveal the complexity of factors, the procedures, practices and institutions which 
give rise to the establishment of an event. Within this framework there is no place for 
conceptions of destiny or the intentions of a constituting individual or any other 
regulative mechanism; instead, emergence of events owes to conflicts, chance and 
error, relations of power and their unintended consequences. This is radically 
different from traditional ways of researching history as a stable, uninterrupted 
continuity of human progress. Interestingly, Foucault does not conceive humanity as 
‘progressing’ from war and combat to a more humane system of the rule of law, but 
as from one domination to another (Smart 1985). These ‘fleeting dominations’ 
Foucault talks of, are made possible through the constitutive quality of discourses 
and indeed we examined in the previous chapter how discourses make knowledge 
claims to such an extent that the picture they paint is often so normalised that it is 
usually referred to as ‘common sense’. Discourse analysis is thus vital in the 
genealogical framework since it problematises ‘common knowledge’ and seeks to 
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deconstruct by asking where and how that ‘knowledge’ emerged and with what 
power effects. It thus seeks to uncover how a particular domination or a system of 
thought comes to be seen as ‘knowledge’.  
It is important however, to note that there is no precise methodology to genealogy; 
Foucault intentionally failed to prescribe methodology. Arguably, if he had 
‘prescribed’, as in a systematised way, in which one must go about doing genealogy 
in order for it to be authentic then such a prescription would have fallen foul of his 
own critique of truth. On this point, O’Farrell (2005) notes that Foucault himself 
suggested that his work functions best as a tool box rather than a coherent system 
requiring a wholesale application. In the absence of method then, a genealogical 
analysis can be best conceived of as a lens through which one understands and 
conceives of historical events. There is thus no ‘one way’ of doing genealogy and as 
Foucault suggests analysts can draw on his ideas for instance, his ideas around the 
operation of power. The absence of method however, does not mean that analysts 
claiming their work to be genealogy inspired have free rein rather, any work that 
claims to be genealogical needs to accrue a focus on understanding history in the 
way that Foucault’s genealogy does - as a constant struggle between dominations 
with discourse as the pivotal factor in creating reality83. In common with 
poststructuralism in general, genealogy does not seek a definitive account and 
endeavours to avoid the substitution of one ‘truth’ for another. 

83Thisstudyhowever,differsfromFoucaultinthesensethatitalsodrawsoncriticalrealisttheories
initsunderstandingofhowthe‘social’isconstitutedineffectitalsogivescredencetothenotionof
theextradiscursiveasplayingasignificantrole.ThoughO’FarrellhassuggestedthatFoucaultdoes
notspecificallydenytheexistenceofamaterialreality.
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A genealogical historical analysis focuses its emphasis and concern on the 
development of discourse/knowledge and the power effects of these. Its analysis of 
history takes as its starting point the discourse as the most important object as 
opposed to traditional analysis whose starting point is usually a historical 
event/movement. By employing a genealogical lens and focussing on discourses the 
aim is to explore how discursive constructions construct the object, the ‘other’, we 
are therefore not looking for a particular historical event/movement as being the 
‘source’84 in terms of defining the ‘self’ and ‘other’. The aim is to trace the 
development of a discourse, to contextualise it, and to explore the effects of the 
constructions. However, it is important to note that this study is not an ‘application’ 
of Foucault’s genealogy; there is no precise template for application. Instead, the 
study draws on Foucault’s work around genealogy and borrows for instance, his 
ideas for instance to discuss how power operates in society through discourse.
4.12 Human Agency - Author or Actor? 
The previous sections have highlighted the various ways that discourses can be 
implicated in the construction of legitimate knowledge and the exercise of power. 
There are two significant themes that clearly emerge form Foucault’s theorisations of 
discourse firstly, the power of discourse is such that it implicitly denies individual 
authorship, and secondly this conception of the power of discourse tends to be 
reductionist. Arguably then, Foucault may be described as a poststructuralist. For 

84ForinstanceinthehistoricalanalysisofthehostilitybetweenIndiaandPakistanaFoucauldian
genealogicalanalysiswouldnotconceptualizethepartitioneventof1947astheultimate‘source’of
hostilityratheragenealogicalanalysiswouldseektotracethehistoricaldevelopmentofhostile
representations.
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instance in his approach personhood as well as all other aspects of social reality are 
reduced to the operation of discourses reflecting an anti-realist philosophy. 
Foucault’s main argument is that social objects and subjects are, first and foremost, 
rooted in the prevailing discursive cultures. This anti-modernist view takes away 
power from the individual and instead locates it within the discourse. Foucault 
radically challenged the reasoning, rational individual of modernity suggesting 
instead that the human subject operates within the limits of a particular regime of 
truth and is subject to the constraining and enabling elements of discursive 
formations. Foucault proposed that it is discourse that produces knowledge and 
meaning and that human subjects almost act like mouthpieces by submitting to the 
rules and conventions outlined by a discourse. For Foucault, the subject, 
can become the bearer of the kind of knowledge which discourse produces. It 
can become the object through which power is relayed but it cannot stand 
outside power/knowledge as its source and author (Hall 2001:79-80).
Foucault (1977) suggests that the ‘person’ is subjected and ultimately produced 
through the discourse; what he meant by this was that discourse constructs ‘subject-
positions’, which are of course specific, to particular discursive regimes and 
historical periods. But the point Foucault is making is that, the discourse produces 
the desired attributes, characteristics etc. for the ‘mad man’ or the ‘criminal’ or the 
‘father’ and so on85. These figures ‘personify the particular forms of knowledge 

85Perhapsthebestillustrationofthewayinwhich‘subjects’areconstructedthroughknowledgecan
beseeninDisciplineandPunish(1977)whichconsistsofFoucault’sstudyoftheemergenceofthe
prisonsysteminwesternsocieties.
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which the discourse produces….[and] have the attributes we would expect as these 
are defined by the discourse’ (Hall 2001:80). Such a Foucauldian understanding of 
personal agency is often seen as sounding the ‘death of the subject’ (see Caldwell 
2007, Edkins 1999, chapter 2). 
Although as Hall (1996) notes, such a poststructuralist position though explaining the 
construction of subject positions within discursive formations is inadequate in 
explaining why certain positions are occupied by some individuals and not others. 
There is the danger here that we understand subject positions as boxes, which 
individuals occupy in an unproblematic fashion. The idea that discourses and 
ideologies ‘summon the subject’ into position is an overarching perhaps totalitarian 
notion possibly leading to an ‘overestimation of the efficacy of disciplinary power 
and to an impoverished understanding of the individual which cannot account for 
experiences that fall outside the realm of the “docile” body’ (McNay 1994 in Hall 
1996:12). In their book: ‘Ideological Dilemmas’, Billig et al. (1998) sought to 
probelmatize the idea that prevailing ideologies in a society were in any way a 
coherent and integrated system. Instead, their argument was that, ideologies are 
essentially dilemmatic in nature offering two opposing sides to the thinking recipient 
so that a dominant ideology of individualism for instance already contains within it 
the idea of collectivism. The individual here is perceived as a rhetorician; a debater 
and someone open to exploring contrary implications of ideas (Burr 2003) as 
opposed to Foucault’s ‘docile’ body (Edkins 1999, chapter 3).
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Discursive psychologists have also tried to move away from notions of ideology as 
wholly imposing on the passive individual. Davis and Harre (2001) for instance 
focus on the way that individuals shape their own subjectivity; their focus is on 
exploring local interaction and on the active way in which individuals choose and 
take up certain positions whilst offering alternative positions to other people within 
the interaction. The view here is that the person engages actively in choosing subject 
positions and the discourse does produce the individual but that individuals also 
manipulate discourse to suit their purposes. Perspectives focusing more on linguistic 
performativity and other aspects of situated language in use tend to over-emphasise 
the power of individuals in terms of constructing versions of social reality through 
their talk and by choosing to employ particular interpretative repertoires or linguistic 
resources as opposed to other available resources. Such approaches tend to look at 
the way individuals deliberately make use of some interpretative repertoires and 
dominant discourses to frame their own experience whilst avoiding other discourses, 
and perhaps offering those alternative positions to other people. The human subject, 
for discursive psychologists, is seen as ‘active’ and not a mere puppet in the hands of 
discourse, since at any one time there exist any number of discourses to choose from. 
Davis and Harre’s approach reserves the ‘individuality of the person; one’s personal 
history and unique life experiences will influence the extent to which we want to 
occupy and feel able to occupy particular positions within interactions’ (Burr 
2003:114).
In contrast, a theoretical approach which views individuals as merely puppets of a 
discourse takes us far away from modernity’s ‘rational’ individual leaving very little 
space to conceptualise how bodies take up discourses. In this context, Foucault’s 
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portrayal of the ‘docile body’ just waiting to be taken up by a subject-position has 
been heavily criticized. Interestingly though, Burr (2003) does suggest that 
Foucault’s notion of the micro-physics of power affords  ‘power’ to each and every 
individual; since that power is exercised each and every time the individual confirms 
the message of prevailing discourses through social practice. Indeed Foucault viewed 
resistance as part and parcel of every dominant discourse suggesting that dominant 
discourses were never entirely secure in their claims to truth and resistance existed at 
some level wherever a dominant discourse prevailed. After all, as Burr (2003:80) 
notes, if the notion that ‘a woman’s place is in the home were really secure in its 
position as prevailing truth, there would be no need to keep asserting it’. 
Nevertheless, Foucault’s social analysis does not directly engage with questions 
around the relationship between human agency and discourse; his approach tending 
to posit discourse as all-pervasive and singularly significant.
Those taking a more critical realist approach to social construction also find 
poststructuralism’s docile body, and Cromby and Nightingale (1999:10-11) argue 
that,
[I]n continually either ignoring the body or treating it as a mere metaphor or 
text, social constructionism obscures and downplays the significance of its 
functional, physiological, hormonal, anatomical and phenomenological 
aspects… [if all] aspects of all bodies must be so similar, so malleable before 
discourse, that they may as well not be there: if the body can be anything, it 
might as well be nothing. 
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Such criticism emanates from critical realism’s deep scepticism of poststructuralist 
theories, which can lead to mono-causal explanations of a complex social reality. 
However, critical realism’s main contention with approaches emanating from a 
broadly poststructuralist vein is their anti-realist86 stance. Instead, critical realists 
stress the relevance and penetration of the extra-discursive on the discursive realm 
and are critical of poststructuralism’s failure to consider and acknowledge the impact 
of extra-discursive structures and mechanisms. The kind of constructivism that a 
critical realist philosophy engenders is sceptical of the discursive reductionism that 
poststructuralist approaches encourage. The discussion below will now seek to 
consider the critical realist critique of poststructuralism and discuss how critical 
realist insights can provide for a more wholesome constructivist analysis.      
4.13 Critical realist critique of poststructuralism
Much of poststructuralism is informed by an epistemological position that views 
sceptically the notion that an independent, external or extra-discursive reality can be 
accessed and finds particularly problematic the idea that an external, objective 
dimension of reality is somehow reflected in our talk. Such a philosophical stance 
postulates that a material reality composed of natural events and structures cannot 
have any intrinsic value in and of itself; we do not in other words un-problematically 
experience an objective ‘reality’, instead, we can only come to experience a material 

86Poststructuralistsdonotdenytheexistenceofaexternal,independentrealityforinstance,rather
theirargumentisthat‘reality’cannotbegraspedoraccessedoutsideofourtextsanddiscourse.
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reality through our talk and representation of it. Although the specific existence of an 
external reality is not denied, such as the existence of natural and physical structures 
of the world, the argument is that the only way we can apprehend these structures is 
through language since meaning and value is established through discourse. Laclau 
and Mouffe (1985 in Burr 2003:89) sum up this point of view,  
the fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to 
do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the 
realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event 
that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of 
my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of 
‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath of God’ depends upon the 
structuring of a discursive field.
What this means is that such things as the existence of God, or the truth/falsity of a 
statement are seen as relative to the individual, social group or culture within which 
the particular concept is located, therefore countering all claims to universalism or 
universal truths.  Indeed, ‘truths’ for relativism are not the result of an external 
objective reality but the function of locally and historically contingent values, norms, 
social practices and beliefs. Thus for poststructuralism, ‘there is no truth to be found 
outside of the language in which such ‘truths’ arise (that is, no extra-discursive 
things, processes or reality in which such truths may be grounded)’ (Cromby and 
Nightingale 1999:208). The argument thus runs that, if we cannot directly ‘know’ a 
material reality outside of our talk of it – it is incorrect to acknowledge or theorise 
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about it. Consequently, scientific inquiry should not concern itself with ‘a pointless 
and futile search for the factual, but with an exploration of the textual and linguistic 
ways in which we describe and construct our world’ (Nightingale and Cromby 
1999:212). A critique of this poststructuralist approach is that it encourages 
theoretical closure in that its social inquiry posits discourse and language as the only 
significant frameworks of analysis. It can be argued that this epistemology affords a 
groundless constructionism, one that is delinked from the historical, material and 
social conditions of its emergence, as Nightingale and Cromby (1999:215 italics in 
original) explain, 
[I]n short, a discourse analysis explicitly grounded in relativism can be seen as 
a useful tool in certain circumstances, but is method that will ultimately fail to 
describe or explain anything other than the locally contingent aims of particular 
instances of talk. It is a useful method in certain circumstances, but even 
within these circumstances can never afford more than a partial, textually 
contingent analysis of the particular functional aims of a particular piece of 
talk. 
Although many poststructuralists have defended an epistemological relativism 
(Edwards et al. 1995), it is perhaps critical realism that has posed the most significant 
challenge to an unrestrained commitment to epistemological relativism within 
poststructuralist approaches, and the notion that discursive theorizing is sufficient in 
adequately explaining complex social realities. Nightingale and Cromby (1999:9-10) 
note that a realization that, 
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our world is socially constructed need not force us to adopt a promiscuous and 
unbridled relativism [ instead rather than attempting to universalise relativism] 
we should…embark upon the far more difficult and dangerous task of 
attempting to forge a coherent and grounded social constructionism that 
explains the world, in all its extra-discursive intransigence and mess. 
 The central critique of critical realism focuses on epistemological relativism’s 
inconsideration toward material conditions of existence which critical realism 
theorizes as effecting our social constructions.
4.14 A stratified ontological framework 
Critical realism is best described as a general philosophy of science with its 
development most commonly associated with the work of Roy Bhaskar (1978, 1979, 
1989). The basic contention of this approach to science is that an external world 
exists and is independent of our representations of it. Social reality is not conceived 
as a one dimensional phenomena; rather, what is critical to this approach is its 
conception of social reality as stratified and layered. Bhaskar divides social reality 
into three distinct layers, which have to be distinguished in order for us to understand 
how things work. The three levels being, the ‘real’ /‘deep’, the ‘actual’ and the 
‘empirical’ as the figure below demonstrates. 
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A stratified social reality 
Empirical: perceptions, impressions, sensation 
Actual: events, state of affairs (conditions) 
Deep/Real: structures, mechanism, powers/liabilities 
Figure 1: A Stratified Social Ontology 
A critical realist stratified ontology is constituted by a ‘deep’ or ‘real’ level of 
reality’, which consists of the intransitive dimensions of the world. At the basic level, 
critical realism makes a distinction between intransitive dimensions of knowledge 
referring to those objects such as physical processes, structures or social structures 
that exist at the deep level of reality and which may, but are often not, observable. 
Bhaskar (1978:22), contends that intransitive objects are not dependent on human 
observations or our knowledge of them, ‘they are the real things and structures, 
mechanisms and processes, events and possibilities of the world; and for the most 
part they are quite independent of us’. Thus in the absence of our knowledge about 
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these intransitive objects of the world they would however, be unaffected. Bhaskar  
(1978:22) writes, 
the tide would still turn and metals conduct electricity…without a Newton or a 
Drude to produce our knowledge of them. The Wiedemann-Franz law would 
continue to hold although there would be no-one to formulate, experimentally 
establish or deduce it.
The contention is that although these aspects of the world exist on a level in which 
they appear in discourse they are however not conceptualised as being reducible to it. 
The argument is that they exist regardless of how we represent or ascribe meaning to 
them. For Bhaskar (1978:250) ‘descriptions belong to the world of society and of 
men [sic]; objects belong to the world of nature. We express [our understanding of] 
nature in thought’. This deeper dimension of social reality is distinguished from the 
‘actual’ level of reality, which is that realm of reality that is triggered by the 
activities of mechanisms and structures existing in the real/deep level. This is the 
reality that happens when the ‘real’ is activated; examples could include the death of 
a public figure or an increase in crime rates. Finally, the empirical strata of social 
reality refers to the transitive realm and refers to the discourses and theories that are 
socially produced about the intransitive objects. The empirical level of reality 
consists of observable events that are manifested in experience and discourse. This is 
not to say that critical realism rejects epistemological relativism in totality; rather, it 
embraces such a framework but in the same instance it combines it with an 
ontological realism or an insistence for depth ontological inquiry. In this sense, an 
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underlying reality provides the conditions of possibility both for actual events and 
perceived phenomena. The insistence on something that is ‘real’ in the world is not 
new rather as Bhaskar (1989:2) argues ‘all philosophies, cognitive discourses and 
practical activities presuppose a realism - in the sense of some ontology or general 
account of the world- of one kind or another’. All approaches whether linguistic or 
empirical presuppose a form of realism albeit in these cases being a focus on 
‘surface’, in other words, a consideration of ‘real’ as only those things that appear on 
the surface in terms of either observed regularity patterns or identifiable discourses87.
For a critical realist social investigation a study of the upper levels of reality (the 
empirical level) is warranted however, at the same time it is very important to 
recognise the stratified nature of reality and tease apart the different ontological 
layers in order to arrive at a more comprehensive and plausible social analysis. 
Bhaskar (1978:58-62) is highly critical of the practice of anthropocentrism or the 
collapsing of the three levels of reality into one ‘flat’ reality. For Bhaskar, this is a 
flawed approach to social reality because of the way in which it ties ‘existence’ to its 
being experienced or being spoken.
4.15 Critical realism and non-Humean causality  
Further, if what we are saying is that the deeper levels of social reality consists of 
mechanisms, processes and structures that ‘effect’ the upper levels of reality 
observable in the empirical domain then, in essence, we are putting forward a model 
of causality. This means that we hypothesis that deeper levels of social reality are 

87Empiricalandlinguistic.
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causally connected to their empirical manifestations. Indeed, this is exactly the line 
that critical realism adopts, and in this connection it puts forward a conception of 
causal analysis that is non-Humean in the sense that it does not rely on empiricism or 
the notion of regularity as the main criteria for determining cause in the social 
sciences. It is useful to consider the close association between causal analysis and 
empiricism in order to demonstrate how a critical realism radically re-conceptualises 
causation within the social sciences by detaching cause from an exclusive association 
with an empiricist philosophy. Empiricism’s close attachment to the concept of 
causal analysis can be traced to David Hume’s eighteenth century philosophy88
which, in critiquing metaphysics, argued that reliable and valid knowledge could 
only be based on direct, observable empirical events rather than human speculation 
and perception. The basis of attributing ‘cause’ was the observance of ‘constant 
conjunction’ of events so that anything that did not fulfil such criteria could not be 
deemed as ‘causing’. The Humean philosophy of causation became extremely 
influential not only within the natural sciences but also in the social sciences. 
Behaviourist social scientists for instance aggressively associated ‘cause’ with 
observable regularities. Milja Kurki (2007:194) notes, that the influence of the 
Humean concept of cause is such that although many social scientists accept the 
legitimacy of qualitative methods and data, ‘yet most social scientists are still 
adamant that only careful observation of regularities (even if ‘localised’ regularities) 
can give us an adequate understanding of human action and society’. This meant that 
many types of data such as qualitative and historical data and methods such as 
discourse analysis tend to be side-lined mainly because they are unable to fulfil the 
obsession with empirical regularity.  

88DavidHume.ATreatiseofHumanNature.Oxford,ClarendonPress.1978.
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Critical realism however, advances a radically anti-Humean understanding of 
causation and this is because it’s stratified ontology postulates the existence of an 
often unobservable deeper level of reality consisting of underlying structures, powers 
and tendencies that provide the conditions of possibility for actual observable events, 
regularities and experienced phenomena. The critical point here is that although the 
underlying deeper level of reality is not observable nevertheless it is conceptualised 
as generative or in other words potentially ‘causing’. Criticising an empiricist 
insistence that entities need to be observable in order to qualify as ‘real’ Bhaskar 
(1978:179-180) argues that, 
if an entity cannot be perceived…does this mean that it cannot be known to 
exist..?..entities may be known to exist indirectly, viz. through the perception 
of their effects. The paradigm here is the case of the detection of radio-active 
material by a Geiger counter, of electricity by an electroscope, of a magnetic 
field by a compass needle…(.) It should be stressed that in the detection case 
that something does exist producing the effect is not in question. Nor is the fact 
that it exists and acts independently of its detection. To say ‘electricity is what 
electricity does’ is to collapse powers to their exercise. Electricity is not what 
electricity does; but what it can do. The mode of reasoning employed in 
inferring the existence of causal agents through the ostension89 of their effects 
in thus perfectly proper. 

89Ostension–conveyingthemeaningofatermbypointingoutexamples,forexampledefining‘red’
bypointingoutredobjects,apples,rosesetc.
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In Bhaskar’s conception of causality, ‘causes’ can be unobservable and hence causal 
analysis cannot be dependent on perception alone; critical realism challenges the 
assumption that causal analysis is singularly dependent on empirical observation of 
regular patterns. Bhaskar (1978:12) has argued that while empirical regularity may 
be indicative of causal structures nevertheless regularity per se is not deemed 
necessary nor significant for establishing a causal explanation. Critical realism, as 
Kurki (2007:365) suggests, seeks ‘not to describe observed patterns, but to give an 
account of the underlying causal powers that explain why the patterns of facts we 
observe exist’. In this sense, a critique of a rigid empiricist framework of analysis is 
that social investigations, as a result, can be intently focussed on identifying 
observed regularities and correlations but are unable to explain important ‘depth’ 
questions relating to why event-regularities occur.  
 A critical realist conceptual framework relates ‘causal powers’ to the object’s nature 
or its liabilities and characteristic ways of acting. Sayer (1992:105) explains,
a plane can fly by virtue of its aerodynamic form, engines etc.; gunpowder can 
explode by virtue of its unstable chemical structure; multinational firms can 
sell their products dear and buy their labour cheap by virtue of operating in 
several countries… whether these powers/tendencies are realised in the actual 
and empirical domains is irrelevant to the question of their existence in the 
real; structures and mechanisms have causal powers whether these are 
empirically actualised or not; indeed non-realisation cannot signify non-
existence.  
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On this view then, as Sayer (1992:105) notes, ‘a causal claim is not about a regularity 
between separate things or events but about what an object is like and what it can do 
and only derivatively what it will do in any particular situation’. Critical realism is 
concerned with the properties of structures, mechanisms and processes, in effect, 
their potentialities. The intransitive dimension of the world is thus not reducible to 
events or patterns, and it is: structures, powers and tendencies that are designated in 
causal laws. Critical realism postulates a disjuncture between an object’s possession 
of causal power and liabilities and its actual realisation, thus rejecting a notion of 
Humean constant conjunctions. Sayer (1992: 107 italics in original) explains, 
Whether a causal power or liability is actually activated or suffered on any 
occasion depends on conditions whose presence and configuration are 
contingent. Whether a person actually works might depend on whether there is 
a job for him/her. Whether gunpowder ever does explode depends on it being 
in the right conditions – in the presence of a spark, etc. so although causal 
powers exist necessarily by virtue of the nature of the objects which possess 
them, it is contingent whether they are ever activated or exercised…the
relationship between causal powers or mechanisms and their effects is 
therefore not fixed, but contingent; indeed causal powers exist independently 
of their effects. 
Critical realism thus disentangles causality from an empiricist philosophy and its 
entailing mechanistic ‘when A then B’ criterion, and causes are loosely defined as 
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‘all those things that bring about, produce, direct or contribute to states of affairs or 
changes in the world’ (Kurki 2006:202). To ask for the cause of something is to ask, 
‘what makes it happen’, what ‘produces’, ‘generates’, ‘creates’, or ‘determines’ it, or 
more weakly, what ‘enables’ or ‘leads to’ it  (Sayer 1992:104).
4.16 Causality in the social sciences 
Since the notion of ‘cause’ is a key concept with critical realist theorising, it would 
be useful to briefly discuss how this notion has been conceptualised within 
postpositivist IR writings. Kurki (2008) argues that the notion of ‘causation’ has 
unnecessarily become a problematic idea within IR owing to an inadvertent 
acceptance of a Humean causal model as the only account of ‘how things are 
caused’. Within the positivist method, observable regularities between two or more 
variables in the context of an objective, mind-independent external reality denote 
causal relations between the variables. This account of establishing causality between 
variables has been directly influenced by Humean ontological assumptions. Causal 
models have thus traditionally been associated with positivist science, and as a 
consequence many postpositivists including poststructuralists and constructivists 
have on the whole been sceptical and dismissive of employing casual terminology in 
their social accounts. Indeed, one of the key elements of the poststructuralist critique 
of positivism is its adherence to the notion that correlations of variables are sufficient 
in establishing ‘cause’ in the social world. Instead, poststructuralists draw attention 
to the way in which the ‘variables’ (such as a specific social action) that positivism 
studies are not unproblematic rather they are constituted by meanings, 
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interpretations, norms and discourses. The postpositivist critique of positivism entails 
a general rebuffing of the notion of ‘cause’ in the social sciences particularly linear 
and narrow conceptions of cause. Kurki (2008:124-125) radically challenges this 
position arguing that such opposition to ‘cause’ is flawed she explains, 
This is because when they [postpositivists] reject causal analysis, they reject it 
on the basis of having accepted, often inadvertently, core Humean assumptions 
regarding the nature of causation. The inability of more radical reflectivists, as 
well as of most constructivists, to conceptualise causation beyond the 
assumption of Humeanism has some important consequences. It leads to a 
paradoxical legitimisation of the Humean empiricist conception of causation in 
IR, as well as certain theoretically reductionist tendencies. Also, it leads to 
blindness towards non-Humean causal assumptions: the reflectivists and 
constructivists make a number of claims that seem common-sensically causal, 
yet cannot be understood as causal because of the dominance of the Humean 
conception of what it means to talk about causes.
Kurki points out that, in rejecting the concept of causation in the social sciences post-
positivists inadvertently accept that a Humean model of causal relations is the only 
valid way to engage with ‘causes’.  This is not to say however that constructivists 
have not (implicitly) engaged with some kind of ‘causality’. Although critical strands 
of IR have engaged with the discursive contexts within which the international 
objects they study are located; there is however, a strong reluctance in employing 
causality terminology in such expositions. Jackson (2007:396) for instance, in 
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examining the post 2001 US discourse, in terms of its construction of the ‘terrorist’, 
argues that he adopts a ‘interpretive logic rather than a causal logic’; similarly 
Campbell (1992:4) in his study of the discursive links between discourse and the 
outbreak of war in Bosnia during the 1990s suggests that his position is opposed to 
‘cataloguing, calculating and specifying “real causes” ’. For poststructuralists in 
particular, the suggestion that discursive constructions are affected or ‘caused’ by 
extra-discursive factors is abhorrent. Interestingly however, Kurki (2006:198-199) 
notes that many critical theorists in IR already implicitly engage in causal analysis 
citing Robert Cox’s work in particular Kurki argues that, 
Cox’s account of world politics seems to be based on careful outlining of 
‘forces’ - material, ideational, and institutional – that ‘produce’ and ‘shape’ the 
world order and agents’ actions within it. However, Cox describes the layered 
and interacting structural forces, not as causes, but as ‘pressures and 
constraints’. It could be argued that to the extent that this terminology implies a 
‘productive’ meaning, and is drawn upon to explain ‘why’ things happen in 
certain ways rather than other, Cox is making ‘common-sensically’ or 
implicitly causal claims.  
The problem here, in terms of the refusal to explicitly engage with causality models, 
is for Kurki (2006) an understanding of causality exclusively in Humean terms i.e. 
the notion that empirical regularity is the bedrock of causal relations and that 
causality can only be understood in terms of mechanistic ‘when A then B’ terms. 
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Interestingly, Kurki’s work offers a useful ‘genealogy’ of how ‘cause’ as a concept 
came to be understood exclusively in Humean terms.  
Such association between ‘cause’ and empiricism is even more problematic from a 
critical realist perspective especially since this approach posits a clear distinction 
between different layers of reality and advocates not only the existence of a ‘real’, 
unobservable level of reality, but proposes that analysts need to theorise about this 
deeper level of reality in order to account for surface events. The existence of 
‘generative’ structures within the deeper levels of reality is a key concept within 
critical realism and which is connected to social patterns and trends on the 
observable level of reality. In essence then, the argument that critical realism makes 
is one of ‘causality’ i.e. that generative mechanisms are causal in the social world 
albeit not in the Humean-empiricist sense. Thus from a critical realist perspective, a 
cause does not need to be actualised in the empirical domain (or that which we can 
directly observe); this is because regularity is not theorized as a necessary condition 
of ascribing ‘cause’. Rather, critical realism works with the notion that a structure 
can possess causal powers, even though these may never be actualised. Causality is 
not necessarily related to regularity. For Kurki (2008:170), 
[the] separation of real causes from their empirical facets allows the critical 
realists to escape the distinctly Humean problem of studying mere observables, 
which has severely limited the appeal of causal explanations in the social 
world. With the help of the philosophically realist account of causation, the 
critical realists can learn to recognise the casual role of unobservables – such as 
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ideas, rules, discourses – that social sciences have tended to frame as non-
causal.  
Kurki argues for the reclaiming of causality for the social sciences and developing a 
more broader non-positivist theory of cause in which empirical regularity and the 
natural science experiment focusing on a mechanistic ‘if A then B’ criteria is not the 
only way to establish causal relations.   
Theoretically then, the notion of ‘causality’ is central to a critical realist orientation 
since unobservable generative structures existing in the ‘deep’ levels of reality are 
conceptualised as shaping and conditioning to some extent discourses, 
representations, norms and on. Since deeper levels of reality are not directly 
observable, and may often only be accessed or theorized about through conceptual 
abstractions and transcendental argumentation, it is clear then, that empiricism 
cannot fit in here. However, this does not mean that the causality as a concept need 
be abandoned indeed as Kurki has demonstrated in compelling fashion a non-
Humean model of causality ‘works’ with critical realism. 
4.17 How can critical realism enhance a constructivist analysis? 
In order to clarify the theoretical position here particularly in terms of how critical 
realism can contribute to a more plausible and comprehensive social investigation it 
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is important to discuss more thoroughly the potential contribution of critical realism 
to a constructivist analysis90. As the discussion above explored, critical realism 
concentrates on the potentialities or the properties of generative mechanisms in the 
real domain; the aim of science not being deductive in the sense that constant 
conjunctions are sought out but ‘science’ aiming to identify and explain the powers, 
structures and tendencies that afford the course of events (or the actual and empirical 
layers of reality). However, this is only one side of the critical realist equation 
because the ontological realism postulating the possibility of causality is combined 
with the kind of epistemological relativist arguments discussed in previous sections 
especially concerning the sociology of knowledge or the idea that all beliefs are 
socially produced through discourse and hence are potentially fallible. However, this 
is a qualified view since from a critical realist perspective socially produced 
knowledge is ‘knowledge of an independently existing reality, knowledge is not 
totally arbitrary and some claims about the nature of this reality may provide better 
accounts than others’ (Patomaki and Wight 2000:224).   Bhaskar’s critical realism 
can be seen to be combining epistemological relativism with an ontological realism 
paving the way for more holistic and plausible explanations of the social world. 
Bhaskar (1978:24) notes, 
[An] adequate philosophy of science must be capable of sustaining and 
reconciling both aspects of science; that is, of showing how science is a 
transitive process, dependent upon ancedental knowledge and the efficient 

90ItisusefultonoteherethatalthoughconstructivisminIRacknowledgestherolesofagencyand
structurewithinadiscursiveexplanationoftheobjectsofIR,thereisalackintheoreticalgrounding
intermsofhowoneistoconceptualisethedialectbetweendiscourse,structureandagency.Inthis
respectcriticalrealismoffersanimportanttheoreticalgroundingandmethodologytoconstructivist
thought.
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activity of men, has intransitive objects which depend upon neither. That is, it 
must be capable of sustaining both (1) the social character of science and (2) 
the independence from science of the objects of scientific thought. 
It is useful to note that although constructivist perspectives within the field of 
international relations conceptualise a dialect between discourse, structure and 
agency in the production of world politics, it is notable that the dialect itself is 
arguably under-theorised within IR. It is here, in terms of offering a robust 
theoretical framework, within which to conceptualise the dialect between structure, 
agency and discourse in the production of world politics that critical realism is most 
useful. In order to bring into sharper focus the potential contribution of critical 
realism to constructivist investigations it would be useful to draw on the structure-
agency debate within the social sciences in order to demonstrate how critical realism 
theorises the production of social life and can be differentiated from poststructuralist
approaches and materialist positions. This discussion will seek to demonstrate how 
critical realism offers a useful synthesis of both approaches in considering the 
production of social reality and how it can further enhance a constructivist approach. 
The structure-agency debate is extremely contentious with two differing and 
somewhat polarized camps each positing their arguments as authentic on the debate 
of whether structure or alternatively, human agency is at the heart of social life. On 
one end of the spectrum is a materialist reductionist argument which postulates that 
structures have a real existence and are comparable to real, material things, and that 
such overarching paradigms are the prime drivers shaping social reality. In this 
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context, Althusser’s (1971) exclusive focus on the power of ‘ideological state 
apparatus’ may be described as a discursive reductionist argument, and is similar in 
many ways to the material reductionism of Marx. What is critical to these approaches 
is the way in which their social analyses’ is devoid of human agency, and social 
reality is reduced to being a result of social structures. The ‘death of the subject’ as 
implied in much of Foucault’s work is similar since there is an absence of the human 
subject in constructing social reality whilst discourse is afforded a pre-eminent 
position within this framework. Such focus on the regulatory powers of discourse can 
also be described as a linguistically reductionist account of social reality. On the 
other hand, and at the other end of the spectrum there is another kind of reductionism 
taking place, which we may refer to as agency reduction. For this approach, a 
rational, intentional human agency acts in light of how s/he interprets the world and 
these actions together make up a social structure (such as society) however, the 
critical point here is that such an agency is not conceptualised as being influenced in 
any meaningful way by social structure. Social reality, in this conception, is the 
result of uninfluenced intentional human action and interaction. What is critical to 
both these accounts of social reality is that they reduce social reality to either human 
agency or discursive/material structures.  
In an attempt to create a synthesis between these opposing camps the theory of 
structuration, developed by Anthony Giddens (1984), proposes that structure and 
agency are actually two sides of the same coin, and that a dichotomy does not exist 
between the two; rather, they are mutually inseparable. There is a continuous dialect 
conceived here between people and society, people create society and society creates 
people in a circular fashion so that structure and agency are so fundamentally 
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intertwined that it is impossible to analytically separate the two. Although Giddens 
theory of structuration attempts to reconcile opposing camps; from the critical realist 
perspective there is a fundamental flaw in Giddens fusion of the concepts of structure 
and agency. Archer (1995), has argued that while individualism is committed to the 
error of voluntarism through ignoring the pre-existence of society, and the 
collectivist to the error of reification through ignoring the activity dependence of 
society; Giddens ‘central conflation’ on the other hand by fusing together both 
structure and agency ultimately works to deprive both structure and agency of their 
relative autonomy and causal powers thus in effect it commits both errors. 
It is useful to explore a little further why Archer (ibid), who taking a critical realist 
stance, criticizes Gidden’s conception of the dialect between agency and structure. 
The critical realist starting point in terms of addressing the structure-agency debate is 
the recognition that structure and agency though intimately related are nevertheless 
separate things. This is an important qualification. Bhaskar clarifies this conception 
of the relation between structure and agency through the development of the 
Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA) which seeks to engage with this 
debate. For a start, structures pre-exist and provide the raw material or the conditions 
for human action. This is not to suggest that agents are simply bearers of structure, 
but to argue that since individuals are ‘thrown’ into a pre-existing social context it is 
important for scientific inquiry to explore the way in which structures enable and 
constrain social activity (Joseph 2007).  As Danermark et al. (2002:180) note, 
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one cannot say that individuals create society out of nothing – we may instead 
regard them as reproducing or transforming it. If social structures already exist, 
actions can only modify them – and the whole set of actions maintains or 
changes them.
In this vein then, we can argue that social and physical arrangements such as poverty, 
capitalist working conditions, power relations in the international arena, religious 
institutions, state systems, and so forth, though many initially socially constructed, 
once set up varyingly impinge by placing limitations on further constructions. Parker 
(1992:36) contemplates whether we can deny that capitalism as an over-arching 
system provides the raw material from which we structure our understanding of the 
world and our life experiences?  He notes that, 
industrial workers are physically located for much of their time together with 
others, and certain types of collective action make sense. In patriarchal 
societies in the West, women are physically located in homes for much of the 
time and certain types of collective action do not make sense. In a world 
organized by structures of imperialism, victims outside and inside the industrial 
centres can only act, accept, or resist, in particular ways. 
Along the same lines, Willig (1999:45) argues that ‘underlying, relatively enduring 
structures, such as biochemical, economic or social structures’ provide the raw 
material or the context within which we structure our understanding of the world. 
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The existence of these structures and the events that they produce means that some 
ways of making sense of them, some constructions, are more likely than others. This 
is not to be seen as a reductionist relationship in that material conditions determine 
our constructions, but that such certain conditions ‘afford’ some constructions more 
readily than others’ (Willig 1999). Furthermore, discourses, norms and 
representations that make up social structures also give rise to materially embodied 
social relations. The argument is that a social structure (such as capitalism, the 
family, the international system) is made up of rules and discourses which define 
social positions and social relations. However, a social structure cannot be reduced to 
a definition that emphasises mere ‘rule-following’ rather, social structures (on the 
basis of the rules, discourse) also creates material conditions that enable and 
constrain agents. Such a conceptualisation of the properties of a structure allows the 
researcher to make an analytical distinction between enabling and constraining 
discourses within social structures and the enabling and constraining properties of 
material conditions of existence. Indeed, both are conceptualised as co-causal. For 
example, the (hierarchical) family structure (with its base in historical discourses and 
representation) gives rise to, or creates the requisite material conditions within which 
the parent is enabled to allow or withhold finance in relation to the young adult who 
is also part of the family. This material condition then constrains the young adult in 
terms of his/her social action. Similarly, the structure of patriarchy is such that in 
addition to being a concept-dependent phenomena it also creates the material 
conditions (through the organisation of space for instance) by which it becomes 
‘easier’ or ‘natural’ for women to be excluded from the workplace. In this way, 
social structures and the social positions and social relations they give rise to are 
materially embodied (in that they materially ‘effect’). This view is in contrast to 
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some poststructuralists that tend to reduce social life or social structures to ‘ways of 
thinking’ (norms, rules, discourses); instead critical realists draw attention to the 
‘pre-existence and the material embodiment and properties of social relations’ (Kurki 
2008:212).
Thus, causal powers of structures are distinct from the activity of agents even if they 
cannot exist without agential activity. Patomaki and Wight (2000:231) write that,  
All social reproduction and/or transformation takes place under conditions and 
relations inherited from the past. These conditions and relations represent the 
already established character of social forms that have been reproduced and/or 
transformed in the past and which confront new generations of individuals as 
obdurate structural contexts which constitute actors and action-possibilities as 
well as inspire, encourage, and reward certain forms of behaviour and 
dishearten, discourage, and punish others. As such, these structural contexts
entail relations of power and authority, which constitute and influence social 
activity in these settings and the wider contexts within which these settings are 
embedded.    
Whilst structure is a pre-requisite of human action; nevertheless, structures cannot 
endure automatically; rather they can only do so when people reproduce them. For 
Bhaskar, reproduction of structure is rarely intentional, for instance, when two 
people marry they do not seek to ‘intentionally’ reproduce the nuclear family 
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similarly, people do not go to work to ‘intentionally’ reproduce the capitalist 
economy; rather these are the unintentional consequences of intentional activities. In 
this conception, although agential action both intentional and rule-governed is critical 
to the emergence and reproduction of social structures nevertheless individual action 
can only be understood in the context of a pre-existing social structural context. 
Arguably, although Bhaskar’s critical realism lacks some conceptual clarification in 
terms of fully theorising the role and scope of agency in social structures 
nevertheless, his ideas provide for, and allow for an appreciation of agential power 
within social theorisations. In this context, Joseph (2007:358) writes that, 
 while structures depend upon human actions for their reproduction, these 
actions are already conditioned by the structures in a way which the actors are 
seldom aware of. This is not to say that agents do not act consciously, but their 
conscious actions generally are at a surface level rather than a deep 
one…consequently, agents act consciously within practices, the effect of which 
is the unconscious or unintended reproduction of deeper (ontologically distinct) 
social structures.
Bhaskar (1979) has sought to clarify his conception of the relationship between agent 
and structure through the development of a ‘Transformational Model of Social 
Activity’ (TMSA) he summarises his basic conception, 
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people do not create society. For it always pre-exists them and is a necessary 
condition for their activity. Rather, society must be regarded as an ensemble of 
structures, practices and conventions which individuals reproduce or transform, 
but which would not exist unless they did so. Society does not exist 
independently of human activity (the error of reification). But it is not the 
product of it (the error of voluntarism). ...Society, then, provides the necessary 
conditions for intentional human action, and intentional human action is a 
necessary condition for it. Society is only present in human action, but human 
action always expresses and utilizes some or other social form.  
The TMSA model proposes that although social structures and individuals are 
contingent upon each other in that they are mutually constitutive91 nevertheless they 
are ‘different kind of things’ (Bhaskar 1979:33). Social structure provides the basis 
or the conditions for agential action in the first place whilst at the same time social 
structure is re(produced) by the agent. Despite an intimate relation however, social 
structure is not conceptualized as reducible to individual action – structure is 
conceptualized as enabling and constraining patterns of organization which the 
individual reproduces often unintentionally through their activities (work marriage). 
Bhaskar’s conception of the interaction between structure and agency is 
demonstrated in the figure below. 

91AsdoesGiddens‘theoryofstructuration’.
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Social Structure 
                                                                                            
enablement/constraint      enablement/ 
        transformation 
                                                         Agency      
Figure 2: The transformational model of the connection between social structure and 
agency. 
Source: Bhaskar 1993:155 
However, if the argument is that society ‘stands to individuals, then, as something 
that they never make, but that exists only in virtue of their activity (Bhaskar 
1979:34)’92 then one may ask where and how in Bhaskar’s Transformational Model 
of Social Activity (TMSA) does human agency operate? We have established that 
structures in the critical realist conception are imbued with irreducible causal powers 
however, it is important that we also recount that critical realism certainly does not 
reduce agency to structure93; instead from a critical realist approach, human agency 
possesses its own distinct properties and powers which interact with structure but are 
not reducible to it. Sayer (1992:105) argues that, ‘people have the causal powers of 
being able to work (‘labour power’), speak, reason, walk, reproduce, etc., and a host 

92Individualsdonotcreatesocietyastheyplease(theerrorofvoluntarism),nordoessociety
completelydeterminetheindividual(theerrorofreifyingsocialstructures).
93Despitethecontentionthatstructureprecedesagency.
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of causal liabilities, such as susceptibility to group pressure, extremes of temperature, 
etc.’ Moreover, causal powers  are sometimes also derived from social positions that 
the individual may occupy in a social structure an example here could be the doctor-
patient relation in which the doctor’s power is not derived from his or her 
characteristics as an individual but from the social position he or she occupies in the 
social structure.  
In this connection Archer (1995) building on Bhaskar’s conception of the interplay 
between structure-agency places the TMSA model in a time dimension which can 
help to further clarify the critical realist position and particularly how agency fits into 
the equation here.
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Analytical cycles in the interplay between social structure and agency 
 Structure 
(1)
        T1 
Interaction 
(2)   
  T2       T3 
      Structural elaboration 
(3)        
      T4       
(T1)
Figure 3: Analytical cycles94      
Source: Archer 1995:76 

94AlthoughArcher’s(1995)depictionoftheinterplaybetweensocialstructureandagencytakesthe
shapeofastringnevertheless,asDanermarketal.(2002:182)note,Figure3maybeseenasacycle
ratherthanastring,inthesensethatthereproducedortransformedstructure(theelaboration)
becomestheconditionunderlyingthenextinteraction(T1),andsothecyclecontinues.
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For Archer (1995), in a linear time sequence the concept of structure (T1) comes first 
and has the power to enable and constrain human action. Secondly, within these 
enabling and constraining conditions human action and interaction takes place (T2 - 
T3). Finally, in the third phase and as a result of human action the process of 
transformation and reproduction of the structure occur (T4). The resulting structure 
which has been either reproduced or transformed (Archer’s term for this is ‘structural 
elaboration’) then becomes the subsequent conditioning structure of the next human 
interaction (T1), and so the cycle continues. For Archer, social reality is emergent 
over time and resulting from the interplay between structure and agency95. In this 
conception, structure and agency are not reducible to each other, but possess 
different properties and powers. The interplay between them means that they can 
potentially impact and transform each other and the resultant social reality is 
emergent over time. It is important to note that these are analytical distinctions and 
are not directly observable. One of Archer’s central critique of Giddens (1984) is 
that, the act of conflating these distinctions cannot allow for a study of the interaction 
between the phases that produce social life. For Danermark et al. (2002:182),  
the most productive contribution to social practice that social science can 
make…. is the examination of social structures, their powers and liabilities, 
mechanisms and tendencies, so that people, groups and organisations may 
consider them in their interaction and so – if they wish- strive to change or 
eliminate existing social structures and to establish new ones. 

95Notethatreproductionandtransformationofstructuresowingtohumanagencyisnot
immediatelyvisible,inthesensethatitoccursatthemomentoftheactualactionratheritbecomes
apparentthatthestructurehaschangedaftersometimehaselapsed.
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The main difference between a critical realist approach to structure-agency and that 
proposed by Giddens (1984) is that the latter collapses the analytical distinction 
between the two, to the extent that neither agent not structure can be analytically or 
methodologically separable. This conflation of structure and agency is problematic. 
Firstly, in failing to recognize the ontologically distinct characteristics of structure 
and agency the interplay of the two is ignored; secondly, this approach does not 
conceptualise that structural constraints predate intersubjective interaction and so 
cannot account for the causal emergence of institutional, normative and discursive 
factors that precede agential interaction. On the other hand, a critical realist approach 
maintains that the two (structure and agency) though belonging to the same process 
nevertheless, occupy distinctly different and separable strata. The critical realist 
insistence on maintaining a dichotomy between the two is based on the idea that both 
structure and agency each possess separate powers and properties (which cannot be 
reduced to the other) so that while structure precedes agency nevertheless agency has 
the causal power and liability to reproduce and transform structure. Giddens theory 
of structuration, while commendable for its attempts to reconcile the opposing camps 
of material and agency reductionism respectively nevertheless is flawed in proposing 
a conflation between the two dimensions of social reality.
However, Bhaskar’s critical realism has also been criticised for the kind of analytical 
status it ascribes to the appreciation of social structures in the constitution of social 
reality. Critics point out that Bhaskar’s stance tends to move the focus away from the 
way in which structure is ultimately dependent on agents and their intentionality; 
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nevertheless, Bhaskar’s insistence on the utility of the notion of social structures is 
convincing. On the first hand, this conceptualisation of social structure encapsulates 
the way in which human agency cannot be conceived as existing independently of 
social context but is in fact deeply related to existing social forms, and secondly 
Bhaskar’s conceptualisation of social structure emphasises the way in which 
structures condition and cause through material organisation and ideational 
structures.
The causal powers of social structures can be conceptualised as possessing both 
material and formal causal powers over agents. Firstly, formal causes captures the 
sense ‘in which agents are constrained and enabled by ideas, rules, norms and 
discourses (ways of thinking)…formal causes are crucial in understanding social 
structures and their causal powers’ (Kurki 2008:228). Secondly, social structures also 
possess material causal powers such as the organisation of social space or the 
hierarchy of differing social positions; indeed, such things as a particular social 
position is not just the result of a discourse but also an outcome of material 
organisation. Kurki (2008:229) uses the example of the social structure of capitalism 
to further demonstrate the way in which social structures are causal through formal 
and material properties. 
The internal relations between capital and wage labour depend on shared 
understandings of meanings. They also depend on rules that define how agents 
should act and rule-following practices of agents. However, the shared 
meanings and rules give rise to material social relations and, crucially, to 
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material constraints and enablement’s on agents within structures (for example, 
minimum wages, capital/property ownership, distribution of profits)….a 
worker by virtue of his [sic] position in the structure has different material 
resources at his disposal than the property owning capitalist. 
In this way, social positions and roles cannot be reduced to the notion of ‘rule-
following’ or as a mere consequence of adherence to a ‘discourse’ rather the notion 
here is that concepts and discourses also give rise to materially embodied social 
relations. Social structures also have material causal powers. This is an important 
qualification especially as it relates to those strands of poststructuralism that posit 
the sole ownership of discourse in the production of social reality. Nevertheless, the 
critical realist concept of social structure is notoriously complex and has received 
the attention of much academic scrutiny indeed as Kurki (2008) further notes, even 
Bhaskar’s work can be criticised for lacking in conceptual clarity in fully 
elaborating on the concept of structure. Nevertheless, this does not imply that the 
conceptualisation of social structure advanced by critical realism is flawed; instead, 
it can be argued that the acceptance of the causal nature of social structures opens 
up a model of explanation of the social world that can incorporate multi-causality. 
4.18 Putting Critical realism to work in IR 
Before concluding this section and moving to a discussion of the concrete 
methodology employed by this study it would be useful to concisely address how a 
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critical realist theoretical approach can be useful for a study, like this one, that is 
broadly located with the field of international relations96. At the outset it is important 
to note that critical realism is not a theory of world politics in fact it says very little, 
if at all, about the study of the international. Rather, critical realism is foremost a 
philosophy of science or a meta-theoretical position on the nature of social scientific 
investigation. Its ontological and epistemological claims, that is, its questions about 
the nature of reality, and how we gain knowledge of it clearly have methodological 
implications. As Kurki (2007:377) notes,  
it is not an IR theory in the classical sense and does not aim to make a specific 
kind of empirical contribution to understanding of world politics. Yet, meta-
theoretical interventions, while not directly empirical, are not inconsequential 
in IR rather meta-theoretical interventions affect the kind of conceptual models 
one formulates, the kinds of reflection one engages in and the kind of 
methodological and evidential grounds one considers important and legitimate.   
In relation to this study, a critical realist philosophy would encourage the exploration 
of political discourse and an examination of how through the use of discursive 
practices a particular social reality is constructed. However, an ontological position 
postulating the stratified nature of social reality would also then necessitate an 
exploration of the depth ontology in order to determine the links and connection 
between depth structures and a surface-level political discourse. Indeed, a 
reductionist discourse analysis can but provide a partial social analysis since it is 

96SeeWight(2006)andPatomaki(2002)forausefuloverviewofemployingascientificrealist
frameworkinInternationalRelations.
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analysis of the ‘surface’ only. As Willig (1999) notes, poststructuralist studies should 
move beyond a description of ‘regimes of truth’ by beginning to account for their 
origin and maintenance. Arguably, this can be done through a project that begins by 
providing a detailed and comprehensive description of discourses available to 
individuals or groups, and how these discourses are deployed, and with what effect. 
Importantly, such an analysis should be followed with a comprehensive analysis of 
the socio-economic and historical conditions giving rise to or making possible the 
constructions under scrutiny.
Although poststructuralist theories have made important inroads into the study of 
international relations nevertheless the dominant paradigm of understanding in IR 
continues to be provided by realism, and the work of Kenneth Waltz. Realism is an 
explicit theory of world politics and its main propositions suggest that the 
international system is ordered through the universal principle of anarchy. In this 
sense, realism explains all patterns of state behaviour in light of the theory of 
anarchy. The idea is that in the absence of a central enforcer states are continually 
involved in their own self-interest and survival, and try to balance and strengthen 
themselves in face of external threats by accumulating resources and power whether 
that is in the shape of military assets, population or economic primacy. Critical 
realism does not offer an alternative account of world politics to rival realist theory; 
it does however provide a different way of looking at things. Firstly owing to its 
ontological position, critical realism cannot subscribe to a parsimonious account of 
world politics that posits a theoretical reductionism such as that put forward by 
realism i.e. the notion that a particular structure of anarchy can explain in full 
patterns of state behaviour. Secondly, whilst realism is more likely to ignore the role 
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of discourses in the production of world politics critical realism acknowledges the 
significance of discourse and language in relation to the construction of social reality. 
Thirdly, critical realism finds problematic the essentialist notions underlying realism 
particularly as they relate to the unchanging and universal nature of the theory of 
anarchy. Moreover, a focus on ‘depth ontology’ means that critical realism does not 
subscribe to the notion that empiricism is the only way to engage with cause-effect 
relations in the social world. On the other hand, realism tends to give primacy to the 
empirical regularity model as basis of valid causality between two or more variables. 
As such then, critical realism is not a critique of realist theories of world politics 
rather it is an ontological and epistemological exposition that differs from the 
positivist philosophy underlying realism and therefore this gives way to a different 
way of looking at world politics.
In order to further clarify how a critical realist approach can provide a useful way of 
examining the objects of IR, we may refer to a recent study that employs such a 
framework of analysis.  Gruffydd-Jones’ (2008) study is marked by it opposition to 
relying on an exclusively empirical science and instead she uses methods of 
conceptual abstraction in order to account for the persistence of the North-South 
divide97. Gruffydd-Jones’ argument begins with an examination of the long global 
history of colonialism with the crux of her argument being that this exploitative 
history is significant even today because of the way in which it structured social 
relations of power. The suggestion is that this relational structuring of social power is 

97Currentlythereisamarkedlackofliteratureemployingacriticalrealistphilosophywithinthefield
ofIRindeedmanyIRtheoristsdiscussthepotentialeffectsofCRphilosophyratherthanprovide
concreteexampleswhereithasbeenapplied.
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enduring to this day and forms an unobservable and underlying structure affecting 
the contemporary world.    
In a compelling fashion, Gruffydd-Jones suggests that the historical distribution of 
property and economic power (justified by a historically racist discourse) had the 
material effect in that it produced and entrenched racialised structures of global 
social power. The argument is that the social structure was initially discursively 
constructed giving rise to and justifying inequality along racialised lines. However, 
the social structure in defining social positions and relations subsequently became an 
‘extra-discursive’ ontological structure (a pre-existing structural condition). Thus, 
despite the modern world now seemingly transcending a racist discourse; 
nevertheless, the configuration of social relations which emerged from specific 
colonial and imperial histories is such, that global inequality, continues to be 
concentrated in the South. Although the rules of the contemporary international 
economic system are not explicitly racialised, ‘yet they build on and entrench an 
already racialised structural distribution of property and economic power locally, and 
globally, which is the product of the long history of global racialised dispossession’ 
(Gruffydd-Jones 2008:924). In a similar fashion, Wight (2003:719) in analysing the 
Macpherson report98 calls for a focus on the ‘actual structural configurations’ 
complicit in the production of outcomes rather than a focus on individuals. Thus it 
possible to suggest that an enduring configuration of relations of power may be 
conceived as a social structure and that it is causally productive in that the underlying 
structure is prone to giving rise to a particular material reality (Joseph 2007:351). 

98TheMacphersonReportof1999developedthenotionofinstitutionalracisminthepoliceforcein
theUK.
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Such conclusions are firmly located within a realist ‘depth’ ontology in which causal 
powers are located in the unobservable dimension of the ‘real’ (real, causal social 
structures). In terms of the analysis above, these underlying ‘conditions of 
possibility’ can help explain the incidence of global inequality.
In contrast, had the analysis drawn exclusively on an empiricist philosophy the 
conclusions would have been different. For instance, a commitment to empiricism 
would have spawned an exclusive focus on observed phenomena such as incidences 
of overt individual discrimination, or racism occurring in local and global 
institutional discourses and rules. However, as Gruffydd-Jones rightly notes, in the 
modern world order racism of such kind is officially rejected and global institutions 
are formally committed to racial equality and universal human rights. An empirical 
study focussing only on regularities and occurrence would draw different 
conclusions most likely negating the idea that global inequality operates along 
racialised lines on the basis that an observed, regularity does not exist. We may thus 
categorise some of the poststructuralist writings within IR in this mould in that they 
largely focus on discursive dimensions of international reality (see for e.g. Milliken 
1999, Campbell 1992, Doty, 1993, Chowdhry and Nair 2002). For instance, in 
Doty’s (1993) purely discursive study of the links between the modern world order 
and racialised identities we find that Doty limits her analysis to the discursive 
construction of those racialised identities examining how these then give rise to 
‘embodied practices’. Importantly, her analysis does not go beyond discursive 
dimensions and does not seek to address questions accounting for why such 
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constructions arise in the first place99. Although ‘critical race theorists’ have worked 
to expose the ways in which institutional racism is routinely reproduced by 
apparently neutral and non-racist institutions however, again much of the scholarship 
here tends to stay within the bounds of discursive theory so that everything is 
conceived as reducible to discourse. This seems a problematic contention, in that the 
logical implication of this is that, once it is agreed, that racism is wrong and this, is 
internalized and normalized, then there is nothing more to say. Such conclusions are 
arrived at owing to the conceptualization of a flat social ontology i.e. empirical and 
linguistic, the notion that reality is only that which can be observed, or alternatively 
only that which is constructed in discourse.
4.19 Untangling ‘critical’ realism from Realism and poststructuralism 
Although this study subscribes to a critical realist philosophy it is crucial to note that 
critical realism is, first and foremost, a meta-theoretical position on the nature of 
social scientific investigation, and its primary focus is on questions of ontology and 
epistemology underpinning social scientific research. This means that critical realism 
is certainly not a theory of international relations on par with political realism. 
Rather, the common theme between the two is the belief that an independent reality 
exists ‘out there’ (Delanty 2005). However, political realism makes a stronger case 
for the necessity of empirical regularity as the basis of social scientific investigation 
and secondly it provides for a meta-narrative in terms of an unchanging, pre-given 
universal reality underlying political process. In contrast, a ‘philosophically realist’ 

99Doty(1999)andWight(2000)engageinaninterestingexchangeontheuseofscientificrealismin
conceptualizingtheworld.
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position cannot profess to be a theory of international relations in the same way as 
realism in that it does not provide an overall meta-narrative of political life. 
Nevertheless, it broadly challenges the sufficiency of the notion of ‘empirical-
regularity’, and also implicitly the political realist position concerning the 
universality of a particular narrative. Whilst critical realism does not offer a specific 
theory of international relations, its conceptualisation of the nature of ‘reality’ and 
how we gain knowledge of it have some methodological implications for social 
inquiry. What critical realism brings to the study of IR is a philosophical argument 
concerning the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the various theories 
and approaches taken in IR. The most notable feature of critical realism is the strong 
ontological stance it takes, and consequently offers new ways to engage with the 
subject of international relations (Patomaki 2002).  
We can further distinguish a critical realist theory from poststructuralism. It is 
notable that whilst a discursive reorientation in IR has been a welcome step in terms 
of re-theorisations of the social world, nonetheless the flip side of this has been a 
case of ‘throwing the baby out with the bathwater’, in that many of these analyses 
concentrate entirely on exploring the political implications of specific representation 
and discourse. Theoretically and methodologically prioritising the discursive realm 
inevitably leads to the conclusion that all social events and processes are discursive 
effects. Although the existence of an external, independent reality is not denied by 
poststructuralist accounts nevertheless, the notion is that this ‘reality’ cannot be 
directly accessed and can only be understood through the medium of text. Thus, a 
focus on texts and how these represent and interpret ‘reality’ becomes the primary 
mode of analysis. Further, if something ‘real’ does exist – something that is extra-
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discursive – the poststructuralist notion is that it does not warrant inspection since it 
is not empirically observable in discourse. The fundamental principle underlying this 
kind of approach is the subscription to a flat ontology to which philosophical realism 
is deeply opposed. While poststructuralists are credited with broadening world 
political inquiry by bringing into focus the ways in which various texts shape all 
levels of political life nevertheless, from a critical realist perspective the 
poststructuralists and indeed the constructivists (sometimes unwittingly) remain 
wedded to a problematic empiricist discourse. For Hume, anything beyond the realm 
of human perception and experience could not be said to exist because we have no 
basis to justify its existence, that all we can know is what we can observe and feel 
firsthand this is commonly known as taking an empirically realist stance. At the heart 
of this account is the recording of observable constant conjunctions between isolated 
variables (within IR these would be such variables as patterns of state behaviour, or 
the distribution of resources amongst and within state entities). Traditional IR 
scholarship, in line with the social sciences in general, became strongly influenced 
by empiricism to the extent that it based much of its analyses of world politics on 
observable and regular quantifiable (causal) variables such as patterns of state 
behaviour or the quantification of material resources. 
So, while poststructuralist and some constructivist approaches have critiqued the 
positivist base upon which traditional IR scholarship is based (quantification); from a 
critical realist perspective, constructivists and poststructuralists have not adequately 
engaged with a critique of empirical assumptions of positivism. Instead, they have 
focussed their arguments on demonstrating why and how the assumption of the 
applicability of the positivist scientific method across the sciences is flawed. The 
175



consequence of this has been that both approaches have unproblematically taken up 
an empirically realist position (reality is only that which is observable). The 
argument is that the disagreement with the positivists has been over epistemological 
matters (how we can gain valid knowledge) and have not reflected on the ontology of 
positivism. Patomaki and Wight (2000:219) have argued ‘the postpositivist reaction 
to positivism is embedded within the same background discourse and is derived from 
a long philosophical tradition of anti-/scepticism’. This is, for critical realists, where 
the real problem lies; since critical realism posits a stratified layered reality this 
cannot fit into a social science that only studies surface effects or that level of reality 
that is immediately observable to us. For critical realism, the study of patterns, 
events, discourses, interpretations, norms is but one side of the equation and thus 
they find problematic the poststructuralist stance i.e. the idea that all beliefs and 
knowledge are exclusively socially produced and hence potentially fallible (so that 
no one account is better than another)100 . In this respect, the poststructuralists can be 
accused of engaging in theoretical reductionism.  Critically, from a critical realist 
philosophy,
the intersubjective merely represents one important and necessary part of the 
social. Yet, important as intersubjective meanings and relations are, they do not 
exhaust the social world…intersubjective relations typically represent only the 
immediate appearance of the social relations that constitute society, even if 
they are also necessary for the (re)production of all social relations (Patomaki 
and Wight 2000:225).  

100Incontrastcriticalrealisminitsacceptanceofanexternalindependentrealitysuggeststhatitis
possibletodiscerntheplausibilityofcompetingsocialaccountssincesomewillnecessarilybemore
accurateintheirdescriptionofthestructuresandmechanismsinthe‘real’.
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In a nutshell then, critical realism’s position on the nature of reality is not empirically 
realist whereas much of poststructuralism and constructivism within IR, despite theor 
critique of positivist science, takes up the empirically realist ontology of positivism 
thus denying depth explanations. For Kurki (2008), poststructuralists in particular, in 
only inquiring into the norms, discourses and representations that constitute the 
world are ultimately engage in a theoretical reductionism since they assume that 
ideas, norms, discourses are the primary motivating force with these being 
conceptualised as ‘divorced’ or ‘independent’ of the material forces and context 
within which they occur. The following section will clarify why a discourse analysis 
on its own and informed by an epistemological relativism (the idea that ‘reality’ is all 
exclusively produced through discourse and is always contingent) is conceived as 
lacking in depth explanation.
4.20 What’s wrong with discourse analysis? 
Chapter five of this study will engage with the discursive constructions clearly 
identifiable within Pakistan political discourse. Whilst such an engagement is 
essential to this study, I hope that by now it has become clear why such a focus, from 
the philosophical position taken here, is in itself insufficient in terms of providing a 
robust and comprehensive social explanation. It is clear, as the name suggests, that 
studies drawing on discourse analysis tend to focus primarily and exclusively on 
surface linguistic regularities which make up a ‘regime of truth’.  Whilst this focus is 
unparalleled in terms of examining the regulatory effects of discourse nevertheless 
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such an approach cannot quite explain why constructions are the way they are, why
are some ways of constructing more readily available than others? A purely 
discursive approach can be limited since it fails to address questions related to why 
some (and not other) constructions and discourses become embedded though often 
within a purely discursive project this question is dealt with along lines that seek to 
link a particular hegemonic discourse to structures of power in society. A purely 
discursive analysis can tell us through Foucauldian inspired genealogical studies how 
certain ways of representation and construction emerge and they can also help us 
understand the regulatory effects of discourse structures. The limitation however, is 
that a relativist philosophy cannot allow for an investigation that seeks to look further 
than that which is observed on the surface of society since it does not allow for an 
investigation of overarching often unobservable structures within which discursive 
economies are embedded. Even if structures, are acknowledged (such as the 
structures of patriarchy or capitalism), then there is a reluctance to explicitly 
conceptualise these, as causal and generative; again much of this reluctance has to do 
with the dominance of the Humean causal model dominant within the social 
sciences101.
Whilst social explanations are at best always partial nevertheless, the argument is 
that a linguistic realist investigation such as a discourse analysis can be enhanced 
through combining it with a depth ontological inquiry, such as that advocated by a 
philosophical realism which seeks to identify why the object (the discourse) exists in 

101Kurki(2008)however,hasarguedthatmanyconstructivistsocialscientistsalreadyengagewith
thenotionof‘cause’whentheyrefertosomethingasconstitutive,oraffecting,shapinginother
wordsbringinganysortofchangetoanotherphenomena.However,thebulkofthisworkrefusesto
explicitlyemploycausalterminologytoaccountforthis‘shaping’ofsocialphenomena(seefore.g.
Campbell1992)owingtotheirmisguidedassumptionsthat‘causality’canonlybeassociatedwitha
empiricistdeterministicmodel.
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its present form. A philosophical realist approach or ‘critical realism’, as it is often 
referred to in the wider social scientific literature, seeks to go beyond descriptions of 
‘regimes of truth’ by also accounting for the origin and maintenance of the 
constructions identified. It has much to offer here in terms of guiding the project 
towards an appreciation of the historical, material, economic, social, ideological 
structures in which discourses are embedded. More importantly however, this 
approach can allow such an appreciation without dismissing social explanations that 
focus on the discursive. Indeed, critical realism subscribes to epistemological 
relativism insofar as it acknowledges that all forms of knowledge are mediated by 
language and discourse Bhaskar (1978:249) asserts that ‘epistemological relativism, 
in this sense, is the handmaiden of ontological realism and must be accepted’. At the 
heart of philosophical/critical realism is the notion of a stratified ontology102 in 
which the observable domain is distinguished from the unobservable dimension 
which is just as ‘real’ despite it not being directly perceived. What this means is that 
a discourse study engaged in analysing the upper (observable) level of reality would 
also need to explore links with a depth ‘reality’ thus giving way to a more holistic 
and comprehensive constructivist account of world politics. At the heart of a critical 
realist philosophy is the notion that although our descriptions are always socially 
embedded in that they pre-exist us, and despite the fact that we continue to 
experience along discursive lines nevertheless this does not mean that we can deny 
the ‘real’ that our are descriptions are of or make reference to103. For Bhaskar, it is 
important that we clearly theorize a distinction between the transitive and intransitive 
dimensions of the world regardless of how interconnected they may be. It is 

102Referto4.14foranelaborationofcriticalrealism’snotionofastratifiedontology.
103Importantly,thismeansthatallaccountsofthesocialarenotequal(asopposedtoa
poststructuralistpositioninwhichnoonesocialexplanationcanbesaidtobeinferiortoanother).
Fromtheapproachadvancedheresomeaccountsbetterreferenceunderlyingrealitiesthanother
accounts.
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important to note at this point that the argument here should not be seen as a negation 
of discourse analysis per se, but an insistence that critical realism offers important 
insights that are able to enhance a discursive study.
4.21  Methodological implications of the theory 
This research is concerned with exploring a specific discursive space during a 
particular time-period. The objective of this exploration is to identify the kind of 
representations being offered, the strategies deployed to legitimise representations, 
other discourses being drawn upon, the subject positions offered by the discourse and 
the extent to which these positions constrain and enable political thought and action. 
This is a broadly constructivist project and it is important to distance it from those 
poststructuralist strands that posit discourse as the only significant variable in terms 
of explaining the social world. In this sense, a critical realist perspective offers a 
paradigm within which it is possible to theorise the discursive construction of social 
reality without an associated theoretical closure. The stratified ontological 
framework of critical realism allows the analyst to engage more thoroughly with 
discourse by allowing for an exploration of the emergence of specific discourses. The 
discussion in this chapter has focussed on these theoretical underpinnings of the 
current study since they permeate the research in its entirety from the kind of 
questions it asks, to the kind of data analysis conducted right through to the 
conclusions made.  
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Having laid this theoretical foundation the discussion will now proceed towards an 
exploration of how such a theoretical stance will inform the concrete methodological 
process associated with this study. In the first instance, the discussion engages with 
the methodology of discourse analysis undertaken in this study. Notably this 
exposition will focus less on theory and will be related more to the practical aspects 
of conducting a discourse analysis, and in this regard it will offer a step-by-step 
approach to the kind of analysis conducted here. Secondly, the ensuing discussion 
will also account for the critical realist methodology adopted in chapter six of the 
study. Whilst a discourse analysis focuses on empirical regularities that are clearly 
evident in the language, a critical realist analysis involves a move into a deeper level 
of reality where structures and generative mechanisms are often unobservable. Thus, 
empiricism and regularity are not assumed here to be criteria for determining 
existence at the ‘deep’ level of reality. This means that critical realism theorises 
about unobservable phenomena and consequently a particular mode of scientific 
inference namely abduction and retroduction becomes more important than other 
ways of inferring scientific claims. Methodologically then, the analyst needs to 
engage with ‘conceptual abstraction’ or engaging, in a thought process, with abstract 
phenomena and hypothesising the connections between the abstract realm and the 
concrete, empirical reality before us. In this context, Danermark et al. (2002) provide 
some very useful strategies of engaging with conceptual abstraction within a critical 
realist framework and their argument is that we should begin the process by asking 
some simple questions such as ‘How is this particular political discourse possible?’ 
This methodology involves ‘thought operations’ that move beyond the empirical, 
because at the heart of this account is the idea that knowledge of a deeper social 
reality can only be gained only if we proceed beyond what is empirically observable 
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‘by asking questions about and developing concepts of the more fundamental, 
transfactual conditions for the events and phenomena under study’ (Danermark et al. 
2002:96). Following the discussion on the methodology of ‘discourse analysis’ 
employed here, the latter sections will engage with the precise methodology of 
critical realism in a more thorough manner.            
4.22 Selecting material as data 
This study consults a wide variety of text in order to arrive at conclusions. This is 
different from a textual approach to discourse which is marked by the lack of variety 
in the range of its data primarily because it involves a focuses on grammatical and 
linguistic nuances in a piece of text. Analysts working in this tradition commonly 
tend to focus their study more on the performativity of language - what people do 
with their talk and writing, and relevant ‘data’ is perceived as only that which occurs 
inside the interaction, event or discourse itself. On the other hand, taking its lead 
from Foucault, this study perceives potentially useful material as being more diffuse 
and not necessarily as only occurring within the interaction event. Analysts in this 
tradition suggest that a particular interaction, event or text must not be studied in 
isolation, but requires contextualising in order for the event/text to be fully 
understood. The focus here is on the discursive resources drawn upon to construct 
objects. Wetherell et al. (2001a:389) rather eloquently note that, 
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[I]f we think of cloth or fabric, what is clear is that the threads are woven 
through the whole. If we take a pen and make a circle on a piece of cloth then 
we have certainly created a boundary – inside the circle and outside the circle – 
but if we follow the thread from inside the circle our boundary becomes rather 
irrelevant since the thread continues through the pen marks and onwards. In a 
similar way, as analysts we can easily select a bit of talk from a tape recording 
and in this way create an object of study rather as we drew a circle on the cloth 
but if we are interested in modes of representation, identity or patterns in social 
interaction is it adequate to restrict our study to this one piece of social life 
alone?
Selection of material for a discourse analysis study is therefore theory-laden and 
depends on what the analysts is trying to find. Moreover, drawing on Foucault, 
relevant context and potentially useful data is defined in broad terms (albeit restricted 
to linguistic acts) however this is not to suggest that ‘anything goes’ indeed selection 
of material will be extremely focused and certainly such a methodology is required 
since the kind of material discourse analysts study is abundant and continually being 
spoken/written/published and so on. However, the point here is that theoretically 
there is no closure in terms of relevant context for this study.
Potential data for a discourse analysis study can include any symbolic system 
possessing meaning for people indeed as Parker (1992:6-7) notes, 
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[S]peech, writing, non-verbal behaviour, Braille, Morse code, semaphore, 
runes, advertisements, fashion systems, stained glass, architecture, tarot cards 
and bus tickets are all forms of text…[A]ll of the world, when it has become a 
world understood by us and so given meaning by us, can be described as being 
textual.
However, considering the time, resources and concise nature of the current project 
this study will only explore written and spoken texts. These texts may take the form 
of policy documents, speeches, pamphlets, legislative proceedings, televised 
addresses and other media sources and so on. Data will be obtained from various 
sources including national archives and libraries holding policy documentation. 
Moreover, selection of data material aims to be focused – texts are limitless and it is 
important for this study that selection of material to be used as data stays close to the 
purpose of the study. The study will therefore be setting two selection criteria, the 
first criteria being that data for the project belongs to the category ‘political’. The 
definition of a ‘political discourse’ for the purposes of this study is text emanating 
from political leaders and parties in Pakistan whether that takes the form of actual 
speech or written material and over the period of Pakistan’s existence. The second 
basis or criteria for selection of material is that the focus of the material relates to the 
purpose of the project, after all, there is little use in analysing or considering material 
that relates to say Pakistan’s economic relationship with Ukraine for instance. 
Material requires focused selection before it can be considered as data, with selection 
being guided by the analysts theoretical assumptions as well as the focus and purpose 
of the project.
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The study will use Parker’s (1992) suggestions in relation to identifying a discourse 
within the data material104. In his book: ‘Discourse Dynamics’, Parker offers a useful 
guide to distinguishing discourses, firstly he notes that discourses are realised in 
texts, with text here being defined in broad terms and including verbal and non-
verbal aspects, indeed anything in the world that has meaning for us is considered a 
text. Secondly, Parker (1992:11) defines discourse as a ‘system of statements which 
construct an object, the notion is that the statements cohere to produce a shared 
meaning.  
4.23 Strategies of data analysis 
Discourse analysis does not offer a set of methodological procedures which, when 
applied result in a ‘discourse analysis’. Rather, discourse analysis is more of a 
theoretical approach conceptualising language as constructive and functional. The 
‘method’ of discourse analysis, if any, is that the analyst ‘reads’ the data with a 
different lens seeking not to ask what a particular text tells us about the authors 
viewpoint but instead asking ‘what is this text doing?’ For instance, Foucault does 
not offer a precise method for genealogy – we are simply asked to approach the data 
with different theoretical assumptions. Nevertheless, some writers (Carabine 2001, 
Parker 1992, Willig 1999, 2001) offer useful guidelines to the novice researcher and 
the study will be drawing on these suggestions to provide a structure and ordered 
analysis of the data. It would be useful to briefly consider these ‘procedural steps’ to 

104SeeAppendixII.
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the discourse analysis conducted at various points within this research project. I draw 
here on the various stages of discourse analysis suggested by Willig (2001)105.
Stage 1: identifying discursive constructions (looking for all the different ways in 
which the object is referred to in a text). 
This step consists of conducting a general scan of the material collected so far to get 
a sense of the themes and representations being put forward. Analysis here consists 
of identifying themes, categories and ‘objects’ of the discourse. At this stage, the aim 
is to identify ‘discursive constructions’ in the data – i.e. which phenomena the 
language brings into being. Willig (2001) suggests identifying all the different ways 
in which the discursive object is constructed in the text, practically what this means 
is that we must highlight all references to the discursive object. Moreover, it is 
important that we do not only look for keywords indeed both explicit and implicit 
references need to be included. As Willig notes (2001:109 italics in original), 
 [O]ur search for constructions of the discursive object is guided by shared 
meaning rather than lexical comparability. [T]he fact that a text does not
contain a direct reference to the discursive object can tell us a lot about the way 
in which the object is constructed. 

105Willig’ssuggestionsarenotdefinitive.Willigofferssixstagesofanalysisincludingonethat
explorestheeffectsofdiscourseonsubjectivity–inlightofthepurposeofthisstudy,Ihaveomitted
thisstagefrommyanalysis.
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This initial step can be seen as similar to the practice of coding in general qualitative 
data analysis however, the critical difference between a general qualitative data 
coding process and a constructivist analysis is the different level of emphasis given 
to the nature of language – a constructivist inspired analysis attributes far more 
meaning and depth to texts and digs deeper as opposed to a tendency to take texts at 
their face value. On a practical note, it is important that the analyst allows themes to 
emerge from the data as opposed to pre-defined categories being imposed on the 
data.
Stage 2: locating discourses (deciding what kind of picture of the object is being 
painted by the different discursive constructions). 
Having identified discursive objects the next stage of analysis focuses on exploring 
the differences between constructions of the same discursive object. It is possible that 
one text at various points draws on differing, wider discourses to construct the same 
object. We are here looking to locate how a variety of discourses are called upon to 
produce a particular discourse and the discursive object. Parker (1992) views 
discourses as drawing institutional support from each other – this step explores the 
interrelationship between different discourses. 
Stage 3: action orientation (what is being done or achieved by these constructions, 
what effects they have for speakers or readers) 
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This stage involves looking closely at what is achieved by constructing the object in 
a particular way? what is the function of the discourse? What is gained by the 
representation and how are constructions related to other construction in the 
surrounding text? Willig (2001:94 italics in original) suggests initially reading a text 
without any attempt at analysis this is because ‘such a reading allows us to 
experience as a reader some of the discursive effects…reading a text before 
analysing it allows is to become aware of what a text is doing’. 
Stage 4: positioning (identifying the subject positions made available by the 
discourses)
Having identified various constructions of the discursive object within the text, and 
having located them within wider discourses, we now take a closer look at the 
subject-positions which they offer.  A discourse constructs subjects as well as 
objects. We have been looking at the concept of subject-positions, and it is here that 
we begin to explore the positions that the discourse makes available. Willig 
(2001:111) notes that [S]ubject positions are different from roles in that they offer 
discursive locations from which to speak and act rather than prescribing a particular 
part to be acted out’. Firstly, the analyst needs to examine how the text addresses us, 
what role are we having to adopt to hear the message of the text (Parker 1992). 
Secondly, what speaking rights does the subject-position entail, enable and restrict. 
Stage 5: Absences and Silences (what is not spoken of and why) 
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Stage 6: Inter-textuality (Identify the extent to which representations draw on other 
available discourses)
Stage 7: practice (identifying the possibilities for action made available by subject 
positions) 
This stage is concerned with the relationship between discourse and practice. For 
Willig (2001:111), this requires ‘a systematic exploration of the ways in which 
discursive constructions and the subject positions contained within them open up or 
close down opportunities for action’. Practices are conceptualised as reinforcing 
discourses. For instance Parker (1992:17) notes that for Foucault, discourses and 
practices were really the same thing in that ‘material practices are always invested 
with meaning….[and] speaking or writing is a “practice”’ so that whenever a 
material practice is performed as a result of discourse stipulation then, in effect, such 
an act simultaneously reinforces the validity of the discourse. In looking at how 
discourses are linked to institutions, Parker (1992) notes that medical discourse exists 
in abundance and supports medical institutions however, we should also see practices 
such as the speech act when in consultation with a doctor, the feeling of an abdomen, 
the giving of an injection, the cutting of a body as discursive practices reinforcing,
reproducing, supporting, legitimising the material basis of an institution.  
Stage 8: Contextualisation
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Of course, discourses and discursive constructions are embedded in particular 
historical periods and have a dialectical relationship with other social structures. For 
Foucault, discourse is intimately related to social structure and analysis is incomplete 
without a thorough grounding of discursive constructions in their socio-historical and 
political contexts – indeed some level of genealogical analysis is required. This stage 
of analysis focuses on precisely this – contextualising our analysis as far as possible. 
Our themes will need to be immersed in their contexts and, indeed this study 
maintains that ‘meanings’ can only be grasped once they are immersed in their 
relevant contexts. The study will therefore also devote substantial analysis to 
contextualisation.
The eight stages in the analysis of discourse outlined and illustrated in the preceding 
sections will help us to approach a text and to investigate the ways in which it 
constructs objects and subjects, how such constructions impact practice and their 
possible institutional links. It is important to note that the stages of analysis are not 
separate and discrete and will not be followed as though they are a recipe to ‘doing’ 
discourse analysis. In practice, the stages are inter-related and analysis sometimes 
will occur simultaneously and at other times occur separately.   
In finality, it is useful to note that in terms of ceasing the analysis of texts the study 
takes its lead from a grounded theory approach which stipulates that analysis should 
cease whenever additional data does not give rise to new information and is simply 
contributing to that which has already been identified.  
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4.24 Generative mechanisms and the role of scientific inference 
The discussion will now seek to explore the methodological implications of a 
theoretical commitment to the notion of a stratified ontology. Since engaging with 
depth ontological structures is one of the cornerstones of critical realism, it is 
important here to clarify how this study proposes to proceed with this engagement. 
Although critical realism is ultimately a philosophy of science and does not proscribe 
a specific working method or research procedure nevertheless, as with all 
philosophies, its ontological and epistemological stance has methodological 
implications. The insistence on an appreciation of depth ontology for instance 
encourages the analyst to investigate this ‘depth’ within an explanatory research 
project. However, the ‘problem’ here as it were is that ontological depth or critical 
realism’s domain of the ‘real’ is conceptualized as being unobservable. Although as 
we have established earlier in this chapter, such an attribution does not suggest the 
negation of the existence of depth ontological structures however, it does have 
methodological implications in that it tends to bring to the fore and make more 
relevant to the research project particular models of scientific inference106.
Inference107 is closely associated with scientific practices viz correlations and 
interpretation of data. To cite a simple example, palaeontologists make inferences as 
to what creatures called dinosaurs looked like by examining skeletal structures, in 

106Indeedtranscendentalargumentationisatthecoreofcriticalrealism’sexaminationofontological
depth.
107Inferenceisdefinedas,‘acognitiveprocessinvirtueofwhichaconclusionisdrawnfromasetof
premises.Itismeanttocaptureboththepsychologicalprocessofdrawingconclusionsandthe
logicalorformalrulesthatentitleor(justify)thesubjecttodrawconclusionsfromcertainpremises’
(Hartwig2007:256).

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fact, it is possible to argue that most ‘known’ scientific facts are inferences since it 
would be impossible to fully gather all material on a subject. Inference, is critical for 
science and involves reasoning and drawing conclusions, it is as Danermark et al. 
(2002:78) note, ‘a way of reasoning towards an answer to questions such as: What 
does this mean? What follows from this? What must exist for this to be possible?’ 
For many working in the critical realist field, the methodological tool that is best 
suited to dealing with abstract and unobservable ontological structures is scientific 
inference based on abduction and retroduction; these types of inference are 
distinguished from the more popular models of scientific inference (deduction and 
induction). Moreover, since chapter six will also employ abduction and retroduction 
in further exploring the dialect between social action/discourse/(realist)ontology it is 
important here to clarify these modes of scientific inference and distinguish them 
from the popular methods of deduction and induction respectively. Briefly, in 
deductive arguments the conclusions follow in a strictly logical way from the given 
premises to the extent that the conclusions drawn must be true if the premises are 
true. Deductive reasoning is marked by a strict adherence to logical reasoning which 
can be seen both as a strength and a weakness. On the one hand, deduction provides 
strict rules for what are logically valid conclusions based on given premises whilst on 
the other hand this strict logical procedure can be seen as limiting in that it cannot 
allow conclusions to move or infer anything beyond that which is contained in the 
premise in the first place, deduction is not content-increasing.
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On the second hand, inference based on the induction model can be differentiated 
from deduction by virtue of its conclusions not necessarily following the premise. 
Often practically this means that a smaller sample is taken, observations made, and 
from which conclusions and generalizations are drawn, an example here being the 
study of a smaller sample population and then extrapolating findings to a whole 
population. The grounded theory approach is the most well-known research design 
that takes at its heart an inductive approach to science. Of course the weakness here 
in comparison to deduction is that such extrapolating inferences suffer from 
uncertainty in that ‘conclusions do not logically follow from the premises, and that 
by inductive generalizations we speak about something beyond what we can observe 
here and now’108(Danermark et al. 2002:87). In effect, the method of extrapolating 
moves beyond that which is concretely observable. However the issue here (for 
critical realism), is that induction draws conclusions about the larger picture from a 
smaller sample but it does this without leaving the empirical level and as such is 
closely related to empirical science. Danermark et al. (ibid) note that ‘induction gives 
no guidance as to how, from something observable, we can reach knowledge of 
underlying structures and mechanisms; it is limited to conclusions of empirical 
generalizations and regularities’. This inability of both paradigms to strongly infer 
something beyond that which is observable is a major bone of contention; for a 
critical realist ontology the ‘objects of science are not primarily empirical 
regularities, but structures and mechanisms’ (ibid) ‘On the realist view’, Sayer 
(1992:158) argues, 

108Thisiscalledtheinternallimitationofinduction.
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Nature’s uniformity – to which many scientists have appealed – derives not 
from the ‘accidental’ regularities of sequences of contingently related things 
but from the internal relations, structures and ways-of-acting of things 
themselves.  
The point of this discussion is to prepare ground for the proposition of a different 
mode of scientific inference, a way of reasoning, a thought operation that allows the 
analyst to infer knowledge of mechanisms and structures which are conceptualized as 
generating and affording empirical regularities. These mechanisms and structures 
they may not always be observable in such a manner i.e. empiricism is not the 
yardstick used to dis/affirm existence. A critical realist meta-theory that emphasises 
the difference between observable and unobservable domain of structures and 
mechanisms strongly requires a mode of inference that can accommodate this 
ontological typology and here, induction and deduction are limited because their 
frameworks are unable to conceptualise anything beyond that given in the premises 
(deduction) or are limited in terms of analysis to only that which is manifested in the 
empirical domain (induction). As Danermark et al. (2002) note, the objects of social 
scientific study can be described both as individual phenomena and as manifestations 
of social structures which are directly unobservable. In the table below this 
observation can be clarified.  
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Table 1: Individual events and general structures 
Individual events/phenomena  General structures 
Men and women who communicate at a 
place of work, in the home or at a political 
meeting 
Pupils and teachers meeting in a 
classroom 
The manifest context of a text 
A building as a physical object 
A funeral, people greeting each other, or a 
morning meeting in a newsroom 
Gender structures, internal relationships 
described in terms of gender theories 
Norms and rule making school a 
specific institution 
Implicit ideological meanings of the text 
The power structures that certain 
buildings can be regarded as embodying 
Rituals creating social cohesion by 
means of internal relations and 
mechanisms 
Source: Danermark et al. (2002:88). 
The question here is, as Danermark et al. (2002:88-89) put it, 
how do we actually make the assumption that individual events may be part of 
a general, more universal context or structure?....How does a social scientist 
195



discover that certain behaviour is a manifestation of a normative structure? 
How can a media researcher, who first sees a news item as a concrete 
description of an event, in the next instance see that what is manifested in the 
news text is part of an ideological structure?
Inductive and deductive models of inference are unable to address such questions 
because attempting to answer and explore such questions involves ‘discovering, or 
drawing conclusions from, circumstances and structures that are not given in 
individual empirical data’ (Danermark et al. 2002:89). Critical realism thus looks 
towards alternatives models of scientific inference and explanation namely abduction 
and particularly retroduction as appropriate tools that can help explore the objects of 
social science. 
4.25 Abduction
Abduction can best be described as a theoretical re-description i.e. to observe, 
describe, interpret and explain the phenomena from a new/different angle. As 
Danemark et al. (2002:91) note social science is abound with many redescriptions of 
such kind:
Marx recontextualised the history of man and society from a materialist 
conception of history….Durkheim re-contextualised suicide as a phenomena 
196



by regarding it as a social fact….Giddens re-contextualises anorexia as a 
manifestation of what he denotes reflexive identity, which has become 
characteristic of post-modern society.  
The essence of abduction is this re-contextualisation/re-description. Firstly, as a 
mode of inference it is different from deduction in that the conclusions are not bound 
to follow from the given premises and secondly abductive logic is different from 
induction in that empirical occurrence does not necessarily form the basis of 
conclusions. An abductive logic allows the analyst to discover new dimensions of 
reality by freeing him/her from frameworks that confine conclusions.
(I)t provides a type of knowledge that cannot be acquired either through 
deduction or inductive generalizations…abduction becomes a manner of 
acquiring knowledge of how various phenomena can be part of and explained 
in relation to structures, internal relations and contexts which are not directly 
observable. Such structures cannot be derived wither inductively or deductively 
(Danermark et al. 2002:92). 
Abduction can be described as inference to the best explanation (Hartwig 2007). The 
skills required here involve a creative reasoning ability on the part of the analyst109,
the ability to visualize something in a different way as ‘something else’ thus 

109Incontrasttodeductionwhichrequiresskillsofstrictlylogicalreasoningandinductionwhichcalls
formasteryofstatisticalanalysis.
197



encouraging the introduction of new ideas and equally importantly questioning the 
plausibility and explanatory power of existing theories. 
4.26 Retroduction 
A retroductive research method is the primary tool employed by critical realist in the 
critical realist model of social explanation. The core of retroduction is transcendental 
argument110 or the inference from effects to explanatory structures (from effects to 
causes). Retroduction involves a ‘move backwards’ within the realist stratified 
ontology, meaning that we move from the level of the (observable) phenomena to a 
different ‘deeper’ level of reality in order to explain the phenomena by means of 
causal mechanisms. The idea here is to identify and clarify the basic conditions or 
prerequisites for existence of such phenomena as a social relationship or a person’s 
action with the fundamental question being ‘how is any phenomenon, like an action 
or a social organization possible? If we call the phenomena X, we may formulate our 
question thus: What properties must exist for X to exist and to be what X is?’
(Danermark et al. 2002:96). A retroductive mode of reasoning asks ‘what does the 
existence of this object (in this form) presuppose? Can it exist on its own as such? If 
not what else must be present? What is it about the object that makes it do such and 
such? (Sayer 1992: 91). In terms of a working procedure, the analyst needs to make a 
theoretical reconstruction of the necessary conditions that must exist for X to be what 
it is with such reasoning differing from induction and deduction in that it is used to 
discover the premises of an argument from its conclusion and so involves working 

110Seefootnote19.
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back from observations to an explanation. This research strategy is used to generate 
hypothetical models of structures and mechanisms that are assumed to produce the 
empirical phenomena.  
4.27 Using abstraction as a methodological tool 
Whilst retroduction beckons a move from an empirical reality towards a deeper level 
of reality it also true that the objects of social science are clearly different from those 
in the natural sciences. In the social sciences, variables cannot physically be isolated 
and studied separately; consequently the natural science experiment is often wholly 
unsuitable. Having said this however, in order to explain an object or phenomena the 
social analyst needs to have the means through which different mechanisms, 
processes can be identified which together culminate to produce the events. For 
many critical realists, the equivalent to the natural science experiment in the social 
sciences is conceptual abstraction. Danermark et al. (2002:42) define abstraction in 
the following way, 
An abstract concept, or an abstraction, is something which is formed when we 
– albeit- in thought separate or isolate a particular aspect of a concrete object or 
phenomena; and what we abstract from is all the other aspects possessed by 
concrete phenomena. 
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Conceptual abstraction is based on the understanding that all phenomena both social 
and natural possess certain properties and powers that are indispensable to the 
object’s existence. The task of abstractions is to ‘distinguish incidental from essential 
characteristics’ (Sayer 1992:88). For Sayer, the purpose of such thought experiments 
is to analytically conceptualise what it is, about the object, that makes it what it is; in 
other words which constitutive parts are indispensable and which ones are incidental. 
For a critical realist approach, abstractions are critical in terms of connecting and 
explaining the relationship between deeper levels of reality and the ‘actual’ reality 
given in observation and experience. Clearly then, this provides the theory 
underpinning the usefulness of abstraction to social investigation however in terms of 
the practical method associated with abstraction we may draw on Sayer (1992) who 
offers a method of abstraction that may assist the researcher in his/her logic of 
discovering and identifying depth ontological structures and mechanisms. Sayer’s 
methodology is based on the realization that the objects of social science are 
relational and thus the task is to distinguish between relations of different types. 
Between relations that are internal/ necessary i.e. that an object is existence-
dependent on its relation to another object distinguished from those relations that are 
external/contingent  (contingent here referring to two objects that can exist 
independently of each other). 
Sayer (1992), suggests that the analyst broadly distinguishes between substantial 
relations and formal relations by identifying those relations that are substantial i.e. 
that they are important and establish the mutual existence of the objects in question 
indeed the idea that one could not exist without the other such as the landlord tenant 
relationship or the slave and master, teacher and pupil connections. This type of 
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relation needs to separated from formal relations which refer to those connections 
that exist, but are not important to the object of the study. An example in this context 
being, that if both landlord and tenant are of a similar ethnicity or a teacher and pupil 
live in the same neighbourhood then this is a formal connection between the two and 
one that may not bear any significance to the landlord/tenant, teacher/pupil social 
relation. For Sayer, another useful distinction to be made within substantial relations 
is identifying internal or necessary relations from those that are contingent or 
external. We will draw here on Danermark et al. (2002) to explain this method, 
taking the example of the landlord-tenant relationship an internal relation is defined 
as that which mutually causes each other’s existence so that each cannot exist 
without its relation to the other i.e. without a tenant there is no landlord. On the other 
hand, external connections are such that the landlord may be stingy and mismanage 
the property or alternatively may be generous and undertake regular repairs, 
whichever the situation the point here is that this relation or characteristic is outside 
the landlord-tenant relation; this characteristic is not constitutive of the landlord-
tenant relation. On the other hand, the existence of a property on the other hand is 
constitutive of the relationship so that if there did not exist a house/flat then the 
landlord-tenant relation would cease. Moreover, asymmetrical relation refers to the 
notion that objects though substantially related the case may be that one may exist 
without the other but not vice versa for instance, houses and flats can exist without 
landlords but not vice versa.
The specific critical realist inspired methodology to be employed here will focus 
precisely on the kind of conceptual abstraction discussed in the above sections. 
Moreover, although the critical realist analysis draws on the work of Sayer (1992) 
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however, to a much larger extent, the methodological guidelines I work with are 
inspired by the work of Danermark et al. (2000) who provide an excellent account of 
the methodology that can be operationalized in a project such as this one.
Having identified an empirically evident political discourse in Pakistan during the 
time period under study, the study will then proceed to engage in a critical realist 
analysis of the object of this study. In practical and methodological terms, this will 
involve taking the object i.e. the political discourse identified in chapter five as the 
starting point and placing it within a stratified ontological framework. This would 
mean that the political discourse is identified as existing on the surface or upper 
levels of social reality i.e. the empirical domain and the analysis would then need to 
consider the emergence of this discourse as causally connected to the depth ontology. 
This understanding is premised on the notion that empirical regularities such as a 
political discourse is not unconnected or emergent from a void but rather it emerges 
from underlying realities. Such an exploration forms the gist of chapter six with the 
analysis commencing with questions such as ‘why does this particular political 
discourse or discursive constructions emerge?’, ‘what structural conditions must 
exist in order for the political discourse to be what it is?’, ‘what are the underlying 
causal structures connected to this political discourse?’ It is important thus to note 
that the philosophy and methodology of critical realism outlined here will be 
employed to discern the depth ontological structures connected to and implicated in 
the shaping and influencing of Pakistan political discourse in the post 9/11 time 
frame.  By engaging in more depth with our object of analysis, a far more nuanced 
and deeper understanding of Pakistan’s political discourse can be arrived at. 
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Discursive Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
The identity stories that construct actors as one or another type of person – 
man versus woman, national citizen versus nomad, one versus another 
ethnicity, and so on – provide the foundations for historical and contemporary 
forms of antagonism, violence and interpretive contention over the meaning of 
actions...they are part of the reigning structure of intelligibility. 111
The purpose of this chapter is an exploration of political discursive space in Pakistan 
following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in order to investigate the kind of constructions 
being articulated. This chapter is an important part of the overall thesis since it 
identifies recurrent themes and discursive constructions and provides the basis for 
later theorizations around the relationship between this discourse and the actual 
political practice of Pakistan in the aftermath of terrorist attacks of 9/11. From the 
perspective here, a deconstruction of Pakistan’s political discourse during this period 
should reveal that the political discourse created the space or the conditions for the 
kind of political practice that emerged following 2001. Discourses are able to 
exercise power through their ability to enable and constrain world-views thus 
normalising some kinds of action and practice whilst constraining alternative action. 
It is for this reason that discourses are said to be constitutive of social reality. 

111Shapiro,M.andCampbell,D.(1999:59).

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Consequently, all social practice may be explained in terms of the discourse that 
supports or normalises such action. If this is our starting point, then any explanation 
of political practice requires an exploration of the discursive space from which the 
practice emerges.  
Within the field of IR, a focus on discursive space was most notably first tabled by 
the likes of Wendt (1992) Shapiro (1989) and Onuf (1989). Since then, many writers 
have taken to exploring the relationship between discourse and state policy and 
practice. David Campbell (1992) for instance, engages in an extensive study of the 
construction of the national American Self and its impact on the construction of 
American foreign policy. Similarly, Doty (1993) examines the way in which the US 
Self is constructed and how this specific construction structured US political practice 
in the Philippines during the 1950s, subsequently reproducing US dominance. 
Adopting a similar line of argument, Weldes (1996) explains how US interest in the 
Cuban missile scenario can be conceptualised as constructed in that the 
representation of the US ‘Self’ as a ‘world leader’ functioned to mandate and 
legitimize an activist US response to the missile deployment which was defined as a 
‘crisis’ scenario. For Weldes (1996), the ‘crisis’ narrative marginalised alternative 
ways of understanding the situation whilst simultaneously producing and 
reproducing a particular US identity. What is common to these investigations is the 
notion that the identity of the ‘national’ or ‘state’ Self is the key component of 
discursive articulations which consequently impact the direction of state policy and 
practice. Most notably, the conclusion that these and other writers (for e.g. Hansen 
2006) draw is that the identity of the national Self coupled with the way in which 
boundaries are drawn between this national Self and the outside (foreign) ‘Other’ 
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impacts or conditions behaviour patterns112.  If the construction of the national Self 
within a country’s political discursive space is linked, in important ways, to 
subsequent political practice; it follows, that this research project, in its attempt to 
explain and contextualise the concrete political practice of Pakistan following 9/11 
needs to investigate the way in which the Pakistani national Self is articulated within 
the political discourse. Furthermore, it must link the constructions identified to the 
possibilities of in/action.
The intent of this chapter is thus to conduct a systematic and structured discursive 
examination of Pakistan’s political discourse in order to identify the kind of 
representations constructed and how the promoting of such narratives subsequently 
affects surrounding representations and discursive constructions. In consequence, 
this analysis will theorise the potential effects such representations have on concrete 
political practice in terms of enabling and constraining action. For instance, in the 
aftermath of 9/11 practices such as Pakistan’s willingness to engage with its Indian 
adversary or its disowning of the Taliban were arguably big domestic policy shifts 
however they were only made possible or enabled by a political discourse that 
legitimised such moves.  

112Itisnotablethatanalystsworkingon‘strategiccultureanalysis’alsohighlighthowstrategic
cultureisimplicatedintheformationofforeignandsecuritypoliciesthoughthereisreluctanceto
explicitlyadoptasocialconstructionisttheory.
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5.2 Primary data-material: Issues of access and availability 
The time-period under consideration relates to the aftermath of the September 11th,
2001 suicide attacks in the US, and therefore all data material used in this chapter has 
been sourced from this specific time-frame. Analysis is based on official speeches, 
interviews, statements, parliamentary debates and other text written and spoken by 
figures belonging to the political leadership of the country. Notably the data material 
consists exclusively of official political text since the aim of this study is to examine 
how official discourse effects political practice. This focus on official texts does not 
suggest that counter-discourses are non-existent or have no interaction with official 
discourses rather the decision to limit analysis to official discourse is guided by the 
recognition that official discourse is a powerful medium in a country like Pakistan 
where official narratives and representations have historically been dominant113.
Moreover, a concentration on official narratives also makes way for a more bounded 
and feasible discursive examination.  
The data selection method was based on a number of considerations some of which 
were, relevance: the content of the text in that it explicitly elaborated on significant 
representations of the Self/Other.  Secondly, data was specifically sourced from the 
relevant time-frame. Thirdly, consideration was given to the critical nature of the 
text; for instance, Musharraf’s national address on September 19th, 2001, which 
occurred soon after the attacks on the US was a critically relevant speech and 
therefore has received considerable analysis within this chapter. In general, national 

113See:subheading1.3“ResearchDesign”andalsosubheading3.6“Pakistan’sMilitaryElite”.
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addresses are important since they reach a wide audience114, as are those directed at 
other important audiences (for instance the UN or other foreign audience). In this 
sense then selection of data-material was conscious and systematic as opposed to 
haphazard.
Material was accessed from various sources including Pakistan’s state-run television 
network (PTV), the National Archives and the departmental library of the National 
Assembly in Islamabad.  Surprisingly, the internet was particularly useful in data 
collection which often listed full text, unedited voice recordings or transcripts of 
speeches delivered by Pakistan’s political leadership115. Within Pakistan, perhaps the 
most useful website has been the presidential website of General Musharraf which 
contains a substantially large volume of speeches and interviews made by the former 
president during his eight year long tenure116. It is important to clarify that during the 
time-period under investigation General Pervaiz Musharraf remained in political 
power throughout and therefore there is an inevitable bias in the data-set. This has 
not been intentional but basically reflects the bias inherent in the available data 
nevertheless, this chapter has tried to include within the data-set a variety of different 
sources. The documents analysed were partly in English whilst those that were in 
Urdu were translated into English by the author. Further, no attempt has been made 

114InlieuofthehighilliteracyratesprevalentinPakistanspeechessuchasnationaladdressesreach
amuchwiderdomesticaudience.
115Therehavebeenmanywebsitesthathavebeenparticularlyusefulintermsofprovidingfull
length,uneditedtranscripts.Manyofthesehavebeennewssites(e.g.theBBC,CNN).Othershave
consistedofthinktanksandinstitutionswheremembersofthePakistanileadershiphavespoken
(e.g.www.cfr.org(councilonforeignrelations),www.usip.org,www.fas.org).Whenthetexthas
beensourcedfromtheinternetIhavepaidparticularattentiontoensuringthatthetextisunedited
bycomparingitwithalternativesources.
116Thewebsite:www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pkwasparticularlyuseful.FollowingMusharraf’s
removalfrompowerin2008thewebsitelistinghisspeecheswasremoved.However,itrecently
becameavailabletoviewagainatanewaddress:www.generalpervaizmushasharraf.com.
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to correct any errors present in the primary texts instead preferring to present the text 
in its original unedited form.  
It is important to discuss access issues since retrieval of data was problematic due a 
number of reasons. Firstly, in light of the deteriorating security situation in Pakistan 
access to government buildings became extremely restricted indeed even accessing 
the public ‘National Library of Pakistan’ became an uphill task with many of the 
surrounding road networks blocked to ensure maximum security to the nearby 
parliament buildings. Coupled with this, it was also found that, Pakistan libraries and 
other institutes have a very poor cataloguing-system so that locating data proved 
more time consuming than anticipated.  Much of the primary data material (policy 
documents and other government literature) available in government libraries and 
departments tended to be of the historical variety in that it could not be classified as 
belonging to the immediate time-period and therefore, for my purposes, was 
irrelevant. Unfortunately, there seemed a significant time lapse before primary data-
material became available in institutes and libraries; this being a wholly different 
experience compared to the UK where government data, speech, policy is readily 
available to view even online117. These difficulties, in terms of access and 
availability, had not been anticipated.
At this point, it is also important to note that whilst a wide range of relevant textual 
material has been consulted and analysed, it is however impracticable within the 

117Forinstance,officialspeechesandstatementsareeasilyavailablefromtheDowningstreet
website:http://www.pm.gov.uk.SimilarlytheWhiteHousewebsitehttp://www.whitehouse.gov
alsoliststextualdata.
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confines of this chapter to present the entirety of all the texts consulted. Instead, a 
selection of textual data is available in Appendix I and is indicative of the kind of 
data that has been analysed in this project. Although this study does not claim to 
have collected all relevant material nevertheless the material selected covers enough 
to provide the contours of the dominant narratives and provide relevant examples for 
the specific points made in this chapter. A grounded theory approach was employed 
in terms of assessing when analysis and consultation of further texts should cease i.e. 
when additional textual material repeatedly ceased to offer any new discursive 
constructions. It must also be noted that the discursive themes identified in this 
chapter were not isolated incidents but occurred frequently throughout the political 
discourse and across a range of texts and authors.
5.3 The war comes to Pakistan 
September 11th 2001 had been, as Musharraf notes in his autobiography (2006), an 
uneventful day in Pakistan, that is, until early in the evening when live coverage of 
the terrorist attacks beamed directly into television screens across the country. As has 
been widely documented, following the terrorist attacks the United States implicated 
the al-Qaeda terrorist organisation as masterminding the attacks on the US and 
vociferously argued that the terrorist outfit, hosted by the Taliban regime, was 
located in the border areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The analysis will 
focus on a number of themes, Firstly, the way in which the events of September 11, 
2001 were interpreted and represented within Pakistan, and secondly the kind of 
subject-positions made possible by the discourse and an exploration of the impact of 
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representations in terms of the world-view/s it constrained and enabled. Finally, how 
this representation (of events) worked to legitimise and normalise the concrete 
practice of Pakistan’s rejection of the (Islamic) Taliban and its simultaneous co-
operation with the US. The argument here is that the suicide attacks in New York 
and Washington DC were represented by the political discourse as a direct threat to 
the very survival of Pakistan.
It is important to note that Pakistan had officially been one of the only nations in the 
world to recognise and support the Taliban government in Afghanistan. However, 
immediately following the attacks Pakistan conducted an abrupt U-turn in relation to 
its foreign policy by withdrawing its vociferous support for the Taliban and instead 
the state sought to co-operate with the US on its ‘war on terrorism’, which 
principally involved a war against the Al-Qaeda terrorist organisation and their 
Taliban hosts in Afghanistan. This was a critical shift for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, Pakistan has historically been associated with conservative Islamic causes, 
and although the Islamic character of Pakistan has been a contested, it has 
nevertheless, been a consistent feature of national identity. In this context, it  
important note that this also entailed the notion of an Islamic brotherhood or 
‘Ummah’ which is an important part of the ideology of Islam. Prior to 9/11 
Pakistan’s support of the Taliban in Afghanistan had, within public discourse, been 
widely constructed as an extension of Muslim brotherhood. Secondly, US-Pakistan 
relations immediately prior to the terrorist attacks had been increasingly strained; 
apart from US economic and military sanctions following Pakistan’s nuclear tests the 
installation of the military regime in 1999 had met with disapproval and 
condemnation by the US and the West in general. The non-delivery of F-16 fighter 
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jets by the United States, despite Pakistan having paid for them, was a particularly 
sore point that was widely discussed within Pakistan. In this context, then it is 
extremely interesting to ascertain the way in which official political constructions 
and narratives were able to more or less successfully reorient Pakistan’s foreign 
policy with popular backing118.
5.4 Discursive Strategy: Interpreting threat 
The first official high-level Pakistani communication following the attacks in New 
York took the shape of President Musharraf’s address to the Pakistani nation on 
September 19th, 2001. This speech is of critical importance in the sense that it set the 
tone of Pakistan’s official stance on the terrorist attacks in New York on September 
11th, 2001, and gave a clear indication of policies to follow. Moreover, if keeping in 
mind the kind of social context within which this text is embedded then it becomes 
far more interesting to discern how the text attempts to weave a reorientation of 
Pakistan’s foreign policy goals, and also how it begins to justify and legitimise co-
operation with the US which implicitly entails an abandoning of the Taliban. The 
broader aim of the text is an attempt to build a national consensus in relation to co-
operating with the US. What is significant about this particular text is the way in 
which it interprets and represents the suicide attacks in New York as being 
meaningful for Pakistan in a particular way. The text itself is long and drawn out and 
is located in full in Appendix I of this study however, only the most important 

118Thesuggestionhereisnotthatthediscourseweareexploringhereisentirelyhegemonicrather
counterdiscoursesarealwayspresentandpersistentneverthelesstheargumenthereisthatthe
worldviewthatenabledthereorientationofPakistan’sforeignrelationswassuccessfulinthatitdid
notcounterwidescalerefusalorviolentoutrage.
211



extracts are reproduced below and have been selected on the basis of their clear 
connotations and representation.
Having conceded within the speech that ‘this act of terrorism has raised a wave of 
deep grief, anger and retaliation in the United States’, the main concern of the text is 
to then interpret the meaning of the attacks but more specifically what they mean for 
Pakistan. Musharraf states that,
Pakistan is facing a very critical situation and I believe that after 1971, this is 
the most critical period. The decision we take today can have far-reaching and 
wide- ranging consequences. The crisis is formidable and unprecedented. If we 
make wrong decisions in this crisis, it can lead to the very worse consequences. 
On the other hand, if we take right decisions, its results will be good. The 
negative consequences can endanger Pakistan's integrity and solidarity. Our 
critical concerns, our important concerns can come under threat. When I say 
critical concerns, I mean our strategic assets and the cause of Kashmir119. If 
these come under threat it would be a worse situation for us. 

119PakistanhasalongstandingconflictwithIndiaovertheterritoryofKashmirlocatedintheNorth
ofbothcountries.BothcountriesclaimtheterritoryofKashmirandhavefoughttwowarsoveritas
wellashavingbeingengagedincontinuouslowintensitywarfareduringpeacetime.Theconflict
stemsfrom1947whentheBritishRajdividedIndiaintotwosovereignstatesandofferedprincely
stateswithintheUniontoeitheropttostaywithIndiaorincorporatethemselveswithPakistan.A
goodintroductiontotheIndiaPakistanconflictoverKashmirisprovidedby:Schofield,V.
(2000).KashmirinConflict.London:IBTauris.
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Clearly, the text begins by articulating a crisis situation and the critical nature of the 
dilemma that Pakistan finds itself in. Immediately, the language taps into a persistent 
and powerful over-arching meta-narrative that has historically ‘framed’ much of 
Pakistan’s official ‘world-view’. The notion of Pakistan as ‘under threat’ is a very 
powerful narrative that has been consistently employed within the political discourse 
and concerns the country’s long running struggle to survive in an anarchic world 
system. The historical analogy evoked in this text i.e. ‘I believe that after 1971, this 
is the most critical period’, is extremely powerful in terms of providing a ‘reading’ 
and locating the nature of the current context to the audience. The events of 1971 are 
popularly viewed as a shameful incident in the nation’s history when arch-rival India 
successfully managed to dismember Pakistan by supporting the secession of East 
Pakistan leading to the creation of Bangladesh. By comparing the current context to 
events in the past the discourse seeks to make comprehendible the crisis of the 
present. Arguably, the purpose of employing this comparison within the text is to 
infer the notion that Pakistan is under a similar or even worse kind of threat, ‘the 
negative consequences can endanger Pakistan's integrity and solidarity’ i.e. 
dismemberment similar to the 1971 episode. This strategy works to inject fear and 
urgency of the situation and the need to focus on making the ‘right decision’.
Musharraf goes onto argue that a, ‘right decision’ will bring far more than simply 
state survival suggesting that, ‘we can re-emerge politically as a responsible and 
dignified nation and all our difficulties can be minimized…… 
However, what is of critical importance here is the way in which the narrative begins 
to locate and identify the source of the ‘threat’ to Pakistan in the context of the crisis 
213



situation articulated earlier. Despite the US being in a mood for retaliation and the 
unfortunate location of the Taliban in Pakistan’s vicinity the text suggests that the 
real threat lies elsewhere indeed ‘threat’ is conceptualized as emanating from a more 
familiar enemy. Thus very early on in his address, Musharraf makes a clear argument 
that India is poised to damage Pakistan:    
….Let us now take a look at the designs of our neighboring country. They 
offered all their military facilities to the United States. They have offered 
without hesitation, all their facilities, all their bases and full logistic support. 
They want to enter into any alliance with the Unites States and get Pakistan 
declared a terrorist state. They want to harm our strategic assets and the 
Kashmir cause. Not only this, recently certain countries met in Dushanbe. India 
was one of them. Indian representative was there.  
What do the Indians want? they do not have common borders with Afghanistan 
anywhere. It is totally isolated from Afghanistan. In my view, it would not be 
surprising, that the Indians want to ensure that if and when the government in 
Afghanistan changes, it shall be an anti-Pakistan government. It is very 
important that while the entire world is talking about this horrible terrorist 
attack, our neighboring country instead of talking peace and cooperation, was 
trying hard to harm Pakistan and defame Islam. If you watch their television, 
you will find them dishing out propaganda against Pakistan, day in and day 
out. I would like to tell India "Lay Off". 
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Pakistan's armed forces and every Pakistani citizen is ready to offer any 
sacrifice in order to defend Pakistan and secure its strategic assets. Make no 
mistake and entertain no misunderstanding. At this very moment our Air Force 
is at high alert; and they are ready for "Do or die" Missions My countrymen! In 
such a situation, a wrong decision can lead to unbearable losses…. 
The threat of annihilation at the hands of the India adversary has historically been a 
hegemonic discursive theme in the political discourse of Pakistan. It is important to 
remember that this speech appeared at a critical historical juncture and its purpose is 
essentially to prepare ground for an official U-turn on policy as regards to the 
Taliban. Without evaluating the ‘truth’ in this statement i.e. whether India was poised 
to take advantage of the situation to the determinant of Pakistan’s interests, it is 
important to draw attention to the rhetorical significance of a discursive strategy that 
highlights malevolent intentions vis-à-vis Pakistan i.e. ‘they want to enter into any 
alliance with the US and get Pakistan declared a terrorist state’. In this context, the 
language draws on older familiar arguments that generate popular mobilisation. 
There is no doubt that the theme of a belligerent India is deeply embedded in the 
national psyche and consequently it is much easier to popularly comprehend and 
refer to. Indeed in Pakistan the image of the enemy Indian Other is able to generate 
acute mobilisation and popular consensus120. The text thus draws on a popular 
national narrative that focuses on India’s underlying desire to isolate Pakistan from 

120Theextremityofthesentimentiswidelyacknowledged.Itwasforinstanceacceptableand
applaudedwhenZ.A.Bhuttodeclared(ondiscoveringthatIndiapossessednucleartechnology)that
Pakistani’swouldeatgrassiftheyhadtobutwouldfindthemoneytofundanuclearbomb.
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the world polity and India’s co-operative actions towards the US are construed in this 
light. The text suggests that the principal basis for the Indian co-operative stance in 
relation to offering the US, ‘all their (military) facilities, all their bases and full 
logistic support’, is to isolate Pakistan, in short the real motive is not the ‘war on 
terrorism’ but a concern to isolate Pakistan from the world polity as a pariah. 
Moreover, we find a brief reference to Pakistan’s armed forces arguably this is a 
peculiar addition in a national address whose main concern is to discuss the 
aftermath of the suicide attacks in the US. This does not seem as peculiar if we are to 
understand that the primary purpose of the text is to represent Pakistan at a 
threatening historical juncture. The reference to ‘Indian designs’ in close proximity 
to the observation that Pakistan’s armed forces are ‘ready and waiting’, works to 
strengthen the idea that Pakistan is facing a credible and immanent threat from India. 
Arguably, the Indian threat is the main thread implicitly running throughout 
Musharraf’s address to the nation in September 2001. In closing his speech, 
Musharraf makes a final explicit reference, ‘we have to frustrate the evil designs of 
our enemies and safeguard national interests’, and immediately in the vicinity of this 
declaration proceeds to reiterate that Pakistan is an Islamic country. Arguably then, 
this arrangement of ideas works to evoke a historically prevalent Hindu/Muslim, 
good/evil narrative. Further, the understanding that although the US is ready to 
retaliate, the ‘real’ threat to Pakistan lies from its immediate neighbour reoccurs 
occasionally within the discourse. Pakistan’s foreign secretary for instance in 2004 
continued to draw on this theme arguing that: 
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 the September 11 terrorist attacks provided India with a heaven sent 
opportunity to drive a wedge Pakistan and the West and to use anti-terrorism as 
another important tool of its foreign policy. It lost no time in pointing out that 
the US and the West were under attack from the same forces that India was 
fighting in Kashmir. It tried to gloss over the basic distinction between an 
armed struggle for the right of self-determination and acts of terrorists. India 
would have found many sympathetic ears has it not been for Pakistan’s 
assiduous efforts to readjust its policy on Afghanistan and support the world 
community’s war on terror. (Kasuri 2004)121.
It is important to understand that a discourse whose overall propose is to legitimize a 
radical shift in constructions is unlikely to be successful unless it employs discursive 
strategies that ‘plug in’ to other more popular discursive themes that are particular to 
the local society. Doty (1993:303) for instance, notes that, 
the reception as meaningful of statements revolving around policy situations 
depends on how well they fit into the general system of representation in a 
given society...[statements] must make sense and fit with what the general 
public takes as “reality” .  
What this means is that interpretations and meanings ascribed cannot be doled out on 
a whim, but that in order for them to be credibly meaningful they must fit into the 

121ForeignMinisterKhurshidMehmoodKasurispeakingattheNationalDefenseCollegein
Islamabadon‘India’sforeignpolicy–Pakistan’sviewpoint’on23thMay,2004.
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existing system of representation. In this sense, Doty suggests that analysts in 
‘reading’ texts pay particular attention to presuppositions122 underling statements. 
The particular interpretation and representation alluded to in the above extracts are 
only meaningful within the context of a popular background knowledge which infers 
a struggle between Pakistani state survival and the (Indian) forces of destruction.
In this context however it is important to note that, it is principally Musharraf’s 
speech of September 19th, 2001 that is most vocal in its association of ‘threat’ from 
India in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. The analysis below will demonstrate that as 
the political discourse begins to focus more on constructing and emphasizing 
Pakistan’s sincerity and maturity vis-à-vis an often implicit juxtaposing with India, a 
direct threat from India in the aftermath of 9/11 is less vocally constructed. In later 
sections, the discussion will argue that the positive construction of the Pakistani Self 
constrains the discursive construction of the Indian Other as inherently ‘evil’ or 
inherently poised to damage Pakistan. Furthermore, the discursive focus also tends to 
move in the direction of constructing the Taliban and other extremist organizations 
as the primary threat to the Pakistani state. However, the initial construction of an 
immediate threat from India in terms of its possible alliance with the US is an 
important feature in that it allowed the Pakistani state to initiate concrete political 
action that entailed an alliance with the US. The almost immediate assurance to the 
US of the use of a limited number of Pakistan’s airbases and other logistical support 
for instance was a concrete political action that the discourse paved the way for.            

122Apresuppositionisanimplicitassumptionabouttheworldorbackgroundbeliefrelatingtoan
utterancewhosetruthistakenforgranted.

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5.5 Discursive Strategy: Assigning ‘meaning’ through religious analogy and 
ideology
Pakistan has long identified itself with an Islamic ideology which has served a range 
of different purposes from attempting to build a cohesive nationalism, to building 
consensus for state policies on Kashmir, to justifying martial law and to legitimize 
war with (Hindu) India. However, it is notable that prior to the suicide attacks the 
regime of Musharraf had not really relied on ‘Islam’ to justify its policies; rather, the 
military coup was justified on the basis that it would promote ‘good governance’ and 
economic prosperity. What is remarkable then is the extent to which an Islamic 
discourse begins to enter the political arena in order to explain, justify and normalize 
state responses in the aftermath of the suicide attacks in the US. For instance, the 
abrupt U-turn in relation to the Taliban was a big undertaking not lost on the 
leadership in Pakistan. There is no doubt that a political narrative that shunned the 
Taliban would require considerable discursive work, especially since previous to this 
Pakistan continually supported the regime on the basis that it was ‘Muslim’. 
However, a close examination of the political language reveals that strategy did not 
entail an immediate shunning and rejection of the Taliban, rather the suggestion of 
abandonment is initially implicit. For instance, note that in Musharraf’s September 
19th, 2001 speech he signals a concern for the Taliban’s safety and continuation: 
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I and my government are much more worried about Afghanistan and Taliban. I 
have done everything for Afghanistan and Taliban when the entire world is 
against them. I have met about twenty to twenty five world leaders and talked 
to each of them in favour of the Taliban. I have told them that sanctions should 
not be imposed on Afghanistan and that we should engage them…. Even in this 
situation, we are trying our best to cooperate with them. I sent Director General 
ISI with my personal letter to Mullah Umar. He returned after spending two 
days there. I have informed Mullah Umar about the gravity of the situation. We 
are trying our best to come out of this critical situation without any damage to 
Afghanistan and Taliban. 
This lack of an overt condemnation may be compared to Musharraf’s later 
statements (2005a) where he, in referring to Taliban sympathizers, argues that, ‘it is 
our responsibility to take Islam out of the claws of these [sic] ignorant and take it 
towards its true essence’. Similarly, Mushahid Hussain Syed (2004b) implicitly 
supports this representation by covertly juxtaposing good, moderate Muslims with 
the radical (Islamic) Other suggesting ‘by and large our people are good and 
moderate Muslims and good human beings…their natural instincts reject 
extremism…there is a popular revulsion to extremism’. Thus, rather than an 
immediate abandonment of the Taliban following 9/11, it can be observed that the 
discourse is more likely to pursue the theme of rejecting the Taliban as related to 
either Pakistan or Islam much later in the time frame.  Further, the particular 
speaking powers assigned to Musharraf enable him to initiate a critique of the 
Taliban. This theme will be developed later in the discussion. 
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Rather than an explicit critique of the Taliban, Musharraf’s speech of September 19th,
2001 moves to a discursive emphasis in which it begins to (re)construct the centrality 
of Islam to Pakistan, thus implicitly taking away its exclusive association with the 
Taliban. On a second note, the related notion of ‘hikmat’123 or sound judgment in 
difficult circumstances is emphasized. Both these themes are important because they 
are subsequently extensively reproduced throughout the political discourse. Musharraf 
(2001) argues,
 At this moment, it is not the question of bravery or cowardice. We are all very 
brave. My own response in such situations is usually of daring. But bravery 
without rational judgment is tantamount to stupidity. There is no clash between 
bravery and sound judgment. Allah Almighty says in the holy Quran, "The one 
bestowed with ‘hikmat’ has a huge blessing. We have to take recourse to 
sanity. We have to save our nation from damage. We have to build up; our 
national respect. Pakistan comes first, everything else comes later. 
Some scholars and religious leaders are inclined towards taking emotional 
decisions. I would like to remind them the events of the first six years of the 
history of Islam. The Islamic calendar started from migration. The significance 
of migration is manifested from the fact that the Holy Prophet (PBUH) went 
from Makkah to Madina. He (PBUH) migrated to safeguard Islam. What was 

123TheoriginalUrdutermisusedhereandinEnglishroughlyrelatestowisdom,farsightednessand
rationaljudgmentbasedonIslam.
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migration? God forbid, was it an act of cowardice? The Holy Prophet (PBUH) 
signed the charter of Madinah (Meesaq-e-Madinah) with the Jewish tribes….. 
At this critical juncture, we have to frustrate the evil designs of our enemies 
and safeguard national interests. ….Pakistan is considered a fortress of Islam. 
God forbid, if this fortress is harmed in any way it would cause damage to the 
cause of Islam… 
….In the end before I take your leave, I would like to end with the prayer of 
Hazrat Musa124 as given in Sura-e-Taha. (Musharraf 2001). 
It is important to consider that Pakistan’s support of the Afghan Taliban government 
had popularly been represented as support for a brotherly ‘Islamic’ government. The 
implication then is that a change of policy towards the Taliban is a rejection of Islam. 
The discourse however, in beginning to explain, legitimise and justify such a reversal 
in policy used two specific discursive strategies. Firstly, the language and tone 
adopted within the text clearly signals towards close natural association between 
Islam and Pakistan. The representation of Pakistan as the fort of Islam fuses the two 
in such a way that Pakistan is constructed as synonymous with Islam, ‘Pakistan is 
considered a fortress of Islam. God forbid, if this fortress is harmed in any way it 
would cause damage to the cause of Islam’. Such a personification of Pakistan with 
Islam suggests that any danger to Pakistan should be interpreted as damage to Islam; 

124Moses.
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this is why the text argues that ‘Pakistan comes first’. On this level, the emphasis 
seeks to reclaim Islam for Pakistan whilst simultaneously there is an implicit de-
linking of Islam’s exclusive association with the Taliban. 
On a second level, this emphasis on the fusion of Pakistan and Islam is coupled with 
an emphasis on the exercise of ‘hikmat’ and what constitutes a ‘right’ decision. The 
question of ‘what constitutes a right decision’ is dealt with by making an explicit 
comparison to an important event in Islamic history, which focuses on the migration 
of the Prophet125. In evoking such an analogy, the discourse seeks to accord the 
present situation with the same significance, but more importantly it seeks to 
construct a similarity between the shift in state policy and the Prophet’s decision to 
migrate. The implication here is that a policy seemingly emanating from a position of 
weakness, as was the Prophet’s, was actually inspired by ‘hikmat’ and was therefore 
ultimately justified since it secured the survival of Islam. The use of this analogy, 
concerning the exercise of ‘hikmat’, conveys to the audience the notion that if 
Pakistan sides with the Taliban it would put Islam/Pakistan at danger. Consequently, 
this rhetorical strategy implies that the Pakistani state’s disassociation with the 
Taliban on the grounds of ‘exercising hikmat’ is justified and an exercise of 
‘hikmat’. The analogy associates the present scenario with a past scenario suggesting 
that ‘the lesson is that when there is a crisis situation, the path of wisdom is better 
than the path of emotions. Therefore, we have to take a strategic decision’. However,
Musharraf goes on to argue that a ‘strategic decision’ or exercising ‘hikmat’ does not 

125FollowingpersecutiontheProphetmigratedfromhishomeinMakkah,SaudiArabiatolivein
Medina,SaudiArabiawherehewasfreetopracticeIslam.Thisevent,thoughatthetimeenvisaged
asadefeatandasanindicationthatIslamwouldceasetoexist,isseentodaybyMuslimsasanact
guidedbywisdomsincethemigrationendedpersecutionandsecuredthefutureofIslaminthe
MiddleEastfromwhereitthenabletospread.
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imply an abandoning of Islam, ‘there is no question of weakness of faith or 
cowardice’; rather the text implies that by disassociating itself from the Taliban, 
Pakistan can ensure the continued survival of Islam in the sub continent.  This is a 
dominant theme reiterated persistently throughout the discourse and occurs at 
different sites at different times indeed even in 2006 President Musharraf argued that,
reconciliation does not mean giving in or surrendering. In the present geo-
political scenario and the present condition of the Ummah126, the path of 
confrontation is closed for us because if we take that we will end ourselves. 
When Prophet Mohammed migrated from Mecca he was avoiding 
confrontation from the position of weakness. (Musharraf 2006b) 
The use of extended religious analogy within political texts may seen strange 
nevertheless the discursive strategy serves a specific purpose in that it locates 
meaning for the wider domestic constituency by implying similarity between past 
and present circumstances.   
5.6 Discursive strategy: Positioning Musharraf
It is important to understand that the discursive emphasis on exercising ‘hikmat’ is a 
key strategy of the discourse to justify state policy and practice. Moreover, whilst 
religious analogies are frequently drawn upon to locate the meaning of the present,

126Muslimbrotherhood.
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an additional feature of the language is the way in which the language implicitly 
affords Pakistan’s political leadership and specifically Musharraf as being the 
embodiment of ‘hikmat’. The narrative positions and constructs the political 
leadership and specifically Musharraf as being imbued with an almost divine 
capacity to protect the fort of Islam. We begin to see such a construction in the very 
first instance following September 11th, 2001 when Musharraf in explaining and 
justifying the decision to co-operate with the US and withdraw support from the 
Taliban implicitly presents this as an exercise of ‘hikmat’ on his part: ‘Allah
Almighty says in the holy Quran, The one bestowed with ‘hikmat’ has a huge 
blessing’ (Musharraf, September 19th, 2001). The main purpose of this focus on 
‘hikmat’ is to strengthen the notion that state policy although appearing distasteful on 
the surface is in actuality inspired by the exercise of ‘hikmat’. It is notable that here 
is reference to the Prophet’s exercise of ‘hikmat’, and in the same text the 
implication that a similar exercise of ‘hikmat’ can be attributed to Musharraf. 
Musharraf is seen to challenge the Mullah’s and other’s who feel that they are the 
‘custodians of Islam’,  
....I tell these people who have become the custodians of Islam or who think 
they understand Islam better, that it is Almighty Allah who gives honour or 
authority to anybody. This is our faith that Almighty Allah gives honour to 
whosoever He wants and snatches (sic) honour from whosoever He wants. If 
this is our faith then Allah Almighty has brought me to this position. This 
position, this authority, has been bestowed by Allah and as long as I hold this 
authority and whatever work I am doing, all Pakistani’s should have 
confidence...because this is our faith (Musharraf 2002a).
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This is a remarkable depiction of Musharraf especially considering that Musharraf’s 
military coup of October 1999 made no such religious inferences. Instead,  justifiers 
of the coup made scant, if any, use of Islamic symbolism and myths claiming that 
Islam necessitated a military takeover instead the coup was wholly represented in 
terms of ‘good governance’ and in opposition to the ‘bad governance’ of the civilian 
rulers who had brought the country to the verge of bankruptcy (see Musharraf , 
October 17th, 1999. Musharraf, December, 15th, 1999, Sattar, November 8th, 1999. 
Musharrraf, August 2nd, 2001).  However, now we find that the narrative suggests 
that Musharraf is, a kind of, divinely guided leader possessing wisdom. Moreover, 
Musharraf’s claim to this special position is attributed to the fact that he is a ‘Syed’ 
as he elaborates below, 
I want to make it clear that I am not in the conceit of being ‘Alim’127 but none 
should doubt upon my Islamic identity. I am a Syed128 and God has conferred 
upon me an honour which a few have had. The doors of the Khana Kaba129 are 
opened whenever I visit there. I happened to enter Khana Kaba six times. Once 
the inner door of Khana Kaba called ‘Tuba’ was opened for me. I mounted the 
roof of Kaba and raised the slogan of ‘Allah-u-Akbar’ from a place where 
Hazrat Bilal130 happened to say his ‘Azan’131. The door of ‘Roza Rasool’ is 
opened for me on my visit to Medina. Therefore none should criticize or 
question on my Muslim identity.... (Musharraf 2005g)

127Islamicscholar.
128Syed’sareattributedtobedirectdescendentsoftheProphet.
129HolybuildinginMakkah,SaudiArabia.
130BilalisattributedwithbeingthefirstMuslimtodeliverthefirstAzan(seebelow).
131Thecalltoprayerdeliveredfromminarets.
226



Before proceeding to a discussion of the kind of picture being presented here, and 
more importantly its functions, it is important to note that the key proponent of this 
language or narrative is Musharraf himself. Indeed, across the discourse, members of 
the ruling elite were likely to describe Musharraf as indispensable and an exceptional 
and wise leader. For instance, 
The President is a brilliant asset for this country who has toiled unreservedly to 
steer the country through these difficult times and towards prosperity. We will 
continue to benefit from his wisdom (National Assembly of Pakistan, 
Debates)132
Nevertheless, it is principally Musharraf who assigns himself with religious 
association. In the texts cited above, Musharraf challenges and places himself on par 
with Alims (Islamic scholars) by emphasising that he is a descendent of the Prophet 
and implicitly that God in some way ‘handpicked’ him for the job of steering 
Pakistan. It is interesting to note his assertion that ‘Allah Almighty has brought me to 
this position’, the discourse seems to attributes far more to Musharraf than the 
practice of ‘hikmat’. Musharraf’s ‘special position’ is strengthened by the use of 
other minor emphasis such as the reference to the ‘special access’ he was afforded to 
holy buildings in Makkah, Saudi Arabia. This construction of Musharraf as ‘chosen 
by God’ is fitting if one recalls that the discourse had increasingly and vociferously 

132NationalAssemblyofPakistanDebates,Friday,27thAugust2004.(OfficialReport:19thSession,
Vol.XIXcontainsNo.1).NAPXIX(1)/2004.TranslatedintoEnglishfromtheoriginalUrdu.
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proceeded to fuse Islam and Pakistan together and begun to represent an opposition 
to the Taliban in terms of good versus bad or authentic Islam versus unauthentic. The 
issue here is less to do with whether people took Musharraf seriously (in terms of the 
construction of Musharraf as a demi-god) rather, the point to be noted here in terms 
of discursive function is that the construction of Musharraf as a special Muslim 
leader positioned him in a way that afforded him particular speaking rights. Milliken 
(1999:229 emphasis in original) notes, ‘discourses define subjects authorized to 
speak and act (e.g. foreign policy officials, defence intellectuals, development 
experts). Arguably, the specific discursive location of Musharraf had the effect that it 
assigned social power enabling him with the authority to differentiate and to mark 
out that which is not Islamic. This is certainly conceptualised as an important 
speaking right which he had not enjoyed prior to such a construction.
The data reveals a ‘replacement’ for the Taliban and the discourse slowly but surely 
begins to present Musharraf as a legitimate representative of Islam as opposed to the 
Taliban thus serving an important political function in terms of countering and 
challenging the Taliban’s image as the sole representatives of Islam. If one takes a 
closer look at the political discourse, we can find that there is not an immediate 
disqualification or condemnation of the Taliban. Instead, the focus is on the Pakistani 
Self and ramifications for the Self in the context of 9/11 attacks. Importantly at this 
point, Musharraf had not been constructed as an overtly ‘Islamic’ leader and thus 
subsequently does not enjoy the accompanying speaking rights; it is only after his 
construction as a ‘Muslim’ within the political discourse that he begins to 
differentiate, mark out the Islamic Self from the radical Islamic Other.   
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The particular discursive construction identified here enabled Musharraf to define 
and distinguish the radical Islamic Other from the Self, the authority to determine 
what constitutes a ‘right’ decision and enabled Musharraf the authority to define and 
frame the most pertinent ‘issues’ for Pakistan. Such representations fulfilled 
important political functions in that they allowed Musharraf to distance state policy 
and action from their association with the US ‘war on terror’, and instead the 
discursive strategy was to moralise state policy by representing it as Pakistan’s 
conflict between ‘real’ Islam and a ‘distorted’ Islam. Pakistan’s political leadership is 
constructed as engaged in a conflict that is simply a struggle between good and the 
thwarted/evil. 
In further consolidating the particular political construction of Musharraf, 
the discourse draws attention to Musharraf’s ‘achievements’, particularly in 
relation to his idea’s of ‘enlightened moderation’. In many ways, this 
narrative harks back or tends to implicitly draw on national myths related to 
the ‘good old days’, the national narrative which posits that Islam led the 
world towards human advancement and compares this with the present 
scenario in which Musharraf is leading Muslim Pakistan towards respect 
and recognition in the international arena. Domestically, in order to 
reinforce the legitimacy of the construction of Musharraf as a Muslim as an 
innovator and a saviour, the discourse emphasises him as someone who has 
attained international acclaim and respect.  
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Of course, Musharraf since the military coup has always been represented as 
indispensable to the country however, whereas this indispensability was 
initially couched in terms of saving the country from economic decline later 
constructions focus on the portrayal of Musharraf as a kind of modern 
Muslim caliph or leader.     
 In my view we have the potential to lead the world, the Islamic Ummah and 
the region towards peace and betterment. We should play our role to enhance 
the glory of the country. This world is common heritage and we should make it 
a better place for our future generation….keeping in view the role of Pakistan 
in the Ummah and the world I presented the strategy of ‘enlightened 
moderation’ to the Ummah. It is a two pronged strategy. On prong implies that 
Muslims reject terrorism and extremism and raise their voice against it and side 
by side we have to concentrate on socio-economic progress so that the Ummah 
can move forward. The second prong demands that the West and US help find 
a just resolution of the all the political issues confronting the Muslim 
Ummah….I am pleased that the strategy of Enlightened Moderation has been 
approved in the last OIC meeting….I proposed the formulation of a new 
department of Islamic thought which should be comprised of educated Islamic 
scholars who can convey the true Islamic spirit to the Ummah and the world. I
am trying to lead the Ummah in this direction for their betterment. We have 
achieved international stature and standing in the Ummah, our economy is 
stabilised. (Musharraf 2005d) 
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The notion is that all sane, rational and more importantly Muslim peoples accept 
Musharraf’s ideas, and implicitly the practices which flow from such ideas. The 
reference to the OIC133 certainly suggests that the Muslim world is with Musharraf. 
Musharraf suggests that he is trying to, ‘lead the Ummah in this direction for their 
betterment’, in effect constructing himself as a Caliph of sorts, who is not just 
leading Pakistan but the entire Muslim world. The key point here is that this specific 
construction is evident across the data material and is consistent in terms of the 
underlying message it construes i.e. that of Musharraf as a statesman capable of 
‘leading’, and in this case the Muslim world. Mushahid Hussain Sayed, in his 
opening remarks to an OIC seminar session reiterating such representations states 
that,
President Musharraf enunciated a vision for the Muslim world that is rooted in 
our religion; enlightenment with moderation as the path forward for the 
Muslim ummah for the 21st century (Sayed, 2004a).134
 In terms of a domestic audience, the discourse is much more likely to emphasise 
notions of ‘Islamic wisdom’ and Musharraf’s Islamic credentials as a modern 
Muslim caliph. The postulation here is not that people necessarily agreed with this 
construction rather, that the political function of this construction was that it allowed 
Musharraf take this further so that he could then argue that the Taliban were un-
Islamic.   

133OrganisationofIslamicCountries.
134OpeningremarksbySenatorMushahidHussainSayedChairman,SenateForeignRelations
Committee,attheOICseminarinIslamabad12June,2004.
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5.7 Discursive Strategy: Constructing rationality and responsibility  
In addition to the construction of Musharraf as a divine leader, the discourse is also 
notably concerned with emphasising Pakistan as a rational and responsible state 
actor. The suggestion here is that Pakistan’s political discourse, in its strategy to 
construct the Self as rational, juxtaposes and differentiates its own ‘rationality’ from 
both an Indian irrationality and an extremist Taliban/Al-Qaeda irrationality. An 
implicit and explicit discursive construction of irrational outside Others politically 
functions to stabilise and make more pronounced the rational attributes assigned to 
oneself. Similarly, the representation of Pakistan as responsible is attributed by 
juxtaposing and drawing attention to the opposite behaviours assigned to outside 
Others namely, the US and India. While it is clear that state actors rarely, if at all, 
deliberately represent themselves as irrational or irresponsible however, often actors 
are willing to construct outside Others as irrational with the function being to 
reinforce, construct and strengthen the picture of oneself as good, responsible, 
rational and so on.
An analysis of Pakistan’s post September 11th, 2001 political discourse clearly 
indicates an intense preoccupation with discursive practices that represent Pakistan 
as a rational and responsible state actor. Such a representation, of course, counters 
the way in which global powers especially the US had begun to represent the 
Pakistan throughout the 1990s, a representation which legitimised various political 
practices amongst which were the imposition of US sanctions and the gradual 
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warming of Indo-US relations. However, it is also important to note that Pakistani 
political discourse prior to 2001 was already indicating a keenness to distance itself 
from an association with ‘rogue’ state. Musharraf’s entrance into the political foray 
in the late 1990s, dressed in his western attire and sporting his pet poodles, promised 
to avert national bankruptcy and repair Pakistan’s image as an international pariah.  
The analysis below will explore identifiable Others within the discourse who are 
implicitly and explicitly often constructed as irrational and/or irresponsible, this 
picture or representation of the Other/s is placed alongside or juxtaposed to a 
representation of the Self implicitly inferring the opposite positive qualities i.e. 
dependability, responsibility, sincerity and so on. The argument here is that the 
function of the discourse is to stabilise and make more meaningful the idea of the 
Self as possessing positive attributes. The discussion below will consider three 
Others, the radical Islamic Other, India and finally the US.
In the first instance, the discursive strategy employed within the discourse seeks to 
juxtapose a rational Pakistan with an irrational Taliban Other, and an authentic Islam 
with an unauthentic Islam. In the speech cited below for instance, Musharraf 
emphasises the historical opposition of ‘conservatives’ to Pakistan and thus 
implicitly Islam. In seeking to represent their ideology as farcical, misguided and 
irrational, attention is drawn to the opposition of ‘conservatives’ to exemplary things 
such as the printing of the Quran and the declaration of the father of the nation 
Mohammed Ali Jinnah as an infidel as clear proofs which qualify the conservatives 
as existing outside of the sane, moral, Islamic, Pakistani community. Indeed, 
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phoney/militant Islam is constructed as irrational and treacherous and since those 
adhering to ‘conservative’ Islam135 were opposed to Pakistan, the discourse 
propositions that this  means that they are opposed to Islam itself since Pakistan is 
synonymous with Islam. Musharraf argued, 
(Islam) emphasizes on ‘Haqooq-ul-abad136 rather than ‘Haqooq-ul-Ullah137’.
Islam leads us towards ‘Ilm’138, contemplation, thought, review, Ijtehad and 
Ijmah. It teaches us peace, progress, prosperity, enlightenment and moderation. 
The extremists and fundamentalists ignore the moderate and high principles of 
the religion. They want to impose terrorist and extremist Islam... 
Now it is our responsibility to take Islam out of the claws of these ignorant and 
take it towards its true essence...I want to take us back into history...Muslims 
launched their freedom struggle which concluded in their defeat after some 
time Sir Syed launched his Aligarh movement so that Muslims could get a 
modern education, a ‘fatwa’ was issued against him by the same conservatives 
to declare him infidel. History is witness to the fact that those who were from 
this Aligarh movement launched the Pakistan movement and formulated the 
Muslim league in 1906. They finally carved out Pakistan. Then printing presses 
were introduced in the sub-Continent but the conservatives banned presses. 
They announced the punishment of execution for anyone who printed a copy of 

135ClearlyMusharrafisimplicitlydrawingsimilaritiesbetweenthehistoricalconservativesandthe
moderndayTaliban.
136Rightsofthepeople.
137RightsofAllah.
138Knowledge.
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the Quran. There was the ideology of Iqbal and...Quaid... but again they issued 
Fatwa’s against Iqbal and branded Quaid an infidel. Pakistan came into being 
despite their opposition (Musharraf 2005a).
The discourse is then working to differentiate between real Muslims, like Musharraf, 
and those ‘conservatives’ who historically opposed all that is good and rational i.e. 
the creation of Pakistan, the printing of the Quran and so on. If these things are 
opposed i.e. the printing of the Quran then the only logical conclusion to draw is that 
those labelled ‘conservatives’ must be irrational and sham Muslims since no sane, 
rational Muslim would oppose such things. Much of the official language concerning 
extremists such as the Taliban tends to disassociate Pakistan and its citizens from the 
radical Islamic Other. Just as Musharraf locates the ‘conservatives’ as outside of the 
body politic Senator Mushahid referring to sectarian violence of the 1990s argues 
that,
[sectarian violence] was a blowback from the geopolitics of the 1980s. I’m 
referring to the West-funded Afghan Jihad, the CIA gave $2.1 billion during 
1979-1989, the training of 200,000 Afghan Mujahideen and over 20,000 Arab 
volunteers including Osama Bin Laden…unfortunately the state either winked 
at or looked the other way during most of this period and the result was the 
growth of this Frankenstein monster of terror and extremism that is today the 
single most important security threat to Pakistan and its people….(Sayed 
2004b) . 
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Here, there is resonance with the earlier text in that the radical Islamic Other is 
represented as a foreign non-Pakistani Other, in particular note the way in which the 
foreign credentials are identified i.e. that it (the radical Islamic Other) was a US 
creation and consisted of Afghans and Arabs. The irrationality of the radical Islamic 
Other can therefore not be associated with Pakistan as Mushahid further notes: 
by and large our people are good and moderate Muslims and good human 
beings. Let them be this way. Their natural instincts reject extremism…there is 
a popular revulsion to extremism (ibid).  
The performative aspect of above theme is that its main function is to emphasise and 
differentiate Pakistan’s moderate and authentic Islam from an unauthentic and 
militant version of Islam, constructed, above all, as a foreign entity. Senator 
Mushahid’s exposition for instance works to consistently associate Islamic militancy 
with ‘foreignness’ and a disassociation from a domestic Pakistani constituency. 
Moreover, at the domestic level this strategy counteracts the notion that the state is in 
opposition to Islam or the notion that militant Islam is synonymous with Pakistan; 
instead, such versions of Islam are attributed to the ‘foreign’, ‘alien’ inferior’ realm 
and therefore justifies the state’s military action against it. Secondly, at the 
international level the differentiation allows Pakistan to be included in the United 
State’s ‘us’ group. If the political discourse represents Pakistan as in opposition to a 
foreign unauthentic Islam then it naturalises Pakistan co-operation with the US 
against this common opponent.  This explicit articulation of a radical Islamic Other 
as an opponent of Pakistan is a construction within the political discourse that is 
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relatively new furthermore it marks a shift in terms of a historically discursive trend 
that tended to focus exclusively on Pakistan’s homogenous Islam with the Hindu-
ness of the Indian Other.
The representations identified here fulfil important political functions in that they 
distance state policy and action from their association with the US ‘war on terror’; 
instead, the discursive strategy is to moralise state policy by representing it as 
Pakistan’s conflict between ‘real’ Islam and a ‘distorted’ Islam. Pakistan’s political 
leadership is constructed as engaged in a conflict that is simply a struggle between 
good and the thwarted/evil. One of the primary purposes of this representation is to 
mark out and distinguish the enemy ‘Other’, and it is through placing this ‘Other’ in 
opposition to the ‘fort of Islam’, and therefore Islam itself, that this function is 
discursively achieved. The discursive construction of the phoney Islamic Other 
justifies and legitimises military action against them and collusion with the US.  
On a second level, and in addition to the juxtaposing between the Self and the 
radicalised Islamic Other, there is a further discursive strategy employed to 
strengthen the construction of the Self as rational and a responsible political entity. 
This is done principally through the discursive juxtaposing of the Self with the 
representation of an irrational and irresponsible Indian Other. It is possible to discern 
such a construction from the way in which official text, across the board, tends to 
emphasise specific actions, reactions, policies of the Self and juxtapose these 
implicitly and explicitly with its Indian counterpart. In the midst of the 2001-02 
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stand-off between India and Pakistan following the attacks on the Indian parliament, 
Indian irrationality is clearly articulated: 
…the whole world knows there are many acts of terrorism in Pakistan also. 
There was an attack on our church in which many foreign national were 
killed….but we did not blame India for these attacks, we did not increase 
tension….I would like to say that all these (Indian) allegations with aggressive 
overtones show highly irresponsible behaviour on the part of the Indian 
leadership. This increases the heat of war and creates war hysteria.  This is 
unacceptable to us. Now look at our attitude. Despite such provocations we 
have exercised restraint and adopted a wise and sane policy. But this should 
never be constituted as weakness. (Musharraf 2002b) 
The narrative here is explicit in terms of assigning recklessness to India whilst 
simultaneously highlighting a seemingly mature and measured Pakistani response. 
This theme of Indian provocation is quite consistent throughout the discourse and is 
often used to strengthen the picture of the Self as level-headed139, since it refuses to 
be provoked into engaging in accusations and threats - implicitly implying moral 
superiority – note, ‘we have exercised restraint and adopted a wise and sane policy’.
By claiming restraint and wisdom in the face of provocation, the opposing negative 
characteristics are naturally attributed to the Indian Other. This juxtaposing between 
rational/irrational is articulated strongly to international audiences as Musharraf’s 
speech below demonstrates, 

139SeeChapterthreeforaninterestingcomparisonwiththewayinwhichIndianirrationallyhas
beenconstructedhistorically.
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the peace process initiated by Pakistan with India over the last two years …the 
initiation of this process was preceded by an unprecedented confrontation; 
India had mobilised more than one million troops along our borders in 2002, 
while we obviously responded in kind…..Pakistan consistently advocated the 
de-escalation, dialogue and conflict resolution….I therefore welcomed the 
hand of friendship extended by former Prime Minister of India Mr. 
Vajpayee.’…. ‘the ceasefire on the line of control was announced in November 
2003 by Pakistan, we took the initiative and responded by India’….given 
sincerity, flexibility and courage on all sides….the objective (of peace) is 
within reach (Musharraf 2006c). 
Although this text is located from a time-period when India-Pakistan relations were 
at an all time high the narrative continues to draw attention to alleged Indian 
rashness. By noting that, India mobilised ‘more than one million troops along 
Pakistan’s borders in 2002’ an absurdity is implied in this very action whilst 
simultaneously the suggestion that we ‘obviously’ responded suggests that it was 
entirely understandable and clear to anyone in the right state of mind that a response 
to such provocation was justified. Moreover, simply by referring to characteristics 
such as quality of ‘leadership, sincerity, flexibility and courage’ in close proximity to 
the construction of Pakistan as responsible and rational brings to mind, or naturalises, 
the binary opposites of these terms. This theme of Indian provocation is recurrent 
particularly in texts articulated to foreign audiences Pakistan’s Foreign Minister 
reiterates this point, 
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Our relations with India have come along way from the tense period in 2001 
and 2002 when India amassed its troops along the Pakistani border. Today the 
situation is much more stable as a result of the offer for ceasefire along the 
LoC made by President Musharraf in November 2003……..our nuclear 
capability must be viewed in the context of India’s pursuit of the nuclear option 
and our security concerns…our strategic capabilities have been developed in
self-defence following the Indian nuclear test of 1974 that disrupted the 
security balance… (Kasuri 2007)140
Kasuri reproduces the dominant themes of provocation when he notes that, India 
amassed its troops in 2001 on Pakistan’s borders. An important point is that this 
discursive emphasis excludes the context in which troops were amassed i.e. that 
India accused Pakistan of being involved in the attack on the Indian Parliament in 
December 2001. Kasuri quickly moves on to highlight that the situation is presently 
much better owing to Pakistan’s initiative of offering a ceasefire. Later in the text, 
Kasuri again retouches on the theme of Indian provocation by referring to Pakistan’s 
nuclear technology as been triggered in self-defence as a result of Indian nuclear test. 
Read as a whole, the kind of construction proposed here points towards a notion of 
India as aggressive and provocative whilst at the same time Pakistan is reasoned and 
mature. Furthermore, it is notable that the idea of Pakistan as an ‘initiator’ (of peace) 
and an advocator of ‘de-escalation, dialogue and conflict resolution’ is stressed. The
underlying implication is that since the Self exhibits these qualities they provide a 

140ForeignMinisterKhurshidM.KasuriattheCouncilonForeignRelations,WashingtonD.C.19th
June2007.Reprintedin‘PakistanForeignOfficeYearbook200607’.
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basis for, and allow for, the Indian Other to offer a ‘hand of friendship’ in the first 
place. The credit for the offer of a ‘hand of friendship’ is, thus implicitly accorded to 
the Self.  Whilst the representation acknowledges India as an essential partner in 
peace, it tends to represent this partner as at some level unwilling and as dragging its 
heels in terms of moving forward. For instance, Foreign Minister Kasuri in an 
interview with the APP news agency referring to ‘progress’ between India and 
Pakistan in terms of bilateral relations states that he hoped that: 
India will also accept Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali’s proposal to 
restore train links suggesting that ‘I am happy the things have improved but 
there is a need to go further’ (Kasuri 2003)141
In contrast to the kind of representation afforded to India, Pakistan by contrast, is 
constructed as a leader; in particular, note the way in which ‘train links’ are proposed
by Pakistan and await an Indian response. Similarly, Farooq Sattar in the meeting of 
the senate foreign relations committee and an EU delegation while noting that he 
along with other members visited India to stress to the government there that 
Pakistan desired peace states that Indian prime minister ‘Manmohan Singh 
reciprocated in very categorical words that he also has a vision that this region, one 
day, will become an economic bloc’ (see Foreign Office Yearbook 2006-2007: 
Government of Pakistan)142.  Often there is an emphasis on how Pakistan offered or 

141ForeignMinisterKasuriinaninterviewwiththeAPPNewsAgencyinIslamabadonJune6th2003–
Sourcedfrom‘ForeignAffairsPakistan’journalpublishedbytheMinistryofForeignAffairs,
Islamabad,GovernmentofPakistan.Pleasenotethatthegrammaticalerrorsarepresentinthe
originaltext.
142FarooqSattarisamemberoftheNationalAssembly.SeeGovernmentofPakistan(2007).
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suggested a Confidence Building Measure (CBM) or attempted to break the deadlock 
and so on while the Indian Other is more or less a passive party in that it responds or 
reciprocates Pakistan’s stimuli. Such a representation implicitly implies India’s 
reluctance at some level to engage with Pakistan and thus affords Pakistan a moral 
high-ground.
Finally, the construction of the Self as reasonable and sincere is additionally 
consolidated by emphasis in language which draws attention to an apparent disparity 
between a conscientious and dependable Pakistan and a somewhat insincere and 
irresponsible US entity especially in the context of the aftermath of the Cold War. 
Consider the following textual articulations taken from a selection of different 
sources which emphasise and naturalise Pakistan’s sincerity and dependability: 
Pakistan took a strategic decision based on the principles of humanity and 
national interest to join the international coalition....Pakistan has played a 
critical role as a front line state in the war against terrorism’ (Address by 
Pakistani High Commissioner to New Dehli, 2004) 143
this decision was based on Pakistan outrage over the terrorist action resulting in 
colossal loss of innocent lives, its abhorrence of terrorism of which Pakistan 
itself has been a major victim; its principled approach to foreign policy and a 
dispassionate assessment of its national interest. With the wisdom of hindsight 

143AddressbyPakistan’sHighCommissionertoIndiaattheCentreforPolicyResearch6thMarch
2004.
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it can now be said with certainty that there was no better alternative…it was 
not the case, as some observers have alleged, the magic of a telephone call that 
Pakistan decided to join the United States in the war on terrorism after the 
terrible events of 9/11. This decision was entirely in line with the principles 
that Pakistan believed in, the values that Pakistan subscribed to and the policies 
that Pakistan had pursued in the past (Kasuri 2004)144.
A common thread running through the discourse is a theme focussing on naturalizing 
responsibility as an intimate or instinctive attribute of the Pakistani state. The 
argument been articulated is that the decision to align Pakistan with the US was not a 
result of a ‘magic phone call’, but emanated from Pakistan’s ‘natural’ disposition 
regarding the opposition to terrorism. Pakistan’s former Foreign Minister Abdul 
Sattar for instance, writing in a local newspaper argues that , 
Pakistan government’s decision to fight terrorism has a pre-eminent national 
rationale. That the policy happens to coincide with the needs also of the world 
community which has witnessed horrifying acts of terrorism can only reinforce 
its logic….to join the global fight against terrorism does not imply 
endorsement of Bush administration’s policies145.

144ForeignMinisterKhurshidMehmoodKasuriaddressingtheHeritageFoundation22ndMay2004.
145‘FightterrorismforusnotUS;AcommentbyformerforeignministerAbdulSattarasappearedin
the‘DailyPakistanObserver’on18thApril2007.Sourcedfrom‘ForeignAffairsPakistan’Islamabad:
GovernmentofPakistan,MinistryofForeignAffairs.
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On a similar note, Farooq Sattar debating in the National Assembly maintains that 
‘we need to rid ourselves of this perception that Pakistan is simply responding to 
America or NATO or the international community’s dictates’146. Despite this 
concerted effort by official sources to ‘own’ the US-led ‘war on terror’ there is much 
contention and during the extensive discussions on foreign policy in the National 
Assembly many opposed the ‘war on terror’. A reading of these debates reveals that 
much of the opposition to the US-led ‘war on terror’ does not automatically mean 
that the Taliban is applauded rather the opposition focuses on a dishonest and 
untrustworthy US partner. For instance, Ahmad Alam Anwar147 argues that, 
after 9/11 the decision of our President was well intentioned, I think it was a 
desire on his part to help Pakistan what he perceived to be in the interest of 
Pakistan’ security and development…(but since then)…the response that we 
have had from American has been negative. And they have betrayed us (and) 
they have not reciprocated in the right spirit (on account of belittling Pakistan’s 
effort and using economic assistance in a carrot and stick manner).      
Furthermore, even where total opposition to the US-led ‘war on terror’ is not 
articulated there is a specific representation that is advanced that brings into 
discursive focus the notion of the US as insincere. In terms of the political 
functionality the discursive construction of the ‘natural’ disposition of Pakistan as 

146FarooqSattarpage930–translatedintoEnglishfromNationalAssemblyofPakistanDebates,
Wednesday,8thAugust2007.(OfficialReport:42ndSession,Vol.XLIIcontainsNos.114).NAPXLII
(8)/2007.
147Page955ofNationalAssemblyofPakistanDebates,Wednesday,8thAugust2007.(OfficialReport:
42ndSession,Vol.XLIIcontainsNos.114).NAPXLII(8)/2007.

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responsible, sincere and principled discussed previously is given further weight by 
contrasting it with the kind of representation of the US alluded to above. Often 
within the discourse, both observations are placed in close proximity to each other in 
order to support the contention of a genuine Self. Former foreign minister Abdul 
Sattar further noting Pakistan’s earnestness to deal with terrorism promptly proceeds 
to point out that while Pakistan cannot deny illegal border crossings:148
But it can and must continue to explain the fact the problem in the context of 
the nightmare legacy bequeathed to us by the liberation struggle in 
Afghanistan. We still have millions of Afghan refugees in our country and it is 
difficult to identify insurgents amongst them. Also, foreign jihadis who were 
bought by the American CIA to fight the Soviets were later left in the border 
areas….Pakistan is not lacking in will to contribute to its solution (Sattar 
2007)149
Again, militant Islam is represented as something that is wholly foreign, note the 
reference to Afghan refugees and other foreign ‘jihadis’ brought into Pakistan by the 
CIA. This discursive emphasis is placed in close proximity to the representation of 
Pakistan as being ‘abandoned’ by a US clearly implying that the United States 
having ‘used’ Pakistan to quash communist Soviet forces in Afghanistan discarded 
the region. Both these themes, i.e. the militant as foreign and the US as 
comparatively irresponsible and selfish, work together to naturalise the overall 
representation of Pakistan as moderate and a responsible world actor. Indeed these 

148SattarreferstoillegalbordercrossingsbytheTalibanfromAfghanistanintoPakistan.
149AbdulSattar(formerForeignMinister)inPakistanObserver18thApril,2007.
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are recurrent themes in the data material and some of the most vociferous 
articulations with regard to emphasising a potential dishonest US partner were 
articulated by Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayed who often discussed the US in the 
context of the Cold War. It must be reiterated, that the ‘truth’ value’ of statements is 
not the issue here rather I am more concerned with the political functionality of the 
articulations and in this sense how the construction or textual emphasis on a 
somewhat insincere US partner works to reinforce the vision of the Pakistani Self as 
reliable.
as far as terrorism is concerned the track record of Pakistan has been very 
strong, very consistent and probably no other country after nine eleven has 
done more and sacrificed more in terms of supporting the campaign against 
terrorism and this also goes back to the years of the cold war when Pakistan 
was supposed to be a front line state in the issue of rolling back Soviet 
expansionism in Afghanistan and when our American and British friends were 
partners in what I call the joint jihad against Soviet Union and Pakistan played 
that role, we were committed to that and there is a strong feeling in Pakistan 
that after the liberation of Afghanistan or the roll back of the Red Army, we 
were left in the lurch. Afghanistan was left in the lurch and the West, Britain 
included, the US, just walked away from the region and we were left to carry 
the baby with the bath water and what you are seeing today is the blowback, 
the consequences, the after math of that Jihad and for 12 years from 1989-
2001, the international community, the Western world, Britain, European 
Union, USA, just forgot about the region, forgot about Pakistan and they also 
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gave us a parting kick in the form of sanctions….(Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations 2004).150
If the construction of identity is understood as a dynamic process produced through 
the activity of discourses, conceptualised as a set of discursive practices that share a 
similarity in terms of the underlying messages they implicitly and explicitly 
articulate, then the above textual emphases are critically important in terms of how 
they implicitly construct Pakistan’s identity. For instance, senator Mushahid focuses 
intently on recalling the role of the United States during a particular time-period, in 
effect, this discursive emphasis works towards reinforcing a positive representation 
of Pakistan whilst simultaneously bringing the intentions and characteristics of the 
US into question.  Taken as whole, the representation of Pakistan as a responsible 
and mature world actor is principally achieved through a discursive juxtaposition 
between the Self and significant Other’s who are in different ways negatively 
differentiated from the Pakistani Self. In many instances, the strategy is to simply 
recall the perceived intentions and actions of Other’s in order to naturalise the 
opposite (positive) intentions and actions with the Self. Pakistan’s political discourse 
is thus strongly focused on the articulation of a Self that is a leader, an innovator, a 
pursuant of peace. 

150VerbatimtranscriptofmeetingwiththeHouseofCommonsCommittee,London.Senate
CommitteeonForeignRelations,Islamabad.ReportNo.1July2004.
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5.8 Discursive constructions and political engagement with India 
On the other hand, it is also possible to discern that the political discourse under 
investigation can also be linked to significant shifts in other areas of political 
practice. Pakistan has historically had an extremely strained relationship with India 
with the extent of polarisation being such that despite sharing significant similarities 
in language and culture the two populations had little interaction owing to the 
draconian travel restrictions and the blanket negative, derogatory and hostile 
stereotyping of the respective Other. However, what is significant from the 
perspective of this study is the way in which the nature of engagement between 
Pakistan and India improved dramatically during the time-period under discussion in 
this study. The nature of engagement involved such things as visits of sports teams, a 
steady stream of visiting movie stars, musicians, journalists, high school and college 
students and peace activists. In Pakistan ,pirated copies of Indian movies have a huge 
and growing market although on the official level Indian movies have been banned 
since 1965 however, in May of 2006 for the first time in 41 years the government of 
Pakistan allowed the showing and legal distribution of an Indian film. On the official 
level, Indian Prime Minister and Pakistan’s President Musharraf began direct talks 
on January 5th, 2004 heralding a series of high-level direct contact and dialogue 
between the two rival states, these bilateral composite dialogues were regular, 
surviving changes in government in India and focussed on dialogue around 
contentious issues such as CBMs, the Siachin glacier, the building of dams, 
terrorism, drug trafficking and economic and commercial co-operation. Moreover, 
there were indications that Pakistan was willing to move away from entrenched 
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positions such as its official stance on Kashmir. Musharraf for instance, conceded in 
an interview in 2003 that, 
we are for UN resolutions, however now we have left that aside. If we want to 
resolve this issue, both sides need to talk to each other with flexibility, coming 
beyond stated positions, meeting halfway somewhere…we are prepared to rise 
to the occasion, Indian has to be flexible also…151.
Musharraf’s assertions regarding the possibility of abandoning UN resolutions in 
relation to the disputed territory of Kashmir was met with some outrage within 
Pakistan but arguably, criticism was limited and cannot be seen as something that 
really disturbed the entire population. Some analysts would argue that the improved 
exchange between the two countries was propelled by the vested interests of the 
United States, who was concerned with ensuring Pakistan’s full commitment to its 
western border. The implication here is the understanding that belligerency with 
India would not be beneficial to the US since it could jeopardise Pakistan’s full 
military commitment to the ‘war on terror’. However, whilst such a focus is entirely 
legitimate nevertheless, the approach here is that language and discourse creates the 
possibilities for political practice.  From the theoretical perspective of this study, 
language is political and productive to the extent that it is constitutive of what is 
brought into being – practice thus relies on the discourse which either works to 
enable or constrain social practice. The argument thus runs that inter-state conflicts 
are significantly fuelled by the institutionalisation of difference and exclusion 

151ReutersNewsAgency–December18th,2003.
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articulated through binary and dichotomous ways of speaking. From this position 
then, changes in a discourse would then signal or enable shifts in practices. This way 
of tackling the thawing of Indo-Pakistan relations is less concerned with who 
propelled the discourse and more concerned with how language creates the 
conditions for policy transformations. The contention here is that specific discursive 
constructions of the national Self which hinged on representations of the Self as 
rational, innovative and responsible had the effect that they created a space within 
which it became possible to talk about Pakistan initiating dialogue and exchange 
with India.
Consequently, what is being proposed is that Pakistan’s political discourse in the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 2001 focussed around a representation or world-
view in which the subject-position that Pakistan was afforded emphasised a ‘Self’ 
that was inherently peaceful and genuine. Ironically, in many ways this 
representation was often built through a direct juxtaposing of the opposite qualities 
which were discursively assigned to the Indian other. In this context, the subject-
position that Pakistan took up meant that it opened political space by making it 
feasible for a more enhanced political manoeuvre. Notably however, the data 
analysis revealed that Pakistan’s willingness to engage with the Indian Other 
emerges principally from a reconstruction of who and what the Pakistani Self is, 
rather than a wholesale reconstruction of the Indian Other. Despite individual 
references, such as Musharraf’s assertions of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh as ‘sincere’ and ‘positive’ (Musharraf 2006e, 2006g) these are qualities 
generally lacking in the representation of India. Pakistan’s political discourse is 
primarily focused on the articulation of a Self that is a leader, an innovator, a 
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pursuant of peace and whilst the discourse acknowledges India as an essential partner 
in peace it tends to represent this partner as at some level unwilling and as dragging 
its heels in terms of moving forward. Pakistan, by contrast, is constructed as a leader, 
and often there is an emphasis on how Pakistan offered or suggested a Confidence 
Building Measure (CBM) or attempted to break the deadlock and so on while the 
Indian Other is more or less a passive party in that it responds to Pakistan’s stimuli. 
Such a representation implicitly implies India’s reluctance at some level to engage 
with Pakistan and in many ways affords Pakistan a moral high ground.  
Whilst this project is not primarily concerned with how Pakistan’s engagement with 
India was enabled by the ‘knowledge’ that the discourse created however, the section 
above seeks to strengthen the principle argument put forward here: namely the idea 
that language and discourse is productive of social practice. These ideas extrapolated 
to the field of IR means that the organising principle of this project has been the 
constitutive significance of representation in formulating and debating domestic and 
foreign policy. Indeed Hansen (2006:6) notes that
foreign policies need to ascribe meaning to the situation and to construct the 
objects within it, and in doing so they articulate and draw upon specific 
identities of other states, regions, peoples, and institutions as well as on the 
identity of a national, regional or institutional Self.  
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5.9 Conclusion: The normalisation of Pakistan’s political practice 
A constructivist theoretical starting point is the basic justification for the analysis 
conducted in this chapter. The idea here is that specific and identifiable discourses 
contribute to the normalisation of particular government policy and practice. In this 
sense, a starting for this chapter has been Doty’s (1993:303 italics in original) 
observation that,
policy makers also function within a discursive space that imposes meaning on 
their world and thus creates reality…an approach that focuses on discursive 
practices as a unit of analysis can get at how this ‘reality’ is produced and 
maintained and how it makes various practices possible.  
The overall objective of this chapter has been to uncover the knowledge’s or state 
practices normalised by a specific political discourse in Pakistan. This kind of 
examination is adept at revealing the assumptions, beliefs and values underlying 
specific texts, and the histories and embedded meanings of the analogies, and how 
these are constitutive of the ensuing political practice. 
The analysis in this chapter revealed that the events of September 11, 2001 were 
‘read’ as posing an extraordinary threat to the survival of Pakistan. Despite the 
rhetoric emanating from the US, the threat to Pakistan is located as emanating from 
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the India Other. The chapter argued that this ‘reading’ fits neatly into the historical 
meta-narrative that assigns a belligerent, vengeful Indian adversary. In the wake of 
the 9/11 attacks on the US, the representation of a hostile India played an important 
role in terms of contextualisation and locating meaning of contemporary events. 
More specifically, this discursive strategy conveyed a sense of immediate and 
immense threat to the vast masses of Pakistan primarily because a threat from a 
hostile India is far easier to relate to and enjoys a historical location in the Pakistani 
psyche. The suggestion here is not that a ‘threat’ from India was deliberately 
constructed rather the analysis demonstrates that the employment of this discursive 
strategy was important in terms of ‘setting the scene’ or defining meaning. This 
attaching of ‘meaning’ was further strengthened by the unabashed use of historical 
analogies to build ‘meanings’ through connecting and associating the predicament of 
Pakistan in the 9/11 environment to specific historical and popular narratives (the 
secession of East Pakistan in 1971 and the migration of the Prophet). Thus, the 
political language and the associations employed between the past and present work 
to enforce a particular reading. Conversely, other meanings/readings were entirely 
possible.
Furthermore  as the analysis subsequently noted, having narrated extraordinary 
threat, the political language then moved to re-infusing more vehemently, to a 
domestic audience at least, an Islamic ideology with the purpose of the state. This 
discursive strategy had a political purpose in that it functioned to ‘reclaim’ Islam for 
Pakistan as opposed to the Taliban exclusiveness in terms of being the sole 
representatives of Islam. The language fused together Islam and Pakistan; in doing so 
it also began to differentiate between a Talibanised unauthentic Islam and an 
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authentic version of Islam152. The fissure of Islam into these two polarised and 
separate camps within the political discourse can be viewed as a phenomenon 
emergent following 2001 and had the effect that it allowed the state to continue to 
employ Islam as a significant tool for mobilisation as well providing the national Self 
with an identity from which Other/s could be differentiated. Within this 
representation, Musharraf is constructed as possessing the special capacity to 
exercise ‘hikmat’, which was effective, in that it afforded him Islamic legitimacy and 
particular speaking rights. The argument made here is that this discursive 
construction of Musharraf as a legitimate speaker was an important strategy because 
it authorized him to distinguish between authentic and unauthentic Islam. 
It is possible to discern that within the corpus of data following 2001, there is a 
notable infrequency in terms of an explicit reference to pitting Hindu India against 
Islam153. In times of heightened tension however for example, during the standoff 
between the India and Pakistan following the December 2001 attacks on the Indian 
parliament154 the discourse is more overt in terms of constructing the Other as 
irrational. Nevertheless, it is notable that there seems a break with the past in that 
representation practices tend not to employ highly derogative imagery to construct 
the Indian Other, and secondly there is less reliance on a narrative that defines the 
Other in terms of its Hindu identity. This strategy can be associated with the 
surrounding discursive emphases on Pakistan’s ‘maturity’ and its role as a 
‘responsible state actor’. An argument can be made that such a favourable 

152Arational,peaceful,authenticPakistaniIslamjuxtaposedtoanegative,irrational,barbarian
unauthenticimitationofIslam.
153Thoughthisnarrativedoesimplicitlysurfacewithinthediscourse.
154IndiablamedPakistanistateinvolvementintheattacksontheIndianparliamentinDecember
2001.Thisconflictualsituationledtothebothcountriesamassingtheirrespectivearmedforceson
theborders.
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representation of Pakistan closes down the possibilities for an explicit construction of 
the Indian Other as inherently ‘evil’ or ‘inferior’. Indeed it would contradict the kind 
of positive characteristics the discourse assigns the Pakistani Self especially at the 
international level.   
This is not to suggest that India is not represented as a hostile Other rather, this 
representation is achieved through a discursive strategy that links multiple positive 
characteristics with the Self and in the process naturalizes the binary opposite 
characteristics to the Other. The representation of India as provocative and irrational 
is central to the efficient discursive construction of Pakistan as possessing the 
opposing qualities. Such a discursive strategy is frequently employed at the 
international level where the emphasis is less on outright condemnations or 
accusations, but takes the form of more subtle references and indications towards 
Pakistan’s sensibility. It is useful to compare this discourse to the way in which the 
Indian adversary has been historically represented there seems a clear qualitative 
difference between the two155.
But what to make of the varied constructions identified in our analysis? It is 
important here to remember that the basic assumption behind this analysis has been 
that representations have consequences. The particular ‘interpretive optic’ within 
which issues are placed has consequences in terms of the kind of government policy 
and direction that can be formulated (Hansen 2006:6). The argument here is that the 
constructions identified in the data cohered to form a particular conception of the 

155Refertochapterthree,foradiscussionofhowIndiahastraditionallybeenrepresentedin
Pakistan’sdiscourse.
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Self and the meaning of events. In Althusser’s (1971) terminology, the discourse was 
productive in the sense that it ‘interpellated’ a particular subject; alternatively 
Foucault would term this production of subjects and objects as an act of 
‘positioning’. Thus the specific constructions identified in the data altogether cohered 
to create a space within which it was possible to envisage a necessary alliance with 
the US in its ‘war on terror’ and enabled actions on the part of the Pakistani state 
related to the Taliban and providing support to US actions in the region. The 
representation of immediate threat to state security vis-à-vis a traditional and open 
Indian enemy worked to pre-empt and close down opportunity to discuss the possible 
alternatives to an alliance with the US. Furthermore, the discursive re-articulation of 
the role of Islam for Pakistan was consequential in that it worked to legitimise 
Pakistan’s concrete co-operation with the US against the unauthentic Taliban. 
Indeed, it justifies such political action. On a similar note, the construction of 
Musharraf as genuine, Islamic and wise was also consequential in that it afforded 
him the authority to initiate political action.
Thus the argument here is that there was a concerted discursive effort by officials 
within Pakistan’s elite, most principally President Musharraf, to construct a 
representation in which Pakistan’s broad co-operation with the US was normalised or 
construed as the ‘best option’. The language examined in this chapter was productive 
in structuring thought and perspective within public discourse and ultimately enabled 
the associated political action. It is notable that the relative lack of public 
mobilisation against US actions in the region had much to do with the way in which 
the political discourse framed subjects such as the unauthenticity of the Taliban, 
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Pakistan’s relationship with Islam vis-à-vis Taliban Islam, the role of India in the 
context of 9/11 and so on. These constructions were consequential for action.
Secondly, part of the lack of popular mobilisation against the US or Pakistan’s 
alliance with the US has to do with the relative lack of readily available public 
information regarding the extent of the US-Pakistan co-operation. The state 
monopolisation of the media meant that the official version of events and the 
meanings attached to them were supported and reinforced. The role of the media is 
very important in terms of information and explanation, and therefore access to this 
resource is a valuable form of social power156. In this instance then, the state 
censorship of the media in Pakistan may also be seen as complicit in the success of 
the discursive representations. Thirdly, since Pakistan’s military elite has historically 
been represented as the ultimate guardians of the state and a legitimate depository of 
knowledge (an epistemic community) then it follows that the information being 
articulated is more likely to be accepted than if it had come from any other source.    
However it is important to note that the constructions identified in this chapter cannot 
have spontaneously emerged from a vacuum of ‘nothingness’ and although linked to 
historical narratives this however, does not explain their specific emergence. This 
study argues that the discourse identified here is connected to specific extra-
discursive conditions which afford the emergence of the discourse in its specific 
shape and form. The overall task of this study is to explain how Pakistan’s political 
practice was made possible and an identification of the variables involved in the 
production of this practice. Political practice is enabled and constrained by the 

156VanDijk(2001)inparticulardiscussesthepowerofmediainhisapproachto‘criticaldiscourse
analysis’.
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‘knowledge’ that discourses advance at any point in time. In this sense, this chapter 
forms an important part of such an investigation nevertheless, it provides a partial 
explanation to the question of ‘production’. This understanding represents a general 
scepticism of reductionist conclusions that posit discourse as the only variable 
involved in the determining of political realities. Rather, the argument of this study is 
that there exist specific underlying structural conditions that function in terms of 
facilitating the particular representations identified within Pakistan’s political 
discourse. These extra-discursive conditions exist outside of discourse even though 
they may have initially been discursively constructed – for instance social structures. 
The argument thus runs that, some social structures or social conditions are enduring 
to the extent that they become antecedent to discourse and impinge by affording 
some ways of understanding the world. These social structures and conditions are 
therefore ‘productive’ in relation to discourse. Thus if we conceptualise 
‘productivity’ of underlying contexts then it becomes necessary to also investigate 
how these social structures are productive in relation to the political reality under 
investigation here. An exploration of the underlying contexts which afford the 
emergence of particular discourses deepens our understanding of how and why 
specific political action is realised. It is to this task that we turn to in the following 
chapter with an aim to provide a more wholesome and plausible explanation of the 
issue of the production of political practice.    
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Pakistan’s political discourse: Exploring ontological depth 
6.1 Introduction 
Intransitive structures do not directly determine outcomes; rather they possess 
tendencies, or potentialities, which may or may not be realised.157
The previous chapter demonstrated how Pakistan’s official political discourse was 
linked, in important ways, to the normalisation of a world-view in which Pakistan’s 
co-operation in the US-led ‘war on terror’ is justified and legitimised. The analysis 
was premised on the philosophical assumption that political action and practice is 
produced by the kind of political discourse underlying it. The purpose of this chapter 
however is to take the analysis of chapter five forward by identifying the extra-
discursive social structures and social contexts that may also be seen as ‘productive’. 
The basic theme of this chapter is the notion that underlying social contexts within 
which discourses are embedded act in an enabling or constraining way by limiting 
the discursive choices that can potentially be made. This assumption is grounded in 
the notion that underlying and relatively enduring structures such as economic, 
biochemical or social structures provide the ‘raw material’, or the context within 
which we structure our understanding of the world (Willig 1999). This study does 
not put forward a deterministic argument of the relation between local and global 

157Willig(1999:45).
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social structures and Pakistan’s political practice; rather, the line of reasoning 
pursued here acknowledges an acceptance that these conditions do impinge and are 
constitutive of political practice. Since social contexts and structures are 
consequential for discursive choices then, in order to adequately comprehend 
political reality, it is important to also identify those contexts that impinge on the 
emergence and maintenance of discursive constructions.  
If we accept the impingement of enduring social structures on the construction of 
political reality, then it becomes necessary to identify these structures and to theorise 
their potential causality. In this sense then, a discourse analysis on its own becomes 
insufficient in terms of rigorously exploring the hypothesis because it refuses to 
engage with anything outside of ‘discourse’ or text. Simply put, from a wholly 
poststructuralist perspective, Pakistan’s political practice following 9/11 is ultimately 
and exclusively produced by the discourse identified in the previous chapter. 
Ontologically and epistemologically, there is a rigidity here which cannot be 
overcome and which hinders a full exploration of the political practice. Whilst it is 
conceded that this study draws much insight from poststructuralist insights into the 
production of social life nevertheless, it simultaneously acknowledges the existence 
of extra-discursive structural constraints on discourses. Importantly, this line of 
argument does not take regulatory power away from discourse; rather, it signals a 
deeper engagement with the production of political reality by taking into 
consideration those contexts/social structures that shape and impact a discourse. The 
theoretical justification for this analysis lies in a critical realist approach to social 
construction, discussed extensively in chapter four, and will not be rehearsed here. 
The objective of this chapter is to apply a critical realist lens to the subject-matter by 
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identifying those social contexts and structures without whose existence Pakistan’s 
discourse would cease to exist in its current form. In other words, this chapter taking 
as its principal focal point Pakistan’s co-operation with the United States and its 
policy practice of reversing support for the Taliban seeks to uncover those social 
structures that ‘afford’ or ‘facilitate’ the emergence of the discourse underlying these 
political practices. This analysis is a continued exploration of the hypothesis which 
focuses its attention on explaining why and how Pakistan’s political practice was 
produced.
6.2 The grounding of discourse analysis   
The remit here is to ground the surface linguistic exploration (discourse analysis) 
conducted in the previous chapter within a stratified ontological framework, as 
opposed to a relativist-conflated ontology. This analysis stems from a philosophically 
realist position which posits the existence of extra-discursive and often unobservable 
structures underlying the social world. What this implies is that a focus on empirical 
regularities (such as regular discursive constructions) is important but not sufficient 
in explaining the way the world works158. From this approach, discourse has a pivotal 
mediating and productive role in constructing the social world nevertheless, this 

158Althoughpoststructuralistapproachesdonotadheretoastrictempiricismneverthelessin
practicalitytheirmethodologyoftenbeliesastrongempiricistapproach.Thisisbecause
poststructuralismpositsthatourunderstandingofanexternal,independentmaterial‘reality’isonly
madepossiblethroughthemediumoftextanddiscourse.Thismeansthatobservabletextsarethe
onlywaytoengagewithanexternalreality.Inessencethenitistheepistemologyofpositivismthat
hasbeenchallengedbypoststructuralists(theapplicabilityofthescientificmethod)andnottheflat
ontologyofpositivism.Incontrastacriticalrealismisintentlyfocussedonquestionsofontology
positingamorerobustdistancefrompositivism’sempiricismbyputtingforwardastratifiedontology
andthepossibilityoftranscendentalargumentationinconceptualisingquestionsofontology.
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understanding is embedded in the notion that, ontological structures underlying the 
social world are ‘generative’ to the extent that they give rise to particular social 
constructions. However, it is important to note that this approach must not be 
confused with a structuralist/materialist stance for which the social world is wholly
reducible to the operation of underlying structures. Rather, critical realism also 
acknowledges the causal powers of other variables i.e. the role of human agency159
and discursive formations in its theorisations of the production of political reality. In 
short, a critical realist philosophy refuses to engage with theoretical reductionism of 
either the crude materialist kind or one that denies the operation of structures.
In terms of the thought process driving the analysis of this chapter, the main task 
involves taking Pakistan’s political discourse and asking: how is this specific 
representation possible?; what are the fundamentally constitutive conditions that 
make this discourse possible? The following sections will proceed to the examination 
of the extra-discursive social structures and contexts that potentially impinge on 
Pakistan’s political discourse. The aim here is to demonstrate the connections 
between wider structures and a localised discourse. The chapter begins by first 
considering the way in which power is structured in the wider global context and 
how this ‘ontological structure’ bears down on the discourse in question. Secondly, 
the chapter will focus on identifying the domestic conditions within Pakistan that are 
connected to the emergence of the discourse. In both explorations, the analysis will 
determine that these underlying contexts are important ‘conditions of existence’, in 
the sense that, in the absence of these underlying contexts the discourse would cease 

159RefertoChapterfour,foranextendeddiscussionofBhaskar’sTMSAmodelwhichtheorisesthe
dialecticalrelationshipbetweenagencyandstructure.
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to exist in its current shape and form. In this way the chapter will argue that these 
wider social contexts are connected to the political discourse under scrutiny and 
ultimately the ensuing political practice taken by Pakistan in the aftermath of 9/11. 
Before concluding this chapter, the analysis will also theorise how the role of human 
agency specifically the role of President Musharraf was also ‘productive’ in terms of 
guiding the direction and substance of Pakistan’s political discourse. The analysis in 
the previous chapter for instance clearly identifies Musharraf as one of the most 
vocal proponents in terms of pushing forward the specific world-views considered in 
the chapter five. Consequently, in the context of this study this observation makes it 
necessary to explain more thoroughly how the role of human agency is theorised in 
terms of the production of political action specific to this particular case-study.  
Analytically then, the thesis moves in the direction of a multi-causal explanation in 
terms of the production of the specific political reality and political action in Pakistan 
by identifying social structures, human agency and discourse in this production.
6.3 The nature US global power: a structural condition? 
It is useful to begin the analysis here with an explicit recognition that contemporary 
world politics or the international system is distinguished by the entrenchment of 
structures of global power that tilt in the favour of the US. This is a relatively 
enduring and underlying social structure and context of contemporary world politics, 
and possesses ‘productive’ or causal powers. These ideas will be addressed by first 
identifying the specific properties of this social context by examining the nature and 
operation of US power in contemporary world politics. The academic debate around 
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the nature and operation of US power is substantial and subject to much debate 
consequently, it would be impracticable to misleadingly assume that the entirety of 
this debate can be addressed within this chapter. However, I do wish to engage in a 
limited exchange by attending to the main contours of a US global structure of 
power. In latter sections, the debate focuses more precisely on how this underlying 
context must be seen as causally connected to the emergence of world-views in 
Pakistan during the time-frame under investigation.
Within the wider literature many writers locate US global power as a specific 
outcome of its leading position in the capitalist global economy and theorise close 
links between the notion of modern imperial power and the system of capitalism160.
Much of the scholarship explains US behavioural patterns within a framework that 
emphasises US concern in maintaining its primary position in the global market. 
Colas (2007) for instance, argues that the US is consistently engaged with developing 
capitalist markets across the world with the aim to maintaining US dominance in the 
global market economy. Similarly, Saull (2008:310) suggests that the explicit longer-
term strategy of the US is the,  
maintenance of its military-geopolitical preponderance over other major 
powers and any potential rival or coalition of rivals, and its continued 
leadership and dominance within the international capitalist economy, such that 
the United States…secures disproportionate economic (and other) benefits 

160Seeforinstance:Stokes,D.(2005)TheHeartofEmpire?TheorisingUSEmpireinaneraof
transnationalcapitalism.ThirdWorldQuarterly,Vol.26.2:217236(2005).Mabee,B.(2004).
Discourseofempire:theUS‘empire’,globalizationandinternationalrelations.ThirdWorld
Quarterly,Vol.24.8:13591378(2004).AlsoColas,A.(2007).Empire.Cambridge:PolityPress
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from the organization and operation of this system’. To this end then ‘policy 
instruments – economic, military, ideological and cultural – [are] deployed to 
realize its strategic objectives. 
For Saull, these strategic objectives have remained the same since 1945 to the extent 
that enduring patterns of hierarchy and dominance have emerged. In a similar vein, 
and although not concerned exclusively with the United States, Gruffydd-Jones 
(2008) also draws attention to the history of colonization which structured the global 
distribution of property and power to the extent that it entrenched enduring social 
relations and structures that favour countries located in the northern hemisphere.
However, this is not to suggest that unequal levels of social power have an 
exclusively material base. Instead and importantly, sets of discursive practices 
justify, sustain and reproduce this social power.  Poststructuralist writers such as 
Edward Said (1979) have been concerned with the deconstruction of international 
discourses and lay emphasis on the political nature of (international) discursive 
regimes of truth. Leong (2003) for instance, working within a discursive framework 
focuses on demonstrating the links between an older colonial discourse and 
contemporary discourses shaping international space. Leong’s (2002:3) analysis 
focuses on a US power and he argues that the ‘creation of the terms, ‘superpower’ or 
‘great power’, euphemistically allows a substitution for imperial power, suggesting a 
country’s structural possession of power while remaining vague about its use and 
avoiding the moral aversion to a concept like imperialism’. Leong’s work 
vociferously engages with demonstrating ‘disguised and subversive’ forms of 
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American domination in the international system arguing that the division between 
an imperial past and the contemporary ‘progressive’ international order is false. 
Leong’s argument is focused in many ways on suggesting the continuity of imperial 
structures of power, he writes, that ‘if these places [Third World] were once 
primitive and uncivilized, they are now variously represented as impoverished, war-
torn, or subjected to despotic rule’ (Leong 2003:3). Thus, we may say that there is a 
material/power hierarchy within the international system which is productive or 
consequential. Further, this material base of power is in many ways buttressed and 
reproduced by a set of discursive practices which often obscure the histories 
associated with the development of unequal power relations.    
Traditionally imperialism as a concept has been associated with territorial conquest 
and expansion although Saull (2008) suggests a reworking of this definition so that it 
is more attentive to the transnational nature of contemporary structures of power. 
Saull argues that an imperial relation can be defined as a particular authority 
relationship between two state entities so that if we assume that hierarchy and 
dominance figure at one end of the spectrum of social relations then the other end is 
characterized by political relations defined by equality and autonomy. In this 
definition, imperialism refers to social relations characterized by hierarchy and 
dominance. For many then, empire or imperial relations in the contemporary world 
has less to do with a notion of territorial empire and more resonance with ‘empire’ as 
defined by the particular organization of political space within ‘sovereign’ states. 
The notion here is that that the modern US ‘empire’ is more concerned with the 
organisation of ‘space’ within seemingly ‘sovereign’ states, so that such space is 
organized in a way that benefits the reproduction of global power. Consequently, 
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rather than territorial expansion, modern forms of imperialism are more concerned 
with a drive towards social expansion across borders to create ‘a more hegemonic or 
politically coordinated form of governance’ in order to better realize the reproduction 
of global structures of American power (Saull 2008:310).  Despite the dissolution of 
empire as a wholly territorial phenomenon, nevertheless notions of exploitation and 
domination are retained, but now conceptualized in a more transnational and 
hegemonic sense (peripheral states are still exploited for the benefit of the core).  But 
if direct force, coercion and territorial conquest are not the defining characteristics of 
the modern imperial structures of power then how might one conceptualise the 
operation of imperial social relations? Saull argues that, on the ground, American 
global power and its lead position in the capitalist economy is sustained by local 
political elites within sovereign states who he refers to as ‘local intermediaries’. 
These intermediaries allow and legitimise particular local arrangements that 
reproduce global structures of power.  For instance, adopting US inspired economic 
and political arrangements (economic liberalism, democracy) in local circumstances 
means that in response the imperial power ‘permits varyingly – but significant  - 
degrees of internal political autonomy for those states associated with the American 
imperium’ (Saull 2008:315). 
6.4 Exploring causality: Ontological structure and political discourse in 
Pakistan
Arguably then, we may conceptualise the reproduction of US power as having both 
material and discursive facets. As the above argument proposes, its material 
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reproduction involves the maintenance of its lead capitalist position through the 
organizing of political space within states in the international system. This 
impingement is enabled by a discourse normalizing the universality of American 
values. It is widely known that the US has consistently been involved in ‘regime 
changes’ in all corners of the globe to ensure that US interests, principally economic 
interests are not jeopardized by the installation of hostile governments. In Pakistan 
for instance, the military establishment has historically enjoyed favour from the US, 
principally because it has been the dominant decision-maker in the local context. 
These ‘favours’ have involved large sums of US funds to develop and accessorize the 
military to fight America’s war’s in the region. In the face of Soviet expansionism 
for instance, the US was concerned to maintain its economic hegemony and thus 
fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan may be seen as part of a long-term strategy aimed 
to ensure the US as the lead capitalist economy. However, the relationship between 
the US and Pakistan’s military establishment has been a case of mutual interests 
since Pakistan especially during the long Cold war years gained not only funds but 
also a strong potential bulwark against a much bigger Indian enemy. In this regard 
however, it is important to draw attention to the potential causality of this global 
structure of power in which the US is materially powerful i.e. that this social 
structure exists and is potentially productive. On the whole, the operation of power is 
‘soft’ or achieved through a Gramscian hegemony in which unequal economic and 
political relations are largely achieved through consent and without overt coercion. 
Joseph Nye in particular has developed the notion of ‘soft’ power as a means of 
exercising hegemony. In Nye’s conception ‘soft’ power can be achieved through 
diplomacy and the dissemination of information which seeks to dominate the global 
debate and discourse on cultural values, acceptable ideologies and commonly 
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accepted human values. However, where ‘soft’ power seemingly fails to elicit 
consensual compliance then the US is not averse to using ‘hard’ power characterized 
by threat and the use of military force, economic pressure and sanctions.  In this 
context, and citing Maier, Saull (2008:312) argues that, ‘we might regard hegemony 
as a state of “potential empire” where attempts to increase autonomy in peripheral 
zones are likely to trigger imperial responses exposing the iron fist of empire’ (Saull 
2008:312). Examples to this effect could include the imposition of US sanctions 
during the 1990s when Pakistan continued with its pursuance of nuclear weapons 
technology, the explosion of nuclear devices in May 1998161, and finally the military 
take-over in Pakistan on October 12th, 1999 (Askari-Rizvi 2004). The potentiality of 
the ‘iron fist’ was more explicitly and forcefully articulated in the wake of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks when the United States made clear that it was prepared to bomb 
Pakistan ‘back to the Stone-Age162’ (Musharraf 2006:201) i.e. either exhibit 
voluntarily compliance or experience the full force of ‘potential empire’.   
From a critical realist theoretical perspective, the purpose of the discussion above is 
to argue that the powers and properties of the favourable social position occupied by 

161WhichhadoccurredinresponsetosimilarexplosionbyIndiaearlierinthesamemonth.
162Musharraf(2006:201)writesinhisautobiographythatUSdeputysecretaryofStateRichard
Armitage‘inwhathastobethemostundiplomaticstatementevermade,Armitageaddedtowhat
ColinPowellhadsaidtomeandtoldthedirectorgeneralnotonlythatwehadtodecidewhetherwe
werewithAmericaorwiththeterrorists,butthatifwechosetheterrorists,thenweshouldbe
preparedtobebombedbacktotheStoneAge.Thiswasashockinglybarefacedthreat,butitwas
obviousthattheUnitedStateshaddecidedtohitback,andhitbackhard.’Itmustbenotedthat
RichardArmitagelaterdeniedemployingthisphraseand,consequentlyitwouldbewrongto
formallyassociate‘bombingbacktotheStoneAge’withofficialUSpolicytowardsPakistan.
Meanwhile,‘Bushwassurethatthosewordswouldnothavebeenused’(Ali2008:145).
Nevertheless,thepointisnottoevaluate‘truth’intermsofwhethertheexactphrasewasusedby
Armitagerathertheissueiswiththeunderlyingrepresentationormessagebeingarticulated.Other
more‘polite’words/phrasescouldequallybeusedtothateffect.
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the US are relational163 and inherent whether they are exercised or not164. The point 
here is that, there is potential for their explicit manifestation and this in itself must be 
conceptualized as a constraining structure within which Pakistan is embedded. What 
this means is that, though on the surface formal political authority of states such as 
Pakistan exists nevertheless it must be acknowledged that in most cases this is 
buttressed by the sheer economic inequality within and between states. This is a 
structural condition from which states in the international system cannot escape; 
indeed it is an underlying context that is generative and causal in relation to ‘what get 
constructed’. A social position has the potential to ‘effect’, to shape, to direct – it is 
an inherent characteristic of the position - rather than the state/individual that 
occupies the position. From this perspective then, analysing the causal effects of the 
social position of the US as it relates to Pakistan’s political discourse is an important 
step in terms of clarifying why the object appears in its current form. So for instance, 
the emergence of a specific discourse can only really be comprehended when the 
analysis takes into account this wider social context within which the emergence of 
the discourse is necessarily embedded. This appreciation discards the 
poststructuralist approach to the construction of social reality as being divorced from 
the impingement of enduring and pre-existing social and material structures and 
contexts.

163Socialpowerissomethingthatisgainednotinisolationbutinarelationshipwithotherentities,
wecanthussaythatsocialpowerisinherentlyrelational.Forinstance,thesocialpoweroftheglobal
NorthisonlyrealisedwhenitisjuxtaposedtotheSouth.
164StrictlyspeakingwithinBhaskar’scriticalrealism,itisthesocialpositionthatispowerfulandnot
theindividual(i.e.theUS)whooccupiestheposition.Althoughsocialpositionsareoccupiedby
individualsorinourcasestateentitiesitisimportanttonotethatthepowerorcausalitytheyare
associatedwithisanattributeofthesocialpositionandnottheindividualorentity.Sayer(1992)for
instance,referringtohousingtenurearguesthatitisthesocialpositionofthelandlordthatcauses
him/hertobepaidrentandnotthequalitiesoftheindividualperse.Inasimilarway,Danermarket
al.(2002:54)notethat‘investors‘profitpower’isnotprimarilybasedonpersonalqualitiesbuton
thesocialrelationbetweencapitalandwagelabour;men’ssocialsurplusvaluecomparedtothatof
womenisnotbasedoncertainmaleandfemalecharacteristicsrespectively,butisrenderedpossible
duetosocialandpatriarchalgenderrelations’.

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This discussion will not dwell too long or take issue with the material conditions that 
afford US global dominance nor the intricacies of the discursive (re)production of 
this dominance. Rather the objective is to explore the relationship between this 
global structure of power conceptualised in the discussion above as an ontological 
structure and its connections with the emergence of the specific political discourse 
which buttressed Pakistan’s political practice. The dominant theme that emerges 
from the analysis here is that in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks the United States 
was distinctly and vociferously involved in the proliferation of a specific world-view 
or representation that assigned meaning and interpretation to the terrorist attacks. 
This representation involved the projection of the attacks on US soil as an attack on 
the ‘entire world’, and the ensuing discussion will demonstrate how the US drew on 
notions of ‘civilisation’ and ‘truth’ to develop this theme. However, it is important to 
note that this ability to ensure the wide-scale dominance of a hegemonic 
representation of the events of 9/11 is only possible owing to the socially powerful 
position alluded to earlier. The dissemination of information in the aftermath of 9/11 
was largely initiated and originated from the US. If we accept that the social power 
of the US is an enduring and important underlying structural context of 
contemporary world politics, having both material and discursive facets, then it is 
important to explore how that power was operationalised or how its ‘causality’ 
operated and was effectual in relation to Pakistan’s political discourse and practice.
In relating the connection between the operation of US power and Pakistan’s 
discourse and practice, the analysis focuses principally on a specific narrative widely 
referred to as the text of ‘the war on terrorism’ articulated by the US and which 
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effectively defined and produced international subjects and objects. The argument 
here is that, the ontological structure operated ‘causality’ through a hegemonic 
discourse that was essentially productive. A distinctive feature of this discourse was 
the way in which it constructed subjects, at the international level, along the 
oppositional and hierarchical dimensions of ‘good’ and ‘evil’.  In this conception, the 
US was discursively located at the pinnacle of the ‘good’ spectrum. Following the 
terrorist attacks of 2001, the Bush administration drew on an amalgam of 
orientalist165 and ethnocentric166 narratives which assume a superiority/inferiority 
binary categorisation between the North/South, East/West, first world/third world. 
This meant that the terrorist attacks, were interpreted as of supreme significance and 
intimately connected to the oppositional notions of good/evil, in effect erasing the 
history and context within which the terrorist attacks took place. Thus, the dominant 
representation rests on articulating that this is an attack on the whole world and all 
that is good and truthful and that this is a war of the ‘civilised’ against the 
‘uncivilised’.  It would be useful to examine the now famous assertion of President 
Bush ‘you are either with us or with the terrorists’ in his speech delivered to the Joint 
Session of the Congress,

165Saidusestheword‘orientalism’torefertoasetofdiscursivepracticesemployedwithinWestern
AngloEuropeanculturestoconstructthe‘orient’(theeast)asaninferiorotheroftheoccident(the
west)–suchdiscursivepracticesthenjustifyingandlegitimizingoccidentalcontrolovertheregionof
theworldcategorizedasorient.InthiscontextJackson(2007)hasarguedthatthecontemporary
discourseofIslamicterrorism,asarticulatedby‘terrorismexperts’unproblematicallydraws
extensivelyonalongtraditionoforientalistscholarshipandatraditionofhostilecultural
stereotypingofMuslims.Jackson(2007:398399)contendsthatthese‘experts’havecloselinkstoUS
policymakingcirclesandthereforethisspecificdiscourseispoliticallyinfluentialinthatit
denaturalisesresponsesassociatedwithnegotiation,appeasementorcompromise.
166Jackson(2005:chapter2)notesthatwemayseetheresponseto9/11asethnocentric,inthe
sensethat,thetragedyoccurringintheUSonSeptember2001wasinterpretedas‘supremely
catastrophic,thedayeverythingchanged,thepinnacle–arguablytheHiroshimaexplosionof1945
wasfarmorehorrific’.
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…And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. 
Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with 
us, or you are with the terrorists. [Applause] From this day forward, any nation 
that continues to harbour or support terrorism will be regarded by the United 
States as a hostile regime…this is the world’s fight. This is civilisations fight. 
This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and 
freedom….the civilised world is rallying to America’s side.167
Studying a large corpus of speech data, Collet and Najem (2005) argue that the US 
narrative following the September 11th attacks constructs two ‘us-groups’. In the first 
instance, this consists mainly of America and the American people presented as ‘a 
great people’, ‘we’re the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world’ 
and ‘no-one will keep that light from shining’168. In the second instance, there is 
another ‘us-group’ comprising of ‘friends’ and allies who embrace American values 
and are willing to defend these against terrorism’. As Jackson (2005:48) notes, much 
of these constructions are couched within a larger meta-narrative that posits the 
notion of civilisation versus barbarianism. This framework, or ‘grid of intelligibility’ 
having a far longer history in the American psyche and forming part of the basic 
foundational myths of America namely in which the ‘white Christian civilization is 
opposed by a “savage” racial enemy’ i.e. the indigenous Indian peoples of America 
(Jackson 2005). When Ambassador Baker argued that this was, ‘an attack not just on 
the United States but on enlightened civilised societies everywhere. It was a strike 

167PresidentGeorgeW.Bush:AddresstoaJointSessionofCongressandtheAmericanpeople,
September20,2001.
168RemarksbyPresidentGeorgeW.Bushaddresstothenation,TheOvalOffice,September11,
2001.
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against those values that separate us from animal – compassion, tolerance, mercy’169
the narrative again reinforces the notion that if you are not with the US then you 
must necessarily occupy the barbarian group. Disturbingly, Jackson (2005:49) notes 
the way in which the discourse was productive in that it normalised and legitimised 
(for some) the abuse of prisoners. In constructing the ‘other’ in such crude terms as 
‘barbarian’, ‘animal’, ‘savage’, ‘cruel’, ‘evil’  
an important real-world effect of this language is to create the conditions for 
abuse and torture against terrorist suspects: if they are animals, barbarians and 
savages then they have no ‘human’ qualities and no ‘human’ rights and can be 
treated as animals without regret and pity. The image of the naked prisoner 
being dragged on a leash is the elemental realisation of this discursively 
constructed relationship – the civilised American soldier subduing the savage 
barbarian.
The Bush administration thus engaged in an intensely prolific project to fix the 
meanings of the events – the principal narrative posited that the terrorist attacks were 
simply and uncategorically a demonstration of evil (them) versus good (us) and were 
embedded within an overarching meta-narrative of civilisation versus barbarianism 
(ibid). Within this narrative then, and as President Bush put it, ‘either you are with us 
or with the terrorists’ the clear implication is that: either you are good, innocent, 
rational, and if you are ‘not with us’ then you must necessarily occupy the binary 
opposite of good, innocent and rational. Arguably, in engaging in such a discursive 

169Baker,23rdSeptember2001.
274



proposition the US reproduced its own global ascendancy however equally 
importantly, it produced two subjects ‘us’ and ‘them’ and nations were asked to 
occupy either position.  One of the most powerful articulations of this came from 
Bush’s State of the Union address where he mentions the ‘axis of evil’, which he 
uses to refer to the assumed alliances between those states defined as ‘rogue’ by the 
US and the terrorists that were involved in the attacks on the US. Bush states that, 
States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to 
threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these 
regimes pose a grave and growing danger. Thy could provide arms to terrorists 
giving them the means to match their hatred….I will not wait on events, while 
dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United 
States of America will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to 
threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons170
As Jackson (2005) quite rightly notes, US discourse makes terrorists and ‘rogue 
states’ synonymous, they are in effect discursively discussed as one and the same 
thing. The implication being that those states that diverge from the dominant US 
interpretation and narration of events must occupy the ‘them’ group and were then by 
default ‘rogue’ and necessarily terrorists. Consequently, the narrative leaves very 
little room for alternative constructions and subject-positions171.

170Bush29January2002.
171Itisdifficulthereowingtotheconfinesofthisstudytofullypresentmoreexamplesandevidence
ofsuchconstructionswithintheUSnarrativehoweverColletandNajam(2005)takingacontent
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Arguably then, the singular most productive capacity of the ‘war on terror’ narrative 
was precisely this delineation of this either ‘us’ or ‘them’ groupings and its explicit 
invitation for states to vociferously define their subject-position in relation to these 
categories. On its part, Pakistan by taking up the specific position of ‘US ally’ is thus 
not taking up the category ‘bad’, ‘evil’, ‘irresponsible’, ‘irrational, ‘belligerent’ as 
defined by a hegemonic world-view. Of course, implicitly and occasionally 
explicitly, underlying the occupancy of the subject-position ‘US ally’ is the potential 
threat of US force which has been conceptualised as a structural condition of the 
wider environment in which Pakistan is embedded and which does not require 
explicit articulation. The point is that, this potentiality exists whether it is manifested 
in experience or not, implying that the political discourse cannot be conceptualised as 
outside of this antecedent social structure and must be embedded in such contexts. 
Initially this potentiality of the deployment US force is implicit in the political 
articulations evident particularly in the attention given to making the ‘right decision’ 
in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. As Musharraf argued, ‘if we make wrong 
decisions in this crisis, it can lead to the very worse consequences. On the other 
hand, if we take right decisions, its results will be good. The negative consequences 
can endanger Pakistan's integrity and solidarity’172. However,  notably as the ‘war 
on terror’ dragged on the political discourse in Pakistan began to rely less on 
articulating an implicit threat from the US as connected to its ‘co-operative’ political 
practices and instead began to rely on discursive strategies that emphasized 
Pakistan’s ownership and stake in the war against the Taliban. In this conception, the 

analysiskindofapproachaffirmthekindofconclusionsmadehere.Jackson(2005)alsoundertakesa
comprehensivestudyofUSnarrativesfollowingtheaftermathofSeptember11,2001.
172Musharraf,September19,2001.
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interests of Pakistan and the United States happened to simply coincide, thus 
justifying Pakistan’s military strategy. 
Furthermore, the discursive construction of the Taliban as the most significant Other 
in relation to the Pakistani Self was again something that emerged from the way that 
the US was involved in signifying the irrationality and barbarity of the Taliban. The 
Pakistani construction of the Taliban as the significant hostile Other ,in the latter 
years of the continuing ‘war on terror’, is directly linked to the impingement of the 
entrenched structures of global power. In particular, this is noteworthy simply 
because this discursive articulation began to draw attention away from Pakistan’s 
principal Other i.e. India who has historically occupied the position of principal 
Other’ in Pakistan’s discourse. Domestically, the Taliban are gradually seen to be 
constructed within the discourse very much in line with the Bush administration’s 
conception of the ‘them’ group consisting of the irrational. If we look to the political 
discourse and the kind of discursive choices that were made, the specific meanings 
attached to the 9/11 events and the way in which Pakistan’s role in international  
space was envisaged, it is difficult to concede that these interpretations, meanings 
and discourse could have emerged from a vacuum. The contention of this chapter is 
that this analysis of the political discourse needs also to take into account the extra-
discursive preconditions that accommodate the discourse in its specific form, in other 
words, the analysis needs an appreciation of those conditions without which the 
discourse would cease to exist. These extra-discursive structures are seen as effective 
or liable in terms of generating particular constructions whilst making it more 
difficult for alternative constructions thus ultimately conditioning the emergence of a 
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particular social world. In this sense, Pakistan’s political practices such as the 
granting of airspace to the US, or the establishment of a number of US bases within 
Pakistani territory flows directly from this kind of subject-positioning alluded to 
earlier. If Pakistan is not a terrorist or ‘rogue’ state then the logical conclusion of the 
dominant narrative is that Pakistan would engage in ‘joint co-operation’ with the US 
in the ‘war on terror’.  
However, it is important to note that the preceding discussion should not be seen as 
indicative of a cause-effect relationship in that US dictates are unproblematically and 
automatically realised or affected in relation to Pakistan. The ‘cause-effect’ is an 
inadequate model to employ in the social sciences where ‘causes’ are often multiple 
and intertwined rather, the argument is that the US as a possessor of global social 
power based on it relational position vis-à-vis other states has the potentiality to 
shape events/processes. If we recall, Bhaskar has argued for a focus on the powers 
and properties of ontological objects rather than an exclusive focus on their actual 
(empirical) manifestation. The critical realist notion of ‘potentiality’ implies a 
different relationship between a power and an effect than does a regularity-
deterministic ‘cause-effect’ model.  The inadequacy of a strict application of the 
cause-effect model is demonstrated if we consider, that during much of the 1990s, 
Pakistan faced growing US criticism for its support of the Taliban government in 
Afghanistan. Nevertheless, and despite US opposition, Pakistan continued its 
commitment to the Taliban regime despite the adverse reputation it invited. 
Potentiality is thus seen here as just that - potentiality- and should not be confused 
with cause-effect.
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6.5 Depth ontology: An exploration of domestic structures
In further engaging with a depth ontological inquiry it is important to identify 
specific domestic conditions within Pakistan as casually relevant to the emergence of 
the particular discursive constructions witnessed in the aftermath of the September 
11th attacks. Again, it is important to reiterate that the objective here is to take the 
political discourse as the starting point and then ‘move backwards’ in the sense that 
the analysis theorises the conditions that sustain and facilitate the discourse. This step 
paves the way for a more holistic and rigorous social explanation by accounting for 
why the discourse emerges as it does. These ‘conditions of existence’ are seen as 
causal, since the argument is, that in their absence the discourse would cease to exist 
in its current form. In the discussion to follow, the argument is that a specific cultural 
context or a general system of representation thriving within Pakistan must be seen 
as an important prerequisite to the operation of the discourse. What is meant by this 
is that a peculiar ‘grid of intelligibility’, whose principal and historical focus has 
been on articulating security threats forms a pervasive feature of Pakistani society 
and can be theorised as a necessary underlying structural context in relation to our 
object of analysis. Secondly, the specific power structure namely the centralisation of 
socio-economic power within Pakistan provides the material conditions within which 
discursive constructions articulated by the political elite are largely unchallenged and 
affords the basis for their sustenance. This can be seen, in part, as a material 
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unfolding of ideational constructs173. The sections below will seek to advance this 
argument and clarify the way in which these domestic contexts are causally 
connected to the emergence of specific constructions in the political discourse.
In the first instance, this study proposes that in order for (political) constructions to 
make sense, in order for them to be relevant to the public recipients it is clear that 
they need (or make an attempt at least) to fit into the prevailing general system of 
representation or an existing cultural context174. This point is highlighted in order to 
emphasise that it is not possible to abruptly discursively construct an object such as a 
‘threat’ without there being a prior cultural understanding of ‘what’ constitutes a 
threat and from which expected corner. In Pakistan’s case, the most striking 
historical feature has been the state’s focus on articulating threat from neighbouring 
India.  As an earlier chapter sought to explain, much of this was done through a 
discourse that represented the Self as Islamic and inherently good as opposed to the 
dirty, alien, irrational Hindu Other.  What is significant here is the extent and 
pervasiveness of this ‘regime of truth’ which normalised the notion that all internal 
crises’ were a result of Indian meddling in Pakistan’s affairs. The Indian adversary 
was represented as being innately possessed with a perpetual desire to either 
completely annihilate Pakistan or to ‘break it from within’ through fanning internal 
dissent. Consequently, Pakistan’s ruling elites displayed extreme sensitivity to any 
kind of internal discord regardless of its nature or the demands of the dissidents175.

173Ifwerecallcriticalrealismdoesnotsubscribetothetheoreticalreductionismthatawholly
ideationalapproachtorealitysupposes.
174Idefineculturalcontextasthetotalityofmeanings,ideas,beliefs,knowledgethataresharedbya
groupofpeopleataparticularhistoricallocation.
175ThefalloutofthispolicyofquashinginternaldissentandbrandingitaproductofIndiandesigns
todestabilisePakistanisclearlyevidentintherelativelyrecentandseriousinternalrebellionstaking
placeintheBaluchistanprovince.
280



Of course, this is not to suggest that these constructions or representations emerged 
from a void. There were issues and crisis’ between India and Pakistan, the never-
ending Kashmir dispute for instance, the role of India in the secession of East 
Pakistan, the dispute over river waters, the three open wars of 1947-48, 1965 and 
1971, and not forgetting the Kargil episode of 1999. From a critical realist 
perspective, a discourse such as this one is afforded by specific extra-discursive 
conditions and as such can never be entirely isolated or divorced from the wider 
structural contexts within which it is embedded. Of course this view immediately 
negates the notion that war, threat or conflict are exclusively ideational or discursive 
constructs rather, there are real referents in terms of ‘ontological conditions’ that 
propel particular narratives176. However, the discussion will not take issue here with 
the conditions that afforded the emergence of these specific historical representations 
rather, attention is drawn to the persistence and pervasiveness of this ‘grid of 
intelligibility’ and its unprecedented dominance within Pakistani society177.
This security narrative enjoyed dominance at all levels of Pakistani society and most 
importantly permeated the world-view of Pakistan’s ruling elites who can be 
described as belonging to an ‘epistemic community’ (Haas 1992). A focus on 
political elites is warranted because in a highly centralised country like Pakistan the 
business of the state is largely determined by political elites who, on the whole, 
manoeuvre with limited public input into government policies (Waseem 2002).  
Within Pakistan, the pervasiveness of the ‘regime of truth’ institutionalising ‘threat’ 

176Forinstance,depthontologicalstructuresaccountingfortheemergenceofnarrativescouldbe
thegeostrategiclocationofPakistan,thelackofnationalunity,thelackofdemocraticoutletsof
expression,thebelligerencyofIndiaandsoon.
177Iusetheterm‘unprecedented’toindicatethatfollowingPakistan’smedialiberalizationin2002
debateandcounterdiscoursesaregivenmore‘airtime’.
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amongst the political elite means that they can be described as belonging to a specific 
epistemic community. Interestingly, within the IR literature such links between 
dominant modes of understanding amongst power elites and the political practices 
that arise from such contexts have to some extent been explored by scholars working 
with the notion of a ‘strategic culture’. The scholarship in this area seeks to explain 
continuity and change in national security policies as well as predict future political 
practice by deconstructing a state’s ‘strategic culture’. A strategic culture in this 
conception is loosely defined as the sum total of such things as collective ideas, 
beliefs, fears, ambitions, aims and traditions within which elite decision-making is 
located. More specifically, those involved in the study of strategic culture aim to 
provide an alternative framework that can explain (and predict) why certain policy 
options (and not others) are pursued by states particularly when realist assumptions 
would infer and assume an alternative policy perusal. Some key elements of 
Pakistan’s strategic culture can be listed below:178
 Opposition to Indian hegemony. Pakistani political and military elites are 
unified in their opposition to Indian hegemony as a basis for a peaceful and 
durable regional order. 
 Primacy of defence requirements. Regardless of whether the Pakistan 
government was run by civilians or the military defence has always been the 
country’s top budgetary priority. Although Pakistan continues to experience 
intense poverty, poor infrastructure, a weak educational system, and nearly 
non-existent social services, defence expenditures run very high. 

178Thisisnotanexhaustivelist.ThisabridgedversionhasbeensourcedfromLavoy(2005).
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 Identification with conservative Islamic causes. The emphasis on Muslim 
nationalism that brought Pakistan into being continues to play an important 
role in shaping its national identity and foreign relations. 
The argument of strategic culture analysts is that these ‘variables’ cohere to form a 
strategic culture or context which then acts as a lens through which policy decisions 
are made. Specifically, the postulation is that a strategic culture enables and 
constrains the thought and action of power elites through the provision of a limited 
range of choices. Although strategic culture analysts are primarily concerned with 
national security policies, their analyses are interesting particularly because they 
implicitly point towards the causal powers of strategic cultures. In this sense, an 
argument can be made that an embedded strategic culture or set of beliefs and values 
held amongst Pakistan’s power elites provides a prism or a lens through which a 
particular ‘world’ is visible. Indeed, this is a world in which the prime threat and 
danger comes from India, to the extent that all other threats are overshadowed. The 
pervasiveness of this world-view amongst power elites is such that domestic policy 
and foreign policy is enacted in light of this strategic culture. Moreover, it explains 
the continuity in Pakistan’s foreign policy despite regime changes.  
This pervasive and all-encompassing system of representation is a significant 
underlying contextual feature of Pakistan’s political life. It is significant because, 
although it is an essentially discursive phenomena, albeit having its own ontological 
structures that facilitate its emergence, nevertheless its historical endurance signifies 
that it needs conceptualising as an extra-discursive and ontological structural context. 
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If we now recall the kind of discursive constructions identified in the data set it 
becomes clear that these tend to tap into this historically and over-arching meta-
narrative already prevalent at all levels of Pakistani society. For instance, the 
representation of exceptional threat from India in the aftermath of the September 11th
attacks draws on a prior populist understanding of the ‘Indian enemy’ as awaiting an 
opportunity to destroy Pakistan; this harks back to the national narrative which 
insists that India has never been able to reconcile itself with the rationale for 
partition179. A threat from India is easy to identify with, for the vast majority of 
Pakistanis, and often evokes strong sentiments, and it is a result of the existence of 
such pervasive cultural understandings that the notion of ‘exceptional threat’ is able 
to thrive. Arguably, if we hypothesis the absence of such a cultural context in 
Pakistan’s case, then it is difficult to discern how the official discourse would have 
articulated exceptional threat, and moreover whether it would be taken on by the 
populace. It is not a coincidence that Musharraf’s September 19th speech and 
subsequent official articulations draw in the ‘India threat’ in order to locate meaning. 
In short, since a specific pervasive cultural understanding exists which suggests that 
Pakistan is constantly threatened by a deceitful enemy, then it becomes relatively 
easier to unexpectedly (as occurred following September 11th, 2001) draw on such a 
notion of threat. The point here is that, the potency of the dominant normative 
structure within Pakistan and the idea that this a precondition for the understanding 
and success of our object of analysis ‘the discourse’ is premised on the existence of 
such a cultural context within which the meanings articulated are easily grasped. 

179Thispopulistbeliefaccruedsignificantlegitimacyduringthelatter1980sandthroughoutthe
1990swhentherightwingBJPbegantodominateIndianpolitics.TheBJPopenlyquestioned
partitionandhasbeenaccusedofincitingviolenceagainstIndianMuslims.TheBabrimosque
incidenceforinstanceoccurredduringtheirtenure.TheriseofthisHindutvapoliticsinIndiathen
confirmstherepresentationoftheHinduOtherasanopenenemyofMuslims.
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One of the material consequences of the ‘regime of truth’ has been the centralisation 
of political power within Pakistan in the hands of the military establishment. In short, 
from the very beginning, the prevailing system of representation justified and 
normalised the inclusion of the military in national decision-making. This early 
entrenchment of the armed forces in the state machinery consequently resulted in the 
weak and halted development of civilian institutions and a simultaneous 
strengthening and development of the military institution within Pakistan (Talbot 
2007). The security discourse alluded to earlier was the principal justification for the 
entrenchment and pervasiveness of the army in Pakistan’s socio-political life 
additionally seeking to galvanise national integration. However, the entrenchment of 
the army in political life and the consequential non-development of civilian and 
political institutions cannot be seen as a wholly deliberated or calculated 
phenomenon. Siddiqua (2007)180 for instance, has suggested that post-colonial 
Pakistan inherited from the British Raj a strong civil bureaucracy since the Raj 
principally controlled undivided India through a powerful state bureaucracy. 
However, a pertinent point is that this arrangement continued even after 
independence in 1947 to the detriment of political institutions within Pakistan. The 
continuance of this setup had the effect that it afforded real power to the civil 
bureaucracy in post-colonial Pakistan whilst reducing political parties to the role of 
mere brokers and thus stunting their growth. Drawing on Alavi’s Marxist analysis, 
Siddiqua  (1983 in Siddiqua 2007:67) suggests that in this paradigm the state or the 
civil bureaucracy acted in the interests of three dominant classes: the landed-feudal 

180Indevelopingthistheme,SiddiquareferstotheworkofSaeedShafqat(1997),CivilMilitary
Relations,Boulder,Colo:WestviewPress,andMohammedWaseem(1994),PoliticsandtheStatein
Pakistan,Islamabad.
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class, the indigenous bourgeoisie and the metropolitan bourgeoisie. Further, the 
military’s stakes became ‘intertwined with those of these three groups making it 
imperative for the military and other groups to protect each other’s interests’, and 
Siddiqua’s work extensively documents the extent of the military’s economy. Over 
the course of time, the military’s relevance to the state became increasingly 
legitimised on the back of a specific regime of truth, and the state bureaucracy came 
to rely on the military in order to protect vested interests. In short, the ascendance of 
the military in Pakistan cannot parsimoniously be attributed to calculated self-
interest; rather this entrenchment into Pakistan’s political process needs to be 
assessed within a multi-causal framework which can appreciate such factors as the 
role of a strong state bureaucracy in the non-development of political institutions, the 
fragmented nature of Pakistan’s political leadership and the operation and 
productivity of Indo-centric security discourses. 
As the military institution became more and more involved in building a vested 
economic empire, its institutional survival began to rely much more on articulating 
binary India/Pakistan categorisations. Siddiqua (2007:23) argues that, 
the external threat from India is used to justify greater investment in defence 
rather than socioeconomic development, so there is an absence of active protest 
against the military’s infiltration into the society and economy. Over the years, 
national security has developed into a dogma almost on par with religious 
ideology….there is barely any institutional protest against the armed forces 
primacy.  
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Moreover, whenever the military took over the state machinery representative 
institutions and public organisations were kept out of operation for long periods of 
time resulting in their stagnation, and a further entrenchment of the army into the 
political process. Further, a monopolisation of communication mediums became an 
important power resource allowing the wide circulation of a discourse that elevated 
the military establishment to a position where any critique was represented as 
synonymous with treachery. This narrative is so strong and ingrained, that arguably 
even today critique of the military institution is often guarded. Thus, privileged 
access to communicative events can be seen in this context as vital to maintaining the 
hegemony of a particular world-view. However, this is not to suggest a denial of the 
context within which these representations flourish i.e. it does not deny a 
‘belligerent’ India for instance, but suggests that in the midst of alternative 
representations Pakistan’s military institution is more likely to interpret and frame 
the issue in a way that corresponds with its world-view. People, as the critical 
discourse analyst Van Dijk181 notes, are more likely to ‘tend to accept beliefs, 
knowledge and opinions from what they see as authoritative, trustworthy or credible 
sources, such as scholars, experts, professionals, or reliable media’. In Pakistan, the 
power to ‘frame’ issues has historically been concentrated in the hands of the ruling 
elite who have strong links with the military and for whom articulating the ‘India 
threat’ is bankable.

181VanDijk(2001:357).
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It is widely acknowledged that civilian governments have rarely if ever, had a free 
rein in terms of formulating policy. Whilst on the surface civilian governments have 
been elected to power, nonetheless real political power lay with the military whose 
size, expansion, funds, forays into the political landscape and general social 
dominance in Pakistan is afforded by this regime of truth. The centralisation of 
political power in the hands of the military is clearly alluded to by Musharraf in his 
autobiography who rather tellingly concedes the context within which the decision to 
co-operate with the US was made following the terrorist attacks on the US on 11th
September. Musharraf himself unwittingly alludes power in Pakistan is a ‘one-man 
show’, and that one man is the Chief of the army staff:   
having made my decision I took it to the cabinet. As expected there was some 
concern from the ministers that they had not been consulted. Doubts were also 
expressed at the corps commanders meeting that followed. In both meetings I 
went over my analysis in detail and explained how and why I had come to this 
decision. I answered every question until all doubts were removed and 
everyone was aboard. I then went on national radio and television on 
September 19 to explain my decision to the people. As I had thought, the 
reaction was limited and controllable (Musharraf 2006:206). 
Since the army wields much of the political power in Pakistan and civilian 
governments have always been accountable and sought the permission of army 
chiefs, it could be suggested that Musharraf’s decision to alter Pakistan’s rhetoric and 
policy goals were easier to initiate for a serving Chief of Army Staff (see Ali 
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2008:147, Jones and Shaikh 2006). After all, Musharraf does not need to seek 
permission of the army – since he is the army. Arguably, given the nature of power 
structures in Pakistan it is difficult to see how a civilian government in such a short 
space of time would have been able to initiate substantial discursive shifts in policy 
as regards the Taliban for instance. The argument here is that this domestic structure 
i.e. the centralisation of political power means that there is little debate and little 
public deliberation; civil society is relatively underdeveloped in Pakistan, and this is 
a condition of possibility that is causally connected to the emergence of the political 
discourse. For instance, when Musharraf in his keynote speech of September 19th
articulated exceptional threat there is little space available for the articulation of 
debate or counter-representations. This does not mean that counter-discourse does 
not exist but that the socio-political dominance of the military establishment is such 
that their voices are the ones that are heard. The suggestion here is that the existence 
of the discourse relies heavily on the way power is structured within Pakistan to the 
advantage of the military182.
6.6 Human agency as a causal variable
This project’s focus on the production of Pakistan’s political practice and the 
preceding discussion on extra-discursive elements impacting the construction of 
political reality and ensuing practice does not indicate a subscription to a crude 
materialist argument. If we recall, a materialist or structuralist argument posits the 
reductionist notion that socio-political reality can be wholly explained in terms of the 

182Perhapsademocraticsetupwouldhaveposedmoreofachallengetothedominanceofa
specificinterpretationsuchastheoneof‘exceptionalthreat’.
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effects of social structures. Indeed, in this conception the role of human agency and 
discourse are omitted in the analysis. However, the broader ontological and 
epistemological grounding of this study opposes reductionism of this sort instead 
preferring to theorise the many causal connections involved in the production of a 
specific political reality. In furthering our investigation of how and why Pakistan’s 
political discourse emerged in the shape and form it did, the discussion will now 
draw analytical attention to the transformatory role of human agency as it is relevant 
to this specific case-study. The discussion below will implicate President Musharraf 
as playing a key role in relation to the production and direction of Pakistan’s political 
discourse and the specific discursive constructions contained within it. However, for 
the moment it would be useful to briefly recall the theory underlying the inclusion of 
human agency in our analysis here.  
Chapter four noted that Bhaskar’s Transformational Model of Social Activity 
(TMSA) affords human agency distinct causal powers and properties. Although this 
conception of human agency does not reduce agents to being mere bearers of 
structure nevertheless it does insist that we define clearly what the structural 
possibilities and limits of human action are. Bhaskar proposes that agency has less 
power to ‘create’ something anew in society but possess the ability to reproduce and 
transform society. However, it is Margaret Archer (1995, 1998), who develops this 
idea in a more meaningful way by placing the notion of human agency within a time 
dimension. The gist of Archer’s argument is that societal transformation generated 
by human agency is often not immediately visible owing to its piecemeal nature but 
is evident over a longer period of time in the sense that it transforms the social 
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structure183. Critical realism does not reduce ‘social reality’ to agency, structure or 
discourse but posits the relevance of all three albeit in different ways.
In investigating the production of Pakistan political reality in the aftermath of the 
9/11 attacks we may draw connections between a critical realist theory positing the 
potential causal powers of human agency and the role of President Musharraf in 
shaping the emergence of the political discourse and practice. To this end, we may 
look to the work of Lavoy (2005) who working from a broadly neo-realist position 
has something useful to say in terms of the potentially critical role that human 
agency can play. The purpose of Lavoy’s paper is a critical comparison of the 
suitability of different frameworks of analysis when applied to Pakistan’s pattern of 
behaviour. His analysis, focuses on considering the explanatory power of neo-
realism and strategic culture analysis in explaining (1) Pakistan’s decision to pursue 
nuclear weapon and (2) its decision to withdraw support to the Taliban and more 
generally to co-operate with the US following September 11th 2001. Lavoy’s main 
contention is that while both realist and strategic analysis models are useful in 
explaining Pakistan’s behaviour, they are limited in some ways because they do not 
have ‘space’ to theorise the potential impact an individual key elite can have on state 
policy. In demonstrating this thesis, and with reference to the first proposition, Lavoy 
argues that a realist model suggests that since states are consistently involved in a 
balance-of-power scenario. Applied to Pakistan in the 1960s the conclusion should 
be: that Pakistan should have initiated a crash program to develop nuclear weapons 
as soon as it learned that archrival India had, following China’s nuclear test of 1964, 
initiated a nuclear plan of its own. Alternatively, a strategic culture analysis would 

183SeeChapterfourforadevelopmentoftheseideas.
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posit that since Pakistan’s political elites were pro-western and enjoyed a close 
relationship with the US, they would continue to rely on conventional weapons and 
enhance a close strategic relationship with the US to meet their security needs. Lavoy 
argues that whilst both models are useful nevertheless, an analytical model that 
focuses on ‘strategic elites’ has more explanatory power in terms of accounting for 
why Pakistan decided to go nuclear in 1972 and not earlier. As Nizamani (2000:72) 
notes, it was Bhutto, leader of a truncated Pakistan from 1972 to 1977, who 
methodically turned this dormant issue into a symbol of national identity’. Bhutto 
was able to transform the prevailing strategic culture to the extent that initiating a 
nuclear program was normalised (see also Ali 2008:108-9). At some level here, a 
specific political elite or human agency is ascribed distinct causal powers (see also 
Nizamani 2000: chapter 4). 
This perspective is developed further in Lavoy’s assessment of Pakistan’s decision to 
co-operate with the US ‘war on terror’. Again, beginning with an application of a 
realist perspective Lavoy argues this model would suggest that Pakistan would do 
whatever was necessary to balance against India following the terrorist attacks, thus 
suggesting an immediate and unproblematic alliance with the US. On the other hand, 
a strategic culture analysis would propose an alternative behaviour pattern since it 
would give more weight to the beliefs and desires of domestic constituencies such as 
Pakistan’ s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) who were pro-Taliban. While both 
models are insightful, Lavoy argues that a focus on the transformative powers of 
strategic elites would however, bring to the fore the notion that Pakistan’s policy 
decision would depend to some extent on the strategic beliefs of the country’s leader. 
For Lavoy, President Musharraf was the decisive leader of the strategic elite who 
292



was instrumental in cultivating a national consensus184 in terms of official policy and 
practice in the aftermath of the 11th September attacks on the US. To ignore this 
instrumental role of agency is to give rise to a poorer analysis. What I want to 
emphasise here is that Lavoy’s incursion recognises and emphasises the critical role 
that individual elites can potentially play in identifying, framing and responding to 
scenarios. These decision-making elites are described as ‘strategic myth makers’ by 
Lavoy who suggests that they operate within the constraints of both the realist world 
order and their place within it and the limitations and constraints imposed by their 
nation’s particular political priorities, national cultural norms and existing strategic 
culture. For Lavoy (2005:2), key political elites,
operate within the constraints of both the international environment and their 
nation’s political culture, but they are not helpless prisoners of these two 
confining structures; they have some degree of freedom to reorient and expand 
the internal and external boundaries of their behaviour.
Lavoy suggests that ruling elites have the ability to cultivate governmental, if not 
national consensuses providing that: 
 the substantive content of the strategic myth and its compatibility with 
existing cultural norms and political priorities; 

184ThisisnottosuggestthatthekindofnarrativeputforwardbyMusharrafwentunchallenged
ratherIwanttosuggestthatdissentwasneitherpowerfulnorextensive.
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 the ability of the myth maker to legitimise and popularise his or her 
beliefs among fellow elites and then to persuade national leaders to 
act on theses beliefs; and finally 
 the process whereby institutional actors integrate the popularised 
strategic myths into their own organisational identities and mission.  
Although Lavoy’s account lacks theoretical grounding, it is useful in the sense that it 
draws attention to the transformative powers of an agency embedded in antecedent 
social structures. Arguably, this fits neatly into the critical realist notion of agency 
possessing powers that are irreducible to the structures within which the agent is 
located.
The discursive analysis in chapter five suggested that Pakistan’s political discourse 
following the terrorist attacks was extraordinary in the sense that in a relatively short 
space of time it proposed major policy shifts especially related to the rejection of the 
Taliban and a simultaneous co-operation with the US. Indeed, in order to reorient 
policy the discursive analysis revealed that much of political discourse in the wake of 
the 9/11 attacks employed specific discursive strategies such as the positioning of 
Musharraf as an embodiment of religious wisdom and the representation of an 
immanent Indian threat. However, what is relevant here is that Musharraf played a 
central role in articulating such representations and subsequently the legitimacy of 
modifying national policy. In this context, Musharraf played a transformative role in 
terms of being able to successfully structure national policy. Of course, the limits of 
the transformative role of agency must be understood as embedded in the kind of 
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underlying structural conditions alluded to in this chapter i.e. the persistence of 
national insecurity vis-à-vis India, the primacy of the military institution as the 
bearers of knowledge, the unequal social position of Pakistan and the ‘rules’ 
underlying international society. As Danermark et al. (2002:180) argue, 
 if social structures already exist, actions can only modify them – and the 
whole set of actions maintains or changes them. While social structures cannot 
be reduced to individuals, the former are a prerequisite for any human action – 
social structures enable actions but they also set limits to what actions are 
possible.
What is being put forward here is a position that acknowledges the role of agency, in 
this case President Musharraf, in the production of a world-view in which Pakistan’s 
participation in the ‘war on terror’ was legitimised. Consequently, this thesis moves 
away from a Foucauldian position which tends to theorise agency as a mere 
mouthpiece of discourse; rather, the suggestion here is that agency is active and 
causal.  Thus, what is suggested here is that the role of Musharraf must not be 
theorised as inevitable rather some degree of freedom is accorded in terms of 
Musharraf actively choosing to respond in a particular way to the post-9/11 scenario. 
Thus, conceptualised in this way, we may also consider Musharraf as a ‘condition of 
possibility’ in the sense that he is intimately connected to the articulation of the 
discourse and discursive constructions identified in the previous chapter. Put another 
way, in the absence of Musharraf as a key political elite, possessing particular 
strategic beliefs and values as opposed to alternative beliefs we may conclude that 
295



Pakistan’s political reality and action may have taken a different form and direction.  
In this context, it is now possible to allude that this thesis considers the production of 
‘political reality’ as causally connected to and as an outcome of the interaction of a 
multiplicity of factors. 
6.7 Conclusion 
The task of a critical realist social science is to explore depth contexts and 
mechanisms in order to provide for a more holistic social investigation in relation to 
why the political constructions take the form that they do. The analysis in this 
chapter signals a much deeper engagement with our object of analysis by seeking to 
explore some of the underlying structural conditions that are theorized as 
‘generative’ or ‘causal’ in relation to Pakistan’s political discourse. The principal 
argument running throughout this chapter has been the notion that these embedded 
and enduring extra-discursive conditions and social structures must be conceived as 
‘conditions of possibility’ in that they facilitate the discourse and are necessary for 
the existence of the discourse itself. Consequently, Pakistan’s political discourse is 
related to these external conditions because they impinge by providing the ‘raw 
material’ in relation to what kind of political reality can emerge. For instance, the 
recognition of the entrenched structures of global power tilted in the favour of the 
United States is an important consideration primarily because it is a causal structure.  
The chapter addressed the effects of the social position of the US, and particularly 
how this specific social position constrains and enables discursive constructions 
within the discourse. The way in which US power was operationalised or in other 
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words, the method of its impingement on Pakistan’s political discourse took the 
shape of a specific narrative which sought to define, normalise and legitimise the 
exercise of a ‘war on terror’. This narrative ‘framed’ or interpreted events and 
subjects in a way that was clearly binary and simplistic in terms of juxtaposing 
good/evil and truth/falsity. The exploration revealed that the discursive strategy of 
binary categorisations of ‘them’ and ‘us’ left very little space for the production of 
alternative subjects, and the argument here is that the US narrative presented stark 
subject-positions to Pakistan. Furthermore, it was also noted that the taking up of a 
subject-position (a particular world-view) on the part of Pakistan necessarily entailed 
accompanying rights and duties, thus impacting thought and practice. The 
significance of the US narrative was that in positioning international subjects it can 
then be conceived as causally connected to the themes identified in Pakistan’s 
discursive space during the time-period under scrutiny here. In essence then, the 
discussion identified a global social-structural context in which the US is dominant 
as an underlying ‘generative structure’ connected to Pakistan’s political discourse. 
Secondly, the chapter identified the particular domestic context within Pakistan as a 
prerequisite or an essential underlying condition necessary to the emergence and 
maintenance of the political discourse. The main argument was that dominant 
cultural forms of thought or the overall ideological context within which Pakistan is 
embedded sets the ‘ground rules’ in term of the subsequent discursive constructions 
allowed and widely understood. If we are to understand social structure as relatively 
enduring patterns of relationships or norms that have the power to potentially shape, 
generate, give rise to, or cause particular practices then arguably, the ‘regime of 
truth’ which normalises the institutionalisation of threat in Pakistan can be conceived 
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in terms of an enduring social structure. Further, the entrenchment of the military 
establishment in Pakistan’s political process has led to the centralisation of political 
power in the hands of the military. The analysis suggested that this domestic power 
structure which is characterised by its relative absence of democratic institutions is 
an important underlying condition that facilitates the emergence of a unified political 
discourse focussed on articulating threat from India and the notion that the military 
and specifically Musharraf is a legitimate Islamic leader. The argument  was that the 
centralisation of power is important in the context of the proliferation of a hegemonic 
discourse.
Furthermore, in addition to connecting local and global entrenched social structures 
to the emergence of a political discourse in Pakistan that normalised co-operation 
with the US, the chapter also sought to theorise the links between Musharraf and the 
emergence of the discourse. In this regard, the argument was that Musharraf as a key 
member of Pakistan’ political elite played an important role in giving direction to the 
ensuing political discourse following 9/11. The chapter drew on Lavoy (2005) who 
in his analysis of Musharraf’s role in the aftermath of 9/11 raises some interesting 
points in relation to the role of agency. This line of reasoning reflects Bhaskar’s 
insistence that although social structures are antecedent to human agency 
nevertheless agency possesses power to transform. The chapter applied this 
theoretical conception to the current case-study noting that, in this sense, the 
discourse in Pakistan was influenced or impacted by a key political elite. In finality, 
it is important to note that the analysis of this chapter is not divorced from the 
identification of discursive constructions made in the previous chapter; instead it is 
intimately connected, because this chapter explains the surfacing of these discursive 
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constructions by grounding them in their contexts of emergence. Having elaborated 
the theoretical underpinnings and a related application and analysis of the case-study 
in the previous chapters, the discussion in the next chapter will now proceed to 
incorporating these various strands together into a coherent position on the 
production of Pakistan’s state behaviour in the aftermath of 9/11.   
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Pakistan and the ‘war on terror’ – Conceptualising the enactment of 
political practice
7.1 Introduction 
The central problematic of this thesis proposed that in the aftermath of the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 the Pakistani policy of rejecting the Taliban and a simultaneous co-
operation with the US was not unproblematic. In explaining Pakistan’s political 
practice, this study has relied on a conceptual framework that incorporates an 
appreciation of discourse, structure and agency. This theoretical orientation has been 
an important underlying aspect of this study in terms of the way it bears down on 
questions of ontology and epistemology. This is an important consideration since the 
relevance of theory is such that it acts like a pair of coloured sunglasses allowing the 
wearer to see only those salient features relevant to the theory. For instance, the 
theoretical framework adopted here, in contrast to realism, tends not to emphasise 
that valid scientific knowledge is only that which is gained through an empiricist 
regularity-deterministic science or the notion that world politics is governed by 
universal laws. As noted in chapter four, the approach of this study prioritises the 
role of discourse in the immediate construction of political reality coupled with a 
non-empiricist transcendental philosophy185 that investigates conditions of existence. 
This conceptual framework identifies and brings into focus salient features that are 
often ignored and overlooked by other theoretical approaches. Although theory is an 

185SeeFootnote19foradefinitionofatranscendentalphilosophy.
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important component of research nevertheless, this study must not be seen as an 
authentic reading or application of constructivist or critical realist theory in 
explaining Pakistan’s political practice. Rather, the starting point has been: how best 
can we explain Pakistan’s political practice in the aftermath of 9/11. Instead of a neat 
application of a particular theory the approach to theory has been premised on the 
question of how useful a particular conceptual framework is in terms of helping to 
answer the query. In taking this avenue of engagement, it was found that a 
poststructuralist conceptual framework though offering important insights was 
lacking in terms of a plausible explanatory framework. In relation to this study-
project, this meant that it seemed inadequate to explain Pakistan’s political actions 
entirely in terms of it being produced by an enabling discourse. Rather, the argument 
here has been that a discursive study combined with an appreciation of social 
structural contexts and agential influences is a more holistic way of engaging with 
explanations in world politics. Although poststructuralism is credited with bringing 
to attention the social construction of the objects of IR however, its underlying 
philosophy and the methodology it engenders is ultimately textually reductionist in 
that its account of political reality often reduces that reality to the operation of texts 
alone186. In critiquing the theoretical closure of many discourse studies Joseph 
(2007:353) argues, 
But there must be something there in the first place to be constructed or 
articulated. It is no good simply saying that nuclear weapons are socially 
constructed or discursively articulated and that prior to this construction or 

186Arguablyinresponsetotheoverdeterminationof‘structure’inneorealistandneoliberaltheory,
poststructuralismhasmovedtoomuchintheoppositeideationaldirection.
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articulation they are meaningless physical things (i.e. that it is only through 
discourse they become meaningful). This merely raises a further question – 
what is it about the physical or material properties of something that allows it 
to lend itself to particular forms of social constructions or discursive 
articulations? Not just anything can be articulated as a nuclear weapon; it has 
to have certain material properties. Social construction might explain why a 
missile is regarded positively as something that provides security (as opposed 
to being a weapon of mass destruction), but the physical properties of 
something, far from being meaningless outside discursive articulation, are the 
very things that make social construction possible. Social construction might 
make certain meanings possible, but material conditions make social 
construction possible. While social construction is irreducible to material 
conditions and it has its own powers and dynamics, this should not stop us 
from recognising the way that these conditions both enable and constrain it.
Consequently, moving away from the textual reductionism of poststructuralism this 
research project sought to employ the conceptual frameworks of both constructivism 
and critical realism in order to conduct a rigorous exploration. Having conducted 
much of the analysis and discussion previously, the purpose of this chapter is to draw 
all the various themes together in order to put forward a coherent position in terms of 
how this study conceptualises Pakistan’s political practice in the aftermath of 9/11.   
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7.2 The main findings of the study
The main theme of this research project is the notion that Pakistan’s political practice 
and policy vis-à-vis the Taliban and the US in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 
was enabled by a political discourse that proliferated a world-view in which certain 
political practices were normalised. On the domestic front, the policy and practice 
was problematic on a number of fronts.  Firstly, there is the issue of ethnic ties 
between Pakistan’s Pakhtun’s and those of Afghanistan which makes Pakistan’s co-
operation with the US military strikes targeting Pakhtun’s across the border 
contentious.  As noted, the state has historically been involved in the deliberate 
cultivation of Pakistan’s national identity as varyingly Islamic and closely connected 
to notions of brotherhood or a Muslim ‘ummah’. Of course as this thesis has sought 
to explain, much of this state cultivation of Islam as a common heritage was aimed at 
bolstering national integration through distinguishing a definite Self from an outside 
and principally Hindu Other. Consequently, this amplification of the distinction 
between the Self/Other legitimised the political intrusion and centre-stage position of 
the military institution in Pakistan. This focus on Pakistan’s national identity as 
primarily Islamic meant that such an ideology had the spill-over effect in that 
prioritising the notion of the Muslim ‘Ummah’ created the space or ‘naturalised’ 
Pakistan forging links with other Muslim countries and Muslim causes around the 
world. Alongside this, Pakistan’s combined effort with the Afghan resistance to oust 
the Soviets further strengthened a pan-Islamic heritage. This partly explains why up 
and until September 11, 2001 Pakistan’s official domestic and foreign policy 
discourse emphasised the legitimacy of the ‘brotherly’ Taliban regime. Thus, 
although Pakistan has never really enjoyed cordial relations with Afghanistan for a 
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sustained period of time nevertheless withdrawing support from the Taliban and co-
operating with the US in its incursions into Afghan territory signalled a radical shift 
in policy. Importantly, on the surface such a policy seemingly represents Pakistan’s 
alliance with a non-Muslim state to target a fellow Muslim state. In this light then, 
whatever Pakistan’s personal relationship with Afghanistan a military alliance with 
the US becomes problematic in the public eye. 
The discourse analysis in chapter five demonstrated how Pakistan’s political 
discourse was consistently involved in constructing ‘extraordinary threat. Within the 
conceptual framework of this study, Pakistan’s political discourse is conceived as a 
‘production site’ that is causally connected to the possibilities of the ensuing and 
emergent political action and practice. In exploring this ‘production site’, the analysis 
revealed that the domestic political narrative relied to a significant extent on religious 
analogies and a deep-seated historical narrative as an overall framework of 
understanding. This interpretation meant that the entire events i.e. the terrorist attacks 
on the US had placed Pakistan (the fortress of Islam) in a precarious position owing 
to its support of the (Islamic) Taliban. Moreover, the old (Hindu) Indian enemy was 
now poised in terms of achieving its long-standing ambition to annihilate Pakistan; 
the narrative posited that these exceptional circumstances required inspiration from 
religious history. Co-operation with the international coalition and especially the US 
was represented as a decision inspired by the kind of ‘religious wisdom’ that 
instigated the ‘hijrah’ or the migration of Muslims. In this context, the religious 
analogy served to focus on legitimating cooperation with the US by drawing 
similarities between such action and the Prophet’s decision to migrate. As Musharraf 
argued, this was not be interpreted as a ‘surrender’ to foreign dictates and simple 
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compliance in attacking a Muslim group (the Taliban), but ultimately an action that 
would ensure survival and success in the context of a hostile Indian neighbour. This 
was a powerful narrative primarily because Pakistan’s official identity and popular 
narratives have historically placed much emphasis on the country’s Islamic character.  
The main contention of this study is that there was a definite political discourse in 
operation within Pakistan’s discursive space which posited particular representations. 
These representation and interpretations signified a world-view in which Pakistan 
was facing extraordinary threat from India and which signalled towards legitimising 
Pakistan’s co-operation with the US in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11. It 
is in this context that we must view Pakistan’s political actions in terms of becoming 
a frontline state in the war on terrorism, and associated political actions such as the 
permission to use Pakistani airspace and airbases, the provision of logistical support, 
the frequent close interaction between US and Pakistan political elites and allowing 
the presence of US troops on Pakistani soil. It is significant to note that despite the 
Western media’s insistence that mass agitation was imminent, in reality there was a 
relative lack of domestic opposition to the new policy of US-Pakistan military co-
operation. As many writers have observed (Synnott 2009, Lavoy 2005), the reaction 
was generally muted and soon fizzled out. Nevertheless, whilst the majority of the 
mainstream political parties supported the government’s decision in joining the 
international coalition, the country’s Islamic groups were outraged. Although strikes 
and demonstrations involving the burning of the American flag and other street 
demonstrations were organised by the opposing Islamist groups nevertheless, these 
were limited in number and impact with most of the population refusing to engage in 
mass protest against the government’s decision. This lack of popular mobilisation 
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against Pakistan’s policy in the aftermath of 9/11 reflects the pervasiveness, 
proliferation and indeed success of a hegemonic interpretation and representation. 
President Musharraf enjoyed ‘widespread if grudging popularity’ even in the 
beginning of 2007 (Schaffer 2008:9). What this means is that, on the whole, 
Musharraf’s domestic popularity remained intact even years after the initiation of the 
‘war on terror. Musharraf’s standing only declining rapidly towards the end of 2007 
when he decided to sack the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.  Although it is not 
possible to claim that the political discourse was overwhelmingly successful in 
positing the legitimisation of these actions187 nevertheless, it provided for a broad, if 
grudging, domestic consensus relating to Pakistan’s role in the immediate aftermath 
of 9/11. This analysis concurred with Foucault’s idea that discourse is a practice i.e. 
the notion that there is no opposition between discourse and practice. This implies 
that engaging in a discourse is ‘doing something’ – it is not ineffectual but a form of 
social action and therefore consequential. 
In seeking to understand why Pakistan’s political discourse was prone to certain 
discursive representations as opposed to their alternatives, the study engaged with a 
transcendental philosophy as put forward by Bhaskar (1978, 1989). The objective of 
a transcendental argumentation is a consideration of those ‘conditions’ and/or 
contexts which are intrinsically connected to the emergence of a social phenomena. 
In this context, Joseph (2007:354) notes that a transcendental stance raises questions 
such as ‘why things get constructed in the way they do’, ‘why some constructions are 
more powerful than others?’ ‘what the conditions of possibility for social 

187AsFoucaultnotesadiscourseisrarelyevertrulyandoverwhelminglyhegemonicratherthereare
alwayschallengestoitshegemonyintheshapeofalternativeconstructions,representationsand
worldviews.
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construction are?’ As we explored, one way of conducting such an analysis is to 
think about whether the social object, in our case a specific discourse, would exist in 
the form that it does in the absence of specific contingent conditions.  This analysis, 
the bulk of which is posited in chapter six, revealed that a number of social contexts 
were significantly connected to the emergent political discourse in Pakistan. While 
the discursive findings posit a causal relation between discourse and practice, the 
critical realist retroductive analysis also posited causality between social structure 
and Pakistan’s political discourse. Sayer (2000:11) encapsulates the causal nature of 
depth social structures (conditions of possibility) in the following way,
the real is the realm of objects, their structures and powers. Whether they be 
physical, like minerals, or social, like bureaucracies, they have certain 
structures and causal powers, that is, capacities to behave in particular ways, 
and causal liabilities or passive powers, that is, specific susceptibilities to 
certain kinds of change. 
In engaging with the causality of social structure as it relates to the research focus, 
the analysis identified a number of salient features. The insistence was that specific 
underlying social contexts such as the pervasiveness of the ‘India threat’, the 
centralisation of domestic political power and the unequal global social relations 
between the US and Pakistan are causally connected to Pakistan’s ‘production site’. 
Rather than conceptualising this relationship between context and discourse in a rigid 
cause-effect manner, the argument was that the social context provides a strong onus, 
a strong potentiality in terms of shaping discursive constructions. Considering the 
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domestic context, the chapter also drew on Lavoy’s (2005) argument where he 
suggests the effectual role that political elites can play in the production of socio-
political life at the national level. The argument was that this understanding of the 
production of socio-political life afforded agency some level of power moving away 
from Foucault’s notion of the passive individual. This conception of agency affords 
transformatory power to individual political elites who are nevertheless, constrained 
by contingent social contexts and contingent cultural epistemes. In this context, 
Archer’s (1995) conception of the production of social life as existing within a time 
dimension is particularly useful in conceptualising the production of political reality 
in Pakistan’s case. If we recall, Archer (1995) drawing on the work of Bhaskar 
proposes that in a linear time sequence the concept of structural constraints comes 
first and has the power to enable and constrain human action188 thus chapter six 
argued that Musharraf was constrained by prevailing material and discursive 
structures. However, within these constraining conditions human action and 
interaction can re-produce and/or transform these structures. The resulting structure, 
which has been either reproduced or transformed, then becomes the subsequent 
conditioning structure of the next human interaction, and so the cycle continues. In 
this way, socio-political reality is emergent over time resulting from the interplay 
between structure and agency. This conception of structure-agency in affording 
qualified human authorship goes some way in addressing Foucault’s ‘death of the 
subject’. Thus the argument was that the role of Musharraf in terms of being able to 
build a broad national consensus in terms of the particular interpretation and 
meanings attached to events may be seen as a demonstration of the ‘power’ of 
agency in effecting change. Of course, Musharraf was constrained by existing 

188Seefigure3.
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structural contexts (cultural and material) but also enabled by these very contexts. 
For instance, the particular structure of power within Pakistan in the favour of the 
military establishment resulted in President Musharraf ‘wearing two hats’ in terms of 
his twin positions as both Chief of the Army Staff and the President which facilitated 
the dominance of the official political interpretation of events.  
A consideration of the social contexts within which discourses are embedded, or 
considering the potential role of agential transformation does not signal a demoting 
of discursive analysis or constructivism. Rather, discourse and language are 
important because they provide the immediate ‘raw material’ from which political 
reality is constructed. Nevertheless, relevant social contexts matter precisely because 
they play a role in shaping an emergent political discourse in Pakistan and therefore 
cannot be divorced from the analysis of political discourse. Underlying structures 
and conditioners are not conceived as ‘rigidly determining’ but more fluidly as 
underlying conditional factors which facilitate, afford, shape or give direction to an 
emergent ‘reality’. This does not imply a crude materialist/structuralist argument; 
rather it can be seen as a kind of ‘middle ground’ between poststructuralist 
approaches189 and crude materialism190. The thesis here concurs with Sayer 
(1992:98) when he notes that, 
while there are serious occupational hazards in any study of social structure, 
the proper response is not to abandon structural analysis, for this would give 

189Approacheswhichtendtoimplythatpoliticalpracticeiswhollyreducibletocirculating
discourses.
190Thenotionthatpoliticalpracticeiswhollyreducibletostructuralconstraints.
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actor’s accounts a false privilege and open the doors to ‘voluntarism’, that is, 
the view that what happens is purely a function of the unconstrained human 
will. 
7.3 Summary of thesis outcomes 
The primary purpose of this study has been to gain an insight into the complexity 
involved in the enactment of potentially contentious political practice. More 
specifically, the study began by observing that although Pakistan became a ‘front-
line state’ following 9/11, and apart from Afghanistan, has been one the countries 
most affected by the on-going ‘war on terror’ nevertheless, little is known 
specifically about how Pakistan was able to build national consensus in relation to its 
participation in the ‘war on terror’. The findings of this study will help to fill this gap 
in the literature. In particular, by employing a broadly constructivist conceptual 
framework, this study has sought to identify specific discursive structures within the 
political discourse and has argued that these ‘framings’ or epistemes are implicated 
in building national consensus in the context of Pakistan’s participation in the ‘war 
on terror’. Thus in the first instance, this study proposes a relationship between 
Pakistan’s political discourse and ensuing political practice. 
In further investigating this relationship between discourse and practice, the thesis 
sought to embed or contextualise the discourse in contingent social structures. Thus 
in the second instance, this study proposed a relationship between an emergent 
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political discourse, whose primary purpose was building national consensus, and the 
external and extra-discursive conditions of its emergence. This thesis here is that a 
constructivist conceptual framework incorporating insights from a critical realist 
theory provides a more holistic and plausible account of how and why Pakistan’s 
political discourse was able to effectively build wide-scale consensus in relation to 
participation in the ‘war on terror’. The focus on these relationships between 
discourse and practice and social contexts and discourse indicates towards the 
dialectical and multi-causal nature of an emergent political reality and represents a 
holistic way of engaging with world politics.
7.4 Final conclusions 
On 12 September 2001, President Pervez Musharraf was candidly given an 
ultimatum by the US government, ‘you are either with us or against us’ (Musharraf 
2006a:201). Soon after, Pakistan’s leadership decided to officially join the global 
coalition against the al- Qaeda and the Taliban. But as Musharraf (2006a:203-204) 
notes in his autobiography, ‘what of the domestic reaction? The mullah’s would 
certainly oppose joining the United States and would come out into the streets. There 
would be an adverse reaction too in the North-West Frontier province bordering 
Afghanistan’. Despite such apprehensions, Synnott (2009:66) notes that in the 
ensuing months, in contrast to overdrawn reports by some analysts ‘the public 
reaction in Pakistan to the Afghan campaign was generally muted’. It is precisely this 
‘muted public reaction,’ that has most interested the current study. In approaching 
this subject-area this research project has argued that the politicised character of the 
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dominant narratives in the domestic political space played a critical role in being able 
to secure a wide-scale consensus concerning the inevitability of Pakistan’s 
participation in the ‘war on terror’.  
The central argument of this thesis has been that a specific political rhetoric and 
discourse was employed by Pakistan’s leadership to interpret the meaning of events, 
and to justify and normalise Pakistan’s coalition with the US. In arriving at such a 
conclusion, the study engaged in exploring the dominant interpretations, 
representations and narratives articulated by the political discourse in order to attach 
meanings to the events of 9/11. The analysis was based mostly on important official 
speeches, interviews, public addresses and other government data. Although this 
study makes no claim of having collected all possible material nevertheless, the 
selected texts were a representative sample of many more official texts concerning 
Pakistan and the ‘war on terror’. Furthermore, as noted elsewhere191, there is an 
inevitable bias in the selected texts however, this has been redressed by trying to 
include as many different speakers as possible within the data-set. In the analysis of 
the data, the study found that the underlying narratives and representations 
concerning Pakistan and the ‘war on terror’ remained consistent between different 
texts and authors. However, in furthering the inquiry into the connections between 
discourse and political practice the project also identified the wider structural 
contexts within which Pakistan’s political discourse is embedded. The argument is 
that, rather than the political discourse spontaneously emerging from a ‘vacuum of 
nothingness’, there are extra-discursive contexts which are causally connected to the 
discourse under scrutiny. 

191Refertofootnote12.
312



Although this study pertains to the general area of the ‘war on terror’ however, it 
contributes specifically in relation to a small aspect of this wider field of academic 
interest. Many studies within the wider literature have examined the role of Pakistan 
in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11.  Much of this existing literature was 
reviewed in chapter three, and in this context it was argued that a distinguishable 
feature in relation to the existing body of work was its geo-political focus in terms of 
explaining Pakistan’s predicaments and dilemmas both before and after 9/11. In 
contrast to this, the current study represents a departure in terms of its emphasis. It is 
notable that within the existing body of work there is very little examination, if any, 
of the role of language and discourse in constituting Pakistan’s practice. Much of the 
existing literature is often principally concerned with ascertaining ‘truths’ or an 
authentic ‘version of events’, and often the focus is geared towards exploring 
Pakistan’s ‘genuineness’ or ‘commitment’ vis-à-vis the United States and the ‘war on 
terror’. Consequently, a key task of this project has been to help redress the 
imbalance by examining the way in which a specific political discourse is 
constitutive of socio-political consensus and state practice within Pakistan. The thesis 
has thus drawn attention to the politicised character of the dominant narratives and 
argued that these narratives enabled and legitimised a particular set of political 
actions geared towards Pakistan’s alliance with the US in the ‘war on terror’.  
While other studies engage with the moral, political and diplomatic dimensions of 
Pakistan’s political practice, this study re-conceptualises the same practice through 
an examination of representational practices. As Shapiro (1989:13-14) notes, ‘to 
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textualise a domain of analysis is to recognise, first of all, that any “reality” is 
mediated by a mode of representation and, second that representations are not 
descriptions of a world of facticity, but are ways of making facticity’. Nevertheless, 
despite the difference in emphasis the primary purpose of this project has not been to 
negate or disqualify the findings and arguments of the current literature, rather the 
main objective has been to contribute to the debate by drawing on an alternative 
theoretical framework in order to deepen our understanding and knowledge of how 
political practice is realised. Thus, it is important to understand that the main 
contribution of this research is the way in which it brings into analytical focus those 
nuances which are often overlooked by broadly realist-inspired studies. 
In finality, it is important to clarify that this project represents but an opening 
towards new ways of dealing with world politics and in this context this study throws 
up many more openings for possible further research. For instance, further research 
could explore the role of the 2002 electronic media liberalisation in Pakistan and the 
way in which this has opened up space for political discussion and heightened 
political consciousness. Prior to 2002, the media in Pakistan was closely censored 
and thus it was relatively easier for an elite discourse to become embedded without 
any challenge. In this context, a further research project may explore the way in 
which this media discourses impacts other public discourses related to national 
identity, the role of Islam in Pakistan, Pakistan’s relationship with the ‘war on 
terror’, relations with India and the US and so on. In particular, the dialect between 
these discourses and government policy is an interesting way to engage with this 
subject-field. Moreover, although this project engaged, albeit in a limited fashion, 
with the way in which the US interpellated or positioned Pakistan and other 
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international subjects in the aftermath of 9/11, such an investigation could be 
extended further into a much more substantial project exploring discursive 
positioning and related impacts in terms of domestic political practice. Further still, 
this thesis opens up additional questions for investigation especially with regard to 
the nature and concrete role that social relations and enduring social structures (both 
ideational and material) play in world politics. In this context, further research could 
identify and explore social structures, at the domestic and international levels, and 
the dialect between the two in terms of impacting discursive space and ultimately 
political practice.  
Much, then, remains to be done. 
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Glossary 
Azan The call to prayer delivered from minarets 
Birdari Family kinship - much like a caste system 
Caliph Islamic leader – the term is usually used to refer to a leader 
that as global resonance 
Hajj pilgrimage to Makkah and one of the five pillars of Islam. The 
others being the affirmation of the oneness of God and the 
acceptance of Muhammed as His Prophet, the observance of 
five daily prayers, observin the fast and the payment of zakat 
(charity). 
Hijrat migration marking the Prophet Muhammed’s journey from 
Makkah to Medina in 622 AD 
Hikmat Farsightedness and wisdom derived from Islam 
Ijtihad  Individual judgement 
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Ijtimah   Congregation 
Ilm   Knowledge 
Huqooq-ul-abad Rights of the people, or rights of the wider community over 
the individual. 
Huqood-ul-Allah Rights of God, or rights of Allah over the individual. 
Jihad   struggle; holy war. 
Jihadi   Individual or group dedicated to Islamic holy war (jihad) 
Kabah   Islam’s holiest site in Makkah, Saudi Arabia. 
Madrassa  Quranic school or religious seminary 
Mujahideen  Soldier of Islam 
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Quaid-e-Azam  The Great Leader. The title given to Mohammed Ali Jinnah. 
Raj   British sovereignty over undivided India 
Sufi spiritual mentor who preaches Islamic values through example 
and non-violence. Music and poetry is a marked feature. 
Sufism   A mystical branch of Islam. 
Sharia   Islamic law 
Syed   Widely accepted as direct descendents of the Prophet 
Muhammed 
Ulema (sing. Alim) the body of formally trained Muslim theologians 
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Ummah  the global Islamic community  
Wadera A term used to refer to a local ‘elder’ who wields significant 
power owing the ownership of vast tracts of land.  
Zamindar  Landowner 
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Abbreviations 
CIA    Central Intelligence Agency 
BJP    Bharitia- Janata- Party (Indian Peoples Party) 
IJI    Islamic Jumhoori Ittehad (Islamic democratic Alliance) 
ISI    Inter-services Intelligence 
JI    Jammat-e-Islami (Islamic society) 
MMA    Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (United Council of Action) 
NWFP    North-West Frontier Province 
PPP    Pakistan Peoples Party 
PDPA    Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan 
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APPENDIX I192
Text of the speech of President General Pervez Musharraf
September 19th 2001
"My dear countrymen, Asslam-o-Alaikum: 
The situation confronting the nation today and the international crisis have impelled 
me to take the nation into confidence.  First of all, I would like to express heartfelt 
sympathies to the United States for the thousands of valuable lives lost in the United 
States due to horrendous acts of terrorism.  
We are all the more grieved because in this incident people from about 45 countries 
from all over the world lost their lives. People of all ages old, children, women and 
people from all and every religion lost their lives. Many Pakistanis also lost their 
lives. These people were capable Pakistanis who had gone to improve their lives. On 
this loss of lives I express my sympathies with those families. I pray to Allah to rest 
their souls in peace.  
This act of terrorism has raised a wave of deep grief, anger and retaliation in the 
United States.Their first target from day one is Osama bin Laden's movement Al-

192Owingtotheconfinesofspaceassociatedwiththisresearchprojectithasnotbeenpossibleto
includeinthisappendixalargervarietyoftextsemployedbythisstudy.FurthermoreItisalso
importanttonotethatmostofthespeeches,interviews,debatesetc.consultedinthecompilation
oftheanalysisareoftenverylongandcontainmuchreiterationandsometimesadiscussionoftopics
notrelevanttothisstudy.Consequentlyinreproducingsomeselectedtextsinthisappendixitsis
usefultonotethatthesehavebeenabridgedtoensurerelevance.
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Qaida about which they say that it is their first target. The second target are Taliban 
and that is because Taliban have given refuge to Osama and his network. This has 
been their demand for many years. They have been demanding their extradition and 
presentation before the international court of justice. Taliban have been rejecting this.
The third target is a long war against terrorism at the international level. The thing to 
ponder is that in these three targets nobody is talking about war against Islam or the 
people of Afghanistan. Pakistan is being, asked to support this campaign. What is 
this support? Generally speaking, these are three important things in which America 
is asking for our help. First is intelligence and information exchange, second support 
is the use of our airspace and the third is that they are asking for logistic support from 
us.
I would like to tell you now that they do not have any operational plan right now. 
Therefore we do not have any details on this count but we know that whatever are 
the United States' intentions they have the support of the UN Security Council and 
the General Assembly in the form of a resolution. This is a resolution for war against 
terrorism and this is a resolution for punishing those people who support terrorism. 
Islamic countries have supported this resolution. This is the situation as it prevailed 
in the outside world.  
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Now I would like to inform you about the internal situation. Pakistan is facing a very 
critical situation and I believe that after 1971, this is the most critical period. The 
decision we take today can have far-reaching and wide- ranging consequences. The 
crisis is formidable and unprecedented. If we take wrong decisions in this crisis, it 
can lead to worst consequences. On the other hand, if we take right decisions, its 
results will be good. The negative consequences can endanger Pakistan's integrity 
and solidarity. Our critical concerns, our important concerns can come under threat. 
When I say critical concerns, I mean our strategic assets and the cause of Kashmir. If 
these come under threat it would be a worse situation for us.
On the other hand, we can re-emerge politically as a responsible and dignified nation 
and all our difficulties can be minimized. I have considered all these factors and held 
consultations with those who hold different opinions. I met the corps commanders, 
National Security Council and the Federal Cabinet. I interacted with the media. I 
invited the religious scholars and held discussions with them. I met politicians. I also 
invited intellectuals. I will be meeting with the tribal chiefs and Kashmiri leaders 
tomorrow. This is the same process of consultation that I held earlier. I noted that 
there was difference of opinion but an overwhelming majority favours patience, 
prudence and wisdom. Some of them, I think about ten percent favoured sentimental 
approach.
Let us now take a look at the designs of our neighbouring country. They offered all 
their military facilities to the United States. They have offered without hesitation, all 
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their facilities, all their bases and full logistic support. They want to enter into any 
alliance with the Unites States and get Pakistan declared a terrorist state. They want 
to harm our strategic assets and the Kashmir cause. Not only this, recently certain 
countries met in Dushanbe. India was one of them. Indian representative was there. 
What do the Indians want? they do not have common borders with Afghanistan 
anywhere. It is totally isolated from Afghanistan. In my view, it would not be 
surprising, that the Indians want to ensure that if and when the government in 
Afghanistan changes, it shall be an anti-Pakistan government.  
It is very important that while the entire world is talking about this horrible terrorist 
attack, our neighbouring country instead of talking peace and cooperation, was trying 
hard to harm Pakistan and defame Islam. If you watch their television, you will find 
them dishing out propaganda against Pakistan, day in and day out. I would like to tell 
India "Lay Off". 
Pakistan's armed forces and every Pakistani citizen is ready to offer any sacrifice in 
order to defend Pakistan and secure its strategic assets. Make no mistake and 
entertain no misunderstanding. At this very moment our Air Force is at high alert; 
and they are ready for "Do or die" Missions My countrymen! In such a situation, a 
wrong decision can lead to unbearable losses.
What are our critical concerns and priorities? These are four; 
1. First of all is the security of the country and external threat.
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2. Second is our economy and its revival.  
3. Third are our strategic nuclear and missile assets.  
4. And Kashmir cause.  
The four are our critical concerns. Any wrong judgment on our part can damage all 
our interests. While taking a decision, we have to keep in mind all these factors. The 
decision should reflect supremacy of righteousness and it should be in conformity 
with Islam. Whatever we are doing, it is according to Islam and it upholds the 
principle of righteousness. I would like to say that decisions about the national 
interests should be made with wisdom and rational judgement.  
At this moment, it is not the question of bravery or cowardice. We are all very brave. 
My own response in such situations is usually of daring. But bravery without rational 
judgment is tantamount to stupidity. There is no clash between bravery and sound 
judgment. Allah Almighty says in the holy Quran, "The one bestowed with sagacity 
is the one who get a big favour from Allah". We have to take recourse to sanity. We 
have to save our nation from damage. We have to build up; our national respect. 
"Pakistan comes first, everything else comes later".  
Some scholars and religious leaders are inclined towards taking emotional decisions. 
I would like to remind them the events of the first six years of the history of Islam. 
The Islamic calendar started from migration. The significance of migration is 
manifested from the fact that the Holy Prophet (PBUH) went from Makkah to 
Madina. He (PBUH) migrated to safeguard Islam. What was migration? God forbid, 
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was it an act of cowardice? The Holy Prophet (PBUH) signed the charter of Madinah 
(Meesaq-e-Madinah) with the Jewish tribes. It was an act of sagacity. 
This treaty remained effective for six years. Three battles were fought with non-
believers of Makkah during this period - the battle of Badr, Uhad and Khandaq. the 
Muslims emerged victorious in these battles with the non-believers of Makkah 
because the Jews had signed a treaty with the Muslims. After six years, the Jews 
were visibly disturbed with the progress of Islam, which was getting stronger and 
stronger. They conspired to forge covert relations with the non-believers of Makkah.
Realising the danger, the Holy Prophet (PBUH) signed the treaty of Hudaibiya with 
the Makkhans who had been imposing wars on Islam. This was a no war pact. I 
would like to draw your attention to one significant point of this pact. The last 
portion of the pact was required to be signed by the Holy Prophet (PBUH) as 
Muhammad Rasool Allah.The non-believers contested that they did not recognize 
Muhammad (PBUH) as the Prophet of Allah. They demanded to erase these words 
from the text of the treaty. The Holy Prophet(PBUH) agreed but Hazrat Umar (R.A) 
protested against it. He got emotional and asked the Holy Prophet (PBUH) if he was 
not the messenger of God (God forbid) and whether the Muslims were not on the 
right path while signing the treaty.  
The Holy Prophet (PBUH) advised Hazrat Umar (R.A) not to be led by emotions as 
the dictates of national thinking demanded signing of the treaty at that time. He 
(PBUH) said, this was advantageous to Islam and as years would pass by you would 
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come to know of its benefits. "This is exactly what happened. Six months later in the 
battle of Khyber, Muslims, by the grace of Allah, again became victorious. It should 
be remembered that this became possible because Makkans could not attack because 
of the treaty. On 8 Hijra by the grace of Allah glory of Islam spread to Makkah.  
What is the lesson for us in this? The lesson is that when there is a crisis situation, 
the path of Hikmat (wisdom) is better than the path of emotions. Therefore, we have 
to take a strategic decision. There is no question of weakness of faith or cowardice. 
For Pakistan, life can be sacrificed and I am sure every Pakistani will give his life for 
Pakistan. I have fought two wars. I have seen dangers. I faced them and by the grace 
of Allah never committed a cowardly act.  
But at this time one should not bring harm to the country. We cannot make the future 
of a hundred and forty million people bleak. Even otherwise it is said in Shariah that 
if there are two difficulties at a time and a selection has to be made it is better to opt 
for the lesser one. Some of our friends seem to be much worried about Afghanistan.  
I must tell them that I and my government are much more worried about Afghanistan 
and Taliban. I have done everything for Afghanistan and Taliban when the entire 
world is against them. I have met about twenty to twenty five world leaders and 
talked to each of them in favour of the Taliban. I have told them that sanctions 
should not be imposed on Afghanistan and that we should engage them.  
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I have been repeating this stance before all leaders but I am sorry to say that none of 
our friends accepted this.  
Even in this situation, we are trying our best to cooperate with them. I sent Director 
General ISI with my personal letter to Mullah Umar. He returned after spending two 
days there. I have informed Mullah Umar about the gravity of the situation. We are 
trying our best to come out of this critical situation without any damage to 
Afghanistan and Taliban. 
This is my earnest endeavour and with the blessings of Allah I will continue to seek 
such a way out. We are telling the Americans too that they should be patient. 
Whatever their plans, they should be cautious and balanced: We are asking them to 
come up with whatever evidence they have against Osama bin Laden; What I would 
like to know is how do we save Afghanistan and Taliban. And how do we ensure that 
they suffer minimum losses: I am sure that you will favour that we do so and bring 
some improvement by working with the nations of the world. At this juncture, I am 
worried about Pakistan only.
I am the Supreme Commander of Pakistan and I give top priority to the defence of 
Pakistan, defence of any other country comes later. We want to take decisions in the 
interest of Pakistan. I know that the majority of the people favour our decisions. I 
also know that some elements are trying to take unfair advantage of the situation and 
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promote their personal agenda and advance the interests of their parties. They are 
poised to create dissentions and damage the country.  
There is no reason why this minority should be allowed to hold the sane majority as a 
hostage. I appeal to all Pakistanis to display unity and solidarity and foil the 
nefarious designs of such elements who intend to harm the interests of the country.  
At this critical juncture, we have to frustrate the evil designs of our enemies and 
safeguard national interests. Pakistan is considered a fortress of Islam. God forbid, if 
this fortress is harmed in any way it would cause damage to the cause of Islam. My 
dear countrymen, Have trust in me the way you reposed trust in me before going to  
Agra. I did not disappoint the nation there. 
We have not compromised on national honour and integrity and I shall not disappoint 
you on this occasion either. This is firm pledge to you. In the end before I take your 
leave, I would like to end with the prayer of Hazrat Musa (A.S)( Prophet Moses) as 
given in Sura-e-Taha: "May Allah open my chest, make my task easier, untie my 
tongue so that they may comprehend my intent". 
May Allah be with us in our endeavours. 
" PAKISTAN PAINDABAD " 
329



Text of the Address to the Nation
by President Musharraf on July 21, 2005
My dear countrymen! It has been long since I addressed you last. 
A number of developments and incidents have taken place in our region, around the 
globe and the Muslim world. 
An internally we are passing through a delicate phase in our history. I think at this 
stage the nation needs unity and understanding the issues in their proper perspective. 
So I thought it a proper time to address you. I would like to review briefly the 
regional and international situation and the state of affairs in the Muslim world. 
We need to talk about the world because we or for that matter any other country does 
not exist in a vacuum. We have to have contacts and maintain relations with the 
world. We have to develop trade and economic ties with the members of the 
international community. I believe that without maintaining relations with other 
countries, no country can achieved development and progress.  
If we look at the world we see it passing through turbulence. Bomb blasts and suicide 
bombings are taking place. a number of innocent lives are being lost all around. 
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Upon examination we will find that these are the Muslims who are perpetuators and 
these are the Muslims again who are suffering. This is our misfortune. It is all the 
more regrettable that whenever such incidents of terrorism occur our country directly 
or indirectly gets linked to these acts of terrorism. Either the accused may have lived 
here, passed through our country or travelled to Afghanistan through our territory. 
This is a matter of grave concern and sadness for me. I see these incidents as 
tarnishing the image of Islam in the world and the world is beginning to see Islam as 
sanctioning intolerance, extremism and terrorism. I refute this kind of thinking and 
strive to project Islam in its true perspective as a religion which gives messages of 
peace and brotherhood.  
……
So how can we move forward in such a scenario? I would like to mention to 
madrassah that the world Ilm (knowledge) has been used 800 hundred times in the 
Holy Quran. After the world ‘Allah’, this is the most frequent used word. Ilm is also 
worldly Ilm. So we should teach our children both religious and worldly knowledge 
so that the graduating students may join the mainstream of national life. 
Pakistan’s future and destiny are linked with the Muslim Ummah…we are also and 
Islamic country. Not only that but Pakistan is the only ideological country carved out 
for the Muslims of the region. Therefore, we are the most important past of the 
331



Muslim world. In addition to that Pakistan is playing a lead role in the fight against 
extremism and terrorism. 
….
Dozens of Mujahideed organisations have mushroomed in cities which recruit people 
openly, train them, collect donations and publish and distribute jihadi literature. This 
practice has been going on for the last 25 years and has played havoc with out 
society. Political elements exploit situations for their own political interests. I want to 
ask these terrorists and extremists of their objectives they want to achieve from such 
activities. Do they aim for the glory of Islam? Do they think their actions will glorify 
Islam. Rather they will get nothing out of their misdeed and terrorism. It is their 
misunderstanding. I will bring the destruction of the Muslim. 
Now I want to ask something from my dear countrymen. Do you want Pakistan to 
play some role in bringing betterment in the world, the Islamic Ummah and this 
region? Do we have the potential? 
In my view we have the potential to lead the world, the Islamic Ummah and region 
towards peace and betterment. We should play our role to enhance the glory of the 
country. This world is a common heritage and we should make it a better place for 
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our future generations. We should help the Ummah to resolve its political issues and 
play a role in improving the socio-economic situation.  
Keeping in view the role of Pakistan in the Ummah and the world, I presented the 
strategy of “Enlightened Moderation” to the Ummaha and the world. It is a two-
pronged strategy. One prong implies that Muslims reject terrorism and extremism 
and raise their voices against it. Side by side we should concentrate on the socio-
economic progress of the public so that the Ummah can move forward. The second 
prong demands that the world and the US find a just resolution to the political issues 
which are being confronted by the Muslim Ummah…In my view this strategy would 
be a success. 
I am pleased that the strategy of Enlightened Moderation has been approved in the 
last OIC (organisation of Islamic Countries) meeting…I proposed the formulation of 
a new department of Islamic thought which should comprise of true Islamic 
representation and educated scholars to convey the true Islamic spirit to the Ummah  
….
We have achieved an international stature, a standing in the wider Ummah and our 
economy has stabilised…      
333



Opening remarks by Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayed at the meeting of the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations.
July 23rd, 2004. (Report No. 1 July 2004)
I think we have a full House now and as I mentioned early that there is an opening 
statement from my side, which will set the perspective as we see it from Pakistan. In 
this I'll mention that probably no country and I think this is important to understand 
the perception here that as far as terrorism is concerned the track record of Pakistan 
has been very strong, very consistent and probably no country after nine eleven has 
done more and sacrificed more in terms of supporting the campaign against terrorism 
and this also goes back to the years of the cold war when Pakistan was supposed to 
be a front line state on the issue of rolling back Soviet expansionism in Afghanistan 
and when our American and British friends were partners in what I call the joint 
jihad against Soviet Union and Pakistan played that role, we were committed to that 
and there is a strong feeling in Pakistan that after the liberation of Afghanistan or the 
roll back of the Red Army, we were left in the lurch. Afghanistan was left in the 
lurch and the West, Britain included, the US, just walked away from the region and 
we were left to carry the baby with the bath water and what you are seeing today is 
the blow back, the consequences, the aftermath of that jihad and for 12 years from 
1989 to 2001 the International community, the Western World, Britain, European 
Union, USA, just forgot about the region, forgot about Pakistan and they also gave us 
a parting kick in the form of sanctions, other punitive measures and they forgot about 
our contributions that we had made. Any way, we contributed to the victory for the 
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West in the cold war, the break up of the Soviet Union, the collapse of communism 
in Europe and so there is a certain suspicion among Pakistanis although we have a 
close rapport these days with the west that whether this relationship is resilient, 
whether it is going to belong term or whether it is simply tactical that it is linked with 
the certain situation and when the situation on the ground changes, the western 
interest change because we know, especially our American friends, they have short 
memories and shifting alliances. In the current scenario, Pakistan's leadership took a 
very wise and decisive action after 9/11. I call it course correction it was needed. We 
helped the West in removing the Taliban leadership and we felt that Pakistan should 
be part of the mainstream. Pakistan became partner rather than a pariah of the west in 
that situation and as you know that over 500 leaders of Al-Qaida were captured by 
Pakistani Intelligence and Security Forces and handed over to the United States. So, 
Pakistan has demonstrated its commitment to the campaign against terrorism and 
also we have seen that we maintained this commitment despite pressures on Pakistan 
from its eastern front - the Indians and the Indians were breathing down our neck for 
10 months as you know through 2002 there was a stand off, one million troops facing 
each other but we remained on track. Now, in the current scenario we have certain 
concerns notwithstanding a strong commitment because this commitment is not 
because just the international community wants it or the international geo-political 
scenario is changed but it is also because it is in our own national interest. Pakistan 
itself is a victim of terrorism. What happened in Karachi day before yesterday 
testifies to that. The attempts on President Musharraf's life two in a ten days' time 
during the Christmas period of 2003, testify to that. But he has maintained the 
course, we have maintained the course, the Government is determined to maintain 
the course. However, we have certain concerns and I would like to point out those 
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concerns as Pakistanis and as Muslims and I think it is important that our friends in 
England, in the UK understand those concerns because these are concerns, which are 
widespread and which reflect, I would say, by and large an overwhelming section of 
public opinion in Pakistan. 
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APPENDIX II 
Criteria for Distinguishing Discourses
Source: Parker, I (1992) Discourse Dynamics, Routledge, London
A discourse is realised in texts 
Discourse analysis begins with a text in which discourses can be identified 
A discourse is about objects 
To which object does the discourse refer? In describing those objects, treat the 
discourse if these objects as itself an object 
A discourse contains subject 
A discourse makes available a space for particular types of self to step in; it 
addresses the reader in a particular way 
A discourse is a coherent system of meanings 
People employ culturally available understandings as to what constitutes a coherent 
pattern or topic. The next step is that of mapping out the world or ontology the 
discourse presents or implies 
A discourse relates to other discourses 
In any text, it is likely that more than one discourse can be identified. The two 
discourses may be in a dialogue, set as opposites or muddled together. Attempt to 
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set possible contrasting discourse against each other and look at the way they 
construct different object or the same object in different ways. 
A discourse is historically located 
Discourses are located in time and history. Methodologically, a further step would 
therefore be to look at how and where discourse emerged. 
Discourse support (or are linked to) institutions  
Discourses are seen not as free-floating but as bound up with existing institutional 
structures (e.g. the state, the medical profession, business etc) 
Discourses reproduce power-relations 
Dominant discourse privilege particular versions of social reality and hence certain 
ways of being over others. Analytically, one could suggest which categories of 
person gain and lose from the employment of the discourse, and hence suggest who 
would want to promote and who to resist the use of the discourse. 
Discourses have ideological effects 
Analytically, Parker suggests analysts show how discourses connect with other 
discourses which justify oppression , and also how these discourses facilitate the 
telling by dominant groups of the narratives, which use the past to justify the 
present. 
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